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PRESENCE TO SELF: AN ESSAY ON THE PHENOMENAL ORIGINS OF
INTENTIONALITY
Christopher Frey, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2011
My dissertation is an examination of an oft-invoked but insufficiently understood feature of
perceptual experience, namely, its presentational character. We open our eyes and a world
is before us. Someone strikes a tuning fork, and a sound is simply present. To experience
is always, in part, to appreciate phenomenally something as other or as before one; it is
always, in part, to appreciate phenomenally a manifest opposition between the self—that
before which the other is present—and the other—that which is present before the self. I
call this aspect of experiential phenomenality, this universally appreciable but non-sensuous
sense of otherness in experience, phenomenal presence.
Phenomenal presence is uniquely suited to illuminate the substantive interrelations that
exist between two fundamental features of perceptual experience: intentionality and phe-
nomenality. I argue that (i) the intentional features of experience, understood in isolation
from experiential phenomenality, neither constitute nor explain phenomenal presence, (ii)
phenomenal presence is itself the minimal realization of experiential intentionality, and (iii)
the intentionality embodied in phenomenal presence is constitutively and explanatorily prior
to all other forms of experiential intentionality. I then show how these conclusions can be
brought to bear on the intentional status of our non-phenomenal, mental states.
These discussions guide us toward an account of perceptual experience in which experi-
ential phenomenality is competent to direct us intentionally beyond ourselves, independently
of the contributions made by the understanding or intellect. Modeling the intentionality and
self-awareness involved in perceptual experience upon the intentionality and self-awareness
iv
involved in belief and judgment, or insisting that the former depend on the latter obscures
both the role of and the contribution made by the exercises of our perceptual capacities. This
tendency to assimilate the perceptual and the intellectual realms and to privilege the intellec-
tual leads inevitably to accounts of perceptual experience that either render epiphenomenal
the distinctive contributions of experiential phenomenality or neglect those contributions
altogether.
v
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1.0 AN ARISTOTELIAN COMMENCEMENT
All men by nature desire to know. An indication of this is the delight we take in our senses;
for even apart from their usefulness they are loved for themselves; and above all others the
sense of sight. (Metaph. I.1 980a22–24)
In these lines, the first of his Metaphysics, Aristotle appeals to the delight we take in our
senses, a love directed upon the senses themselves, as the principal evidence that a desire
for knowledge is essential to man. But this delight is not as universal as Aristotle suggests.
The familiar is often mistaken for the mundane and the ubiquity of experience—beginning
in utero and rarely absent thereafter—deadens the sense of wonder that ought to accompany
our perceptual episodes. We do not typically value perception for its own sake but for its
utility. We do not typically direct our inquiries upon perception itself but upon the world
perception reveals.
Though the sentiments to which Aristotle appeals and the reflective orientation that
underlies them fall short of the universality his argument requires, we may forgive his en-
thusiasm. Aristotle is not among the unreflective and the nature and exercises of perceptual
faculties are frequently the target of his inquiries. If we examine these discussions and extract
the account of perception contained therein, we will find at its center the first articulation
of a fundamental insight concerning perception’s significance. And once we understand, as
Aristotle does, the full extent of perception’s role in our lives, we can hardly avoid the wonder
it excites.
In what does perception’s significance consist? According to Aristotle, it is twofold. First,
perception is among the principal means whereby we acquire knowledge about the world in
which we live. Though controversial in his day, that perception occupies this epistemological
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status is now widely acknowledged.1 This epistemological role is indeed important; we must
understand it if we are to provide even the simplest, general account of ourselves and our
relationship to the world. But according to Aristotle, perception’s significance runs deeper:
to be capable of perception is to occupy an exceedingly privileged status among the living.
Though it may initially appear unremarkable, this claim is, in my opinion, among the most
profound of Aristotle’s numerous insights. But what, exactly, does it mean?
Aristotle is not making a statistical observation. Perceptual faculties are more than rare.
For Aristotle, the faculty is transformative. Its possession marks a determinate threshold
for attributions of a distinctive form of animate existence, namely, animal life.2 Consider
an organism that lacks the capacity to perceive. The merely nutritive existence of vegetable
life is exhausted by activities that never reach beyond themselves. Nutritive activities have
a single end: the existence of the very form of life that they epitomize. For an organism to
achieve this end is for it to sustain the exemplification of its particular form of life either
in itself or, assuming a finitude that precludes perpetual exemplification in the self-same
organism, in a numerically distinct organism (by duplicating the form of life as best it can
in that distinct individual).
To possess a perceptual faculty is to advance beyond the reflexivity of a merely nutritive
existence. When an animal exercises its capacity to perceive, it is, in a sense, fulfilling its
perceptual form of life. But this exemplification of form is not the capacity’s primary end.
The end of perception is achieved only insofar as it allows an organism to encounter mean-
ingfully a world that lies beyond itself. Unlike the inanimate or merely nutritive relations
in which an organism stands to the world, the relations that the successful exercises of an
organism’s perceptual capacities effect allow it to appreciate that it is so-related. That is,
perception affords an organism an appreciation, however minimal, that it is a self, a self that
is systematically embedded within and stands in opposition to a populated world.3
1Aristotle supports the claims in our epigraph by invoking perception’s epistemic role: “For not only with
a view to action, but even when we are not going to do anything, we prefer sight to almost everything else.
The reason is that this, most of all the senses, makes us know and brings to light many differences between
things” (Metaph. I.1 980a24–28).
2Aristotle defends this claim in De Anima, book II.
3The terms ‘self’ and ‘world’ are not philosophically innocent; to invoke them, as I do here, may lead
even the most charitable reader to conclude that I am committed to a battery of unpalatable philosophical
positions. Much work needs to be done to make my preferred use clear and to separate it from alternatives.
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Though this Aristotelian dictum dominated philosophical inquiry into perception for cen-
turies, a survey of the state of the art reveals few accounts of perceptual experience that are
even implicitly guided by the outlook it embodies. This estrangement from our Aristotelian
heritage has at least two sources. First, our increasingly sophisticated understanding of the
physical states and events that constitute or enable the animate activities of living organisms
has led many to minimize or eliminate the gap between these activities and the “merely”
physical interactions of inanimate bodies. The possession of a perceptual faculty, on this
view, doesn’t mark a categorial distinction between altogether different kinds of organism.
To be capable of perception is merely to occupy a position on a continuous spectrum of
physical complexity.
The second impetus to amend or abandon this Aristotelian dictum arises when we stop
considering the perceptual faculties of animals in general and begin to focus on the percep-
tual faculties of the comparatively rarefied class of organisms to which we belong, namely,
rational animals. Our rational (cognitive, intellectual, conceptual, etc.) capacities make
available an understanding of our position in the world that surpasses anything that per-
ception would provide independently. Moreover, these rational capacities may be operative,
perhaps necessarily, in most, if not all, of our perceptual achievements. Considerations of
this sort have led many to confer the significance Aristotle attributes to perceptual faculties
upon these rational faculties instead. It is the possession of a rational faculty, according to
this outlook, that allows an organism to encounter meaningfully the world that lies beyond
it. It is our rational capacities that set us apart from mere brutes—animals which are, in
this respect, no different from the myriad nutritive and inanimate entities that surround us.
The discussions and arguments that follow are shaped by two convictions:
(i) If we are to understand perception, we must recognize its transformative and transcen-
dent nature and not rest content with explanations of some emaciated homonym.
(ii) It is the distinctively experiential aspects of our perceptual episodes—not thought, belief,
Consequently, many of the initial characterizations of the views I defend will only be understood completely
once one has finished the expository discussions that follow. For now, let it suffice to note that ‘world’ does
not stand in opposition to ‘environment’ (as in McDowell [1994a] and Gadamer [1960/1997]); nor does the
expression connote objectivity, materiality, or mind-independence. A positive characterization of these terms
occurs in ch. 3.
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judgment, or any other rational contribution or accompaniment to perception—that allow
us to transcend the isolation characteristic of nutritive life.
The defense of these convictions and of the Aristotelian insight that inspires them are among
my principal aims in this essay. Success requires the resolution of a number of difficult
questions: In what way do the relations that the successful exercises of our perceptual
capacities effect differ from the inanimate (or merely nutritive) relations we stand in to
worldly objects? How does perception present a world before its subject? In virtue of what
does perception provide its subject with an opportunity to appreciate that it is a self? And
in virtue of what does perception provide such a self with an opportunity to appreciate that
it stands within and in opposition to the world perception reveals? Upon taking up this
pursuit one quickly finds that even modest advances in understanding are rare. This essay
records my attempt to achieve such a modicum of progress.
4
2.0 INTENTIONALITY AND PHENOMENALITY
Perception possesses many remarkable features, but two in particular stand out. First, per-
ception is the principal means whereby we establish communion with the world we occupy.
Perceptual experience is directed upon the world and its function is to make that world
accessible to us. It brings our world into view and, in so doing, makes its denizens avail-
able as objects of attention, recognition, thought, and action. Let us call this first feature
intentionality and its perceptual exemplification experiential intentionality.
Second, these perceptual engagements, in contrast to the vast majority of the physical
and intellectual relations in which we stand to the world, manifest themselves phenomenally.1
The most salient of the phenomenally appreciable elements in experience, what we will call
sensuous qualities, are typically introduced by way of example, say, the way the redness of a
Red Delicious apple looks when one sees it, the way middle C sounds when one hears it being
played on a Bo¨sendorfer piano, and the way a pain feels when one experiences a pin pierce
one’s finger. Let us call this second feature phenomenality and its perceptual exemplification
experiential phenomenality.2
1In picking out this feature, one’s manner of expression will always appear to beg important questions. I
intend at this point to be absolutely noncommittal about the nature of and relationships between experiences,
subjects of experience, and that which is appreciable in an experience for a subject. I introduce the core notion
in our preferred account of experiential phenomenality—being phenomenally appreciable in an experience
for a subject—in § 2.2.
2There is a narrow and a broad use of the term ‘experience’. Conceived narrowly, experiences are states
that possess a proprietary phenomenality, e.g. conscious perceivings, bodily sensations, episodes of perceptual
imagination, etc. Conceived broadly, experiences include, in addition, occurrent propositional attitudes that
presumably lack phenomenality, e.g. thoughts, volitions, judgments, etc. I embrace the narrow use. Also,
though experiences, narrowly conceived, are usually taken to comprise both perceptual and non-perceptual
states, I use the terms ‘experience’ and ‘perceptual experience’ interchangeably, unless a particular context
demands otherwise. This use foreshadows an important thesis that I will defend: all experiences—not
just perceptual experiences but bodily sensations and other so-called “raw feels”—possess intentionality (cf.
§§ 2.3.2.3 and 5.2). This explains, in part, the present choice to speak of experiential intentionality and
phenomenality rather than perceptual intentionality and phenomenality.
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Intentionality and phenomenality pervade our mental lives and their signal importance to
the philosophical enterprise of understanding the mental as such is widely recognized. In fact,
philosophical investigations into the mind almost always take one or both of these features
to be constitutive of mentality. Unfortunately, the importance of attaining an understanding
of these two features is matched by the degree of difficulty that accompanies our attempts to
do so. Despite the centuries of attention that their elevated status has fostered, satisfactory
accounts remain elusive.
Though there are many reasons for this failure, one in particular stands out: at present,
we do not know what a satisfactory account of either intentionality or phenomenality would
even look like. For we do not understand whether or how intentionality and phenomenality
are related to one another and without a clear, though possibly revisable, conception of the
substantive relationships that obtain between these features, we are not in a position to
recognize a successful explanation of either feature for what it is.
My principal concern in this essay is to fill this lacuna. That is, I wish to defend several
theses about the substantive interrelations that exist between intentionality and phenome-
nality and to draw attention to the consequences these theses have for the achievement of
a satisfactory account of either notion. The investigation is governed by two guiding ques-
tions. First, I wish to understand the relationship between experiential intentionality and
experiential phenomenality. Are these features mutually independent and separable despite
their frequent, and perhaps universal, co-occurrence in experience? If not, in what ways
(and in which directions) does one feature depend on, constitute, or determine the other?
Second, I wish to understand the relationship between experiential phenomenality and the
intentionality of our paradigmatically non-phenomenal states. Can states that presumably
lack phenomenality altogether, say, occurrent, non-perceptual judgments or sub-conscious
beliefs, nevertheless possess intentionality? If so, do these intentional features stand in any
important relations to states that have experiential phenomenality?
Perceptual experience is uniquely suited to serve as the starting point of our investiga-
tion. Intentionality and phenomenality are perceptual experience’s most important features
and it is natural to think that the pair are somehow intimately connected. On the one hand,
a satisfactory account of experiential phenomenality appears to involve the notion of expe-
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riential intentionality. When a subject describes that which is phenomenally appreciable for
her in an experience, she will almost always employ concepts that are intentionally directed
upon worldly entities. These concepts are, prima facie, the very same as those employed in
descriptions of the world that do not concern directly our experiences or their phenomenal
features.3 On the other hand, a satisfactory account of experiential intentionality appears
to involve the notion of experiential phenomenality. An experience affords its subject an op-
portunity to avail herself of the worldly entities upon which it is intentionally directed and it
is reasonable to think that this availability depends upon what is phenomenally appreciable
for her in the experience. Prima facie, it is at least partly in virtue of what is phenomenally
appreciable for a subject in an experience that an entity is made available as, say, the object
of one of her perceptually-based demonstrative judgments.
These considerations support the idea that intentionality and phenomenality are con-
nected, but they hardly determine a clear or exhaustive account of this relationship and fail
to guarantee the existence of an essential interface at all. But despite the leeway available to
theorists interested in these matters, a near consensus has emerged over the broad shape that
a successful account will take. Though the theories of perception that present-day philoso-
phers of mind advance are marked by significant differences, we can discern three claims that
garner widespread support and these commitments, despite the opposition of a small and
vocal minority4, reflect the prevailing attitude toward the first of our guiding questions.
Methodological Separatism: If inquiry into the phenomenality of experience is to occur
at all, one can (and ought to) adopt a separatist methodology—one’s philosophical labor
will comprise two projects with experiential phenomenality and experiential intentional-
ity as their respective foci.
Intentional Independence: An experience’s intentionality neither depends essentially up-
on nor is explanatorily derived from its phenomenality (assuming the features are nu-
merically distinct).5
3Gendler and Hawthorne call this claim ‘The Harmony Thesis’ (Gendler and Hawthorne [2006] 8; cf.
Campbell [1993], Jackson [1996], and Coates [2007] ch. 8).
4Notable challenges to one or more of these commitments include McGinn [1988], Searle [1990], Strawson
[1994], Siewert [1998], Horgan and Tienson [2002], Loar [2003a], and Chalmers [2004].
5This commitment is often found in connection with another.
Intentional Unity: The intentionality of experience and the intentionality of states without phenomenality
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Intentional Priority: If there is any connection between the phenomenality and intention-
ality of experience, it will be a relation of dependence, e.g. supervenience, of the former
on the latter. If the phenomenal features of experience are identical to (a subset of) its
intentional features, their status as intentional is somehow fundamental.
The affirmation of one or more of these claims encourages, if not entails outright, the attri-
bution of a secondary significance to experiential phenomenality.
The position that emerges from the discussions and arguments of this essay runs counter
to each of these widely held commitments. Though I defend several theses, they are united
by a common theme: experiential intentionality is constitutively and explanatorily posterior
to experiential phenomenality. An experience’s intentional features neither explain nor de-
termine exhaustively its phenomenal features. In fact, there is a distinctive, autonomous,
and original source of intentionality to be found within the phenomenality of even the sim-
plest of our experiences. This irreducibly phenomenal aspect of experience, what I will call
phenomenal presence, is itself the minimal realization of experiential intentionality. More-
over, it must be appreciable in an experience for it to possess experiential intentionality in
any form.
This reorientation of the prevailing attitude toward perception’s most important features
has far reaching consequences. In particular, it will allow us to see a path to a surprising
conclusion to the second of our guiding questions, namely, that the ability to understand
the intentionality of one’s paradigmatically non-phenomenal states requires a prior appreci-
ation of phenomenal presence. A finite being that lacks (or never exercises) a capacity for
phenomenal appreciation cannot possess the conceptual resources needed to understand her
intentional states as such.
Our headspring will be an examination of an oft-invoked but insufficiently understood
feature of perceptual experience, namely, its presentational character. We open our eyes and
is common in kind.
If experiential intentionality is simply a variety of intentionality and a state can possess intentionality without
possessing phenomenality, then phenomenality cannot be necessary for intentionality. A state’s phenomenal-
ity may, according to such a view, play some role in determining what the state is intentionally directed upon
and may indicate the manner in which this directedness occurs, but it cannot be essential to the state’s being
intentionally directed. So proponents of both Intentional Independence and Intentional Unity can subject
the exhaustive specification of an experience’s intentional features to various conditions of phenomenological
adequacy without undermining these commitments.
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a world is before us. Someone strikes a tuning fork, and a sound is simply present. In all
sensory modalities, the objects of perceptual experience are there, present to us, in a way
that the objects of most beliefs and judgments are not. In perception it is as if the world
itself is revealed, its occupants disclosing their sensible natures to our consciousness.
As the following quotes attest, appeals to the presentational character of experience have
been made by philosophers that champion wildly different accounts of perceptual experience.
(i) [T]o say that S has acquaintance with O is essentially the same thing as to say that
O is presented to S. (Russell [1910] 108)
(ii) [T]hat this whole field of colour is presented to my consciousness [. . . ] cannot possibly
be doubted. [. . . ] This peculiar and ultimate manner of being present to consciousness
is called being given, and that which is thus present is called a datum. (Price [1932]
3)
(iii) In its purely phenomenological aspect seeing is [. . . ] ostensibly prehensive of the
surfaces of distant bodies as coloured and extended. [. . . ] It is a natural, if paradoxical,
way of speaking to say that seeing seems to “bring one into direct contact with remote
objects” and to reveal their shapes and colours. (Broad [1952] 32–3)
(iv) Mature sensible experience (in general) presents itself as [. . . ] an immediate conscious-
ness of the existence of things outside us. (Strawson [1979] 97)
(v) [Perceptual] experience has a kind of directness, immediacy and involuntariness which
is not shared by a belief which I might have about the object in its absence. It seems
therefore unnatural to describe visual experiences as representations [. . . ] because of
the special features of perceptual experiences I propose to call them “presentations”.
(Searle [1983] 46)
(vi) [The kind of content possessed by a conscious perceptual experience] seems essentially
conscious, shot through with subjectivity. This is because of the janus-faced character
of conscious content: it involves presence to the subject, and hence a subjective point
of view. (McGinn [1988] 300)
(vii) By an ‘object of experience’ we shall mean something present in experience. [. . . P]res-
ence (in experience) connotes a kind of direct or immediate availability. An object
which is present is right there, available to us. (Valberg [1992] 4)
(viii) Consider a basic (demonstratively expressible) singular empirical judgement: say, a
judgement one might express, in a suitable perceptual situation, by saying “That cat
is asleep”. The content of such a judgement depends on the perceived presence of
the cat itself. [. . . S]uch thought does not need to be “carried to” its object by a
hypothesis, because the object is directly there for the thinker. (McDowell [1994b]
343)6
The presentational character of experience is rarely interpreted univocally. It is a premise
in arguments for just about every account of perceptual experience of any consequence. It
6The appeal to the presentational character of experience persists into the twenty-first century. See, for
example, Dainton [2000] 18, Sturgeon [2000] 9, Smith [2002] 69, Martin [2002b], McCulloch [2002], Maund
[2003] 177, Loar [2003a] 82, Alston [2005] 255, Crane [Spring 2005], Chalmers [2006] 65ff., Johnston [2007]
233, Burge [2007b] 403–14, Pautz [2007], and McDowell [2008] 8.
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is used to support both the existence of mind-dependent objects immanent to consciousness
and the existence of the objective, mind-independent objects of “na¨ıve” common sense.
It is employed equally in epistemological, metaphysical, phenomenological, and semantical
contexts. And attempts to elucidate the phenomenon all too often rely on metaphors—
immediacy, directness, givenness, contact, intimacy, openness, being en rapport—that are
no less obscure.
Despite this confusion, I contend that it is only by unpacking the metaphors that sur-
round experience’s presentational character and appraising the phenomenon’s alleged conse-
quences that we will come to understand the interface between the intentionality and phe-
nomenality of perceptual experience. But before we begin our pursuit in earnest, we must
state our guiding questions more precisely and motivate our preferred approach. To this end,
I elaborate upon our brief, introductory characterizations of experiential intentionality and
phenomenality (in §’s 2.1 and 2.2 respectively) and employ the distinctions discussed therein
to state more clearly our principal theses (§ 2.3.1). I then develop and motivate these claims
by situating them within four prominent philosophical movements (§ 2.3.2). I conclude this
chapter with an outline of the essay’s argumentative structure (§ 2.3.3).
2.1 INTENTIONALITY AND REPRESENTATION
2.1.1 Three Conceptions of Intentionality
Attempts to introduce the notion of intentionality typically (and problematically) conflate
three ideas. The first conception of intentionality, which I consider paramount, is this:
(Int 1) Intentionality is that aspect of a state or event that consists in its being of, about,
or directed upon an entity (object, property, relation, etc.) other than itself (or upon
itself qua other).7
7This conception mirrors the term’s etymology: ‘intentionality’ derives from the Latin ‘intentio’, which
in turn derives from the verb ‘intendere’—being stretched toward something. I use the prepositions ‘upon’,
‘at’, and ‘toward’ interchangeably when describing the directedness of intentional states. Though I use the
disjunctive phrase ‘state or event’, the difference will matter little for our purposes and I will often refer only
to states. Relatedly, I use ‘entity’ in a metaphysically neutral way to refer to any disjunction of object, stuff,
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The rider ‘or upon itself qua other’ is significant. According to this conception, it is the
nature of intentionality to be directed beyond itself, beyond the individual (or a state thereof)
that possess it. Intentional states that are, as a matter of fact, directed upon themselves
are possible. But when such cases occur, the identity that obtains between that which is
intentionally directed and that upon which it is intentionally directed is entirely accidental;
this self-directedness is essentially other-directedness that merely happens to be directed
upon itself.8
The two alternatives to this conception can be grouped together since they both place
conditions of semantic evaluability, broadly construed, on intentional states.
(Int 2) Intentionality is that aspect of a state or event that consists in its having conditions
of correctness/satisfaction.
(Int 3) Intentionality is that aspect of a state or event that consists in its having one or
more representational contents.9
These conditions of semantic evaluability are meant to elucidate our first conception. For
our intentional states are not directed upon entities simpliciter. They are always directed
upon entities as exemplars of some general property, relation, kind, or category. (Int 2) is
one way to capture this. According to this conception, a state is intentional if and only
if it makes a claim about the world. In so doing, the state is assessable for correctness or
incorrectness. If a perceptual experience makes a propositional claim, there are ways the
state, event, property, relation, etc. (context will usually make it clear which categories are relevant), with
no restrictions on the natures of the referents—Meinongian objects, sense-data, abstracta, physical objects
within our objective environment, etc. all count as entities.
8(i) It is even possible, as Brentano held, that all intentional states are, in addition to being directed
beyond themselves, self-directed (cf. Brentano [1874/1973] and the articles in Kriegel and Williford [2006]).
But this possibility does not undermine the rider. The identity that would obtain between the subject
and object of intentional directedness, even if it holds of necessity, would be, with respect to the nature of
intentional directedness, a universal accident. (ii) Aristotle employs this same rider when he discusses what
takes place when a doctor exercises her ability to heal upon herself. That doctor and patient are identical on
such occasions is, with respect to the art of healing, an accident (it is an identity kata sumbe¯bekos). The art
comprises capacities that are, by definition, “source[s] of change or motion in another thing or in the same
thing qua other” (Metaph. V.12 1019a15ff.).
9(Int2) and (Int3) are often associated with conceptions of intentionality that focus on state ascriptions
rather than states themselves. On these conceptions a state is intentional if and only if its ascription is
susceptible to failures of (i) existential generalization and (ii) truth-preserving substitutions of extensionally
equivalent expressions. The locus classicus for this linguistic approach is Chisholm [1957] ch. 12. Though
the association of these sorts of expression with a state is often a good indication that the state possesses
intentionality, such ascriptions are neither necessary nor sufficient for intentionality.
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world can be that render the experience true; if it makes a non-propositional claim, there
are ways the world can be that render the experience veridical.10 So, for example, one’s
visual experience of an object O as having a specific color shade C at a relative location L
is associated with the following condition of satisfaction: the experience is satisfied, i.e. is
veridical, if and only if O has C at L. An intentional state can be directed upon an entity
on occasions in which its condition is not satisfied and, on most versions of (Int 2), it can
do so even if this failure is the result of the entity not existing.
(Int 3) attributes representational or informational content(s) to intentional states. If
intentional states contrast in respect of their satisfaction, they differ in representational
content and if one specifies the representational content of a state, one thereby determines
the conditions that must be met if it is to be satisfied. But a state’s representational
content can have a principle of type-individuation that is more fine-grained than that of
its satisfaction condition. This allows (Int 3) to capture a further feature of intentional
directedness. Our intentional states not only direct themselves toward entities as exemplars
of some general property, relation, kind or category, but do so from a particular perspective
or under a particular aspect.11
States with experiential intentionality are no exception. First, our experiences occur in
distinct sensory modalities. A single property, say, sphericity, can be experienced either visu-
ally or tactilely. Second, and more important, our perceptual capacities are always exercised
from a particular point of view and provide, at best, a partial and incomplete perspective on
10I consider truth to be a subspecies of veridicality that applies only to propositionally structured entities.
When a state’s propositional status is unimportant, I use the more general term.
11Searle introduces the expression ‘aspectual shape’ to refer to this feature of intentionality at Searle [1992]
155ff. Frege made the requirement of aspectual shape vivid with respect to our intentional thoughts and
their canonical expressions. One’s thoughts can be directed upon a particular entity, say, Venus, under the
aspect or mode of presentation (Art des Gegebensein) of being the first heavenly body seen in the evening
or under the aspect or mode of presentation of being the last heavenly body seen in the morning. Frege
identifies the representational content of a thought with the Sinn of the sentence used to express it and
these Sinne embody the modes of presentation under which the thought’s objects (Bedeutungen) occur.
Frege’s invocation of Sinn reflects his view that the requirements rationality places upon thinking subjects
are central to the very idea of thought possessing cognitive value (Erkenntniswert). One can simultaneously
accept and deny (or withhold acceptance from) thoughts that possess identical conditions of satisfaction
without being irrational. So to think about an object as being some way under different aspects is to
think different thoughts, to have thoughts with distinct cognitive values, even if the thoughts have the same
veridicality conditions. Note, however, that the role aspectual shape plays in perception may not be the
same role that Fregean Sinn plays in thought. For many conceive perceptual experience, in contrast to the
perceptual beliefs and judgments it occasions, to stand outside the normative requirements of rationality.
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that which we perceive. The perspectival nature of experiential intentionality involves more
than there being properties of perceived entities that are not themselves perceived, e.g. a
visual experience of an opaque object doesn’t reveal its every side but only its facing surface.
It also involves there being a perspective on the objects, properties, and relations we do
perceive. A single perceived shape can appear differently as we move in relation to it. And
the appearance of a single perceived color will vary if subjected to differential illumination or
if surrounded by objects with contrasting colors. The contextual parameters that contribute
to the perspectival, aspectual shape of perceptual experience are legion. A capacity that
yields states that are directed upon entities without being directed upon them as being some
general way under some particular aspect is traditionally called intellectual intuition. Such
a capacity cannot be found this side of Heaven.12
Representational contents can be typed in a manner that reflects the perspectival nature
of perceptual experience. This is easily done if one attributes Fregean contents to expe-
riences. Fregean contents are structured complexes of modes of presentation of objects,
properties, and relations. But one can also capture experience’s aspectual shape by invoking
Russellian contents—structured complexes of objects (or existential quantifiers), properties,
and relations—that comprise appearance properties, i.e. finely-individuated properties that
reflect a subject’s perspective, rather than (or in addition to) properties simpliciter.13
There are, however, at least two respects in which the broadly semantical conception
of intentionality that the union of (Int 2) and (Int 3) conveys does more harm than good.
First, satisfaction conditions and representational contents are not the only way to capture
the generality and aspectual shape of intentional directedness. The semantical conception
excludes alternative accounts of experiential intentionality, many of which belong to ven-
erable traditions, by definition. Second, the semantical conception improperly demarcates
intentionality’s domain. I will discuss these problems in turn and offer a more robust version
of (Int 1) that will serve us in the remainder.
12Kant provides a representative discussion of intellectual intuition in his Lectures on the Philosophical
Doctrine of Religion, 28:1051 (Kant [1817/1996] 389). Acts of intellectual intuition are also commonly taken
to create or posit the entities upon which they are directed; this feature merely serves to distance it further
from intentionality.
13On the notion of appearance properties, see Broad [1923] ch. 8 or, more recently, Shoemaker [1994a] and
Egan [2006].
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2.1.2 Intentional Objects, Contents, and Relations
According to the semantical conception of intentionality, perceptual success consists in the
satisfaction of conditions determined by the experiential state’s representational content(s).
But the having of such content on an occasion does not depend on the way the world is at
that time. For a state to possess a particular type of content may require a background of
systematic causal interaction or veridical representation between the organism (or its relevant
representational system) and certain aspects of the organism’s environment. But whether an
experiential state has a particular type of representational content on an occasion does not
require that the world actually be the way the content represents it to be at that time. On
this conception, failures of veridicality do not affect an experience’s intentional features.14
An alternative conception of intentionality emerges when we reflect on perception’s func-
tion. Some contend that perceptual success does not consist in the satisfaction of states
already in possession of their intentional features. Instead, perceptual success consists in the
establishment of a state’s intentional features on an occasion. That is, particular experien-
tial episodes establish connections with entities and, in so doing, make them available to the
perceiver as objects for attention, recognition, thought (especially singular, demonstratively
expressible judgments), and purposive action. On this conception, perceptual success does
not presuppose experiential intentionality; perceptual success consists in its establishment.
This outlook is often referred to as the relational view of experience.15 It embodies
a genuine alternative to the semantical conception of experiential intentionality. On the
relational view, experiential intentionality is described, as in (Int 1), as a directedness upon
14Insisting that the representational content of perceptual experience contains object-dependent
elements—object-dependent, singular, demonstrative senses (McDowell [1984]) or instantiation-dependent,
predicational, demonstrative senses (Brewer [1999])—is not sufficient to eliminate the independence of a par-
ticular experience’s content from the current state of the world. But such matters are delicate and turn on
what is meant by ‘dependence’, on whether there is a fundamental difference between the object-dependent
contents of experiences and those of non-phenomenal representational states, and on how the principle for
individuating experiential contents relates to the principle for individuating experiential kinds or natures (cf.
Burge [1991], Soteriou [2000], and Martin [2002a]).
15Notable contemporary advocations of this view can be found in Alston [1999], Brewer [2006], Campbell
[2002a], Campbell [2002b], Fish [2009], Johnston [2004], Johnston [2006], Martin [1998], Martin [2002b],
McDowell [2008], Travis [2004], and Travis [2006]. Thomas Reid, at least in his early work, is a prominent
defender of the view (Reid [1764/1863]). He calls the relevant relation ‘simple apprehension’ or ‘simple
conception’. The relational view is a species of the act-object account of perception and is related to what
is often called na¨ıve realism.
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entities. But this directedness is not semantically evaluable and is not determined by the
experiential state’s representational features. The state’s intentional directedness consists
rather in the obtaining of a simple, non-representational relation between the state (or the
individual whose state it is) and one or more entities. The relata upon which the state is
directed partly constitute this intentional relation. The following quotes provide succinct
expressions of this view.
(i) [P]erceiving an object is an essentially relational state, of which the object perceived
is a constituent; so the perception is constitutively dependent on the object perceived.
(Crane [2006] 140)
(ii) Sensory awareness discloses the truthmakers [i.e. an object, obtaining state, or event
whose existence guarantees the truth of a judgment] of our immediate perceptual
judgments. Those truthmakers are external spatio-temporal particulars, which sen-
sory awareness makes available for immediate demonstration. (Johnston [2006] 282)
(iii) [We must] acknowledge that experience is not exhausted by its propositional content—
we have to do this to acknowledge that experience is what explains our grasp of
propositional content—and to maintain that experience of an object is not merely an
effect produced by the object. Rather, experience of the object involves the mind-
independent thing itself as a constituent. (Campbell [2002a] 140)
The relata upon which our experientially intentional states are directed occur as exemplars
or instances of various general features and the intentional relation obtains from a particular
point of view. But standing in such an intentional relation to an entity is no more evaluable
for correctness or veridicality than is standing in the relation kicking to a soccer ball.16
There may be adequate grounds to reject relational accounts of experiential intention-
ality. It may turn out that the possession of representational features is necessary for the
possession of intentionality. But this necessity is not conceptual and alternative views ought
not be eliminated by stipulation through our definition of ‘intentionality’. Some continue to
use ‘intentional’ and ‘representational’ synonymously and characterize the debate as being
between relational and intentional accounts of experience.17 But the relational view is itself
an account of what it is for an experiential state to be directed upon an entity; the debate
16This is so even if one can only stand in an intentional relation to an entity by drawing on capacities that
are operative principally in one’s discursive, conceptual activities.
17Cf. Crane [2006]. Some prefer to maintain the synonymy because representational states, unlike inten-
tional relations, can be directed upon entities that do not exist. One’s capacity to enter into intentional
relations is fallible, but one cannot stand in an intentional relation to a non-existent object. Though the
permissibility of directedness upon non-existent objects is a common feature of representational states, I do
not think that it is definitive of intentionality.
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is between relational and representational accounts of experiential intentionality.18
We have isolated two distinct phenomena that may be central to intentional directed-
ness. First, directedness upon an entity can be seen as the establishment of certain non-
representational relations. Second, directedness upon an entity can be seen as the possession
of representational content.19 The common commitment of the relational and representa-
tional accounts of experiential intentionality is captured in a slight elaboration of our initial
conception.
(Int 1*) Intentionality is that aspect of a state or event that consists in its being of, about,
or directed upon an entity other than itself (or upon itself qua other) as an exemplar or in-
stance of some general property, relation, kind, or category from a particular perspective
or under a particular aspect.
This conception of intentional directedness is distinct from and conceptually prior to both
the relational and the representational accounts. These accounts simply provide different
analyses of this feature.
2.1.3 Intentionality’s Domain
Unfortunately, this updated formulation will not do. For as we descend the scala naturae
or retreat into the physiological and psychological workings of our perceptual systems we
encounter states and events that are, in some sense, of, about, or directed upon an entity in
this manner but, nevertheless, do not possess intentionality. To demarcate intentionality’s
domain properly we must defend two claims: (i) Neither dispositional states nor capacities
18This pair does not exhaust the possible accounts of experiential intentionality. For example, on one
interpretation, Aristotle conceives experiential intentionality to consist in becoming, in one manner of being,
the entity one experiences: “That which can perceive is, as we have said, potentially such as the object of
perception already is actually. It is not like the object, then, when it is being affected by it, but once it has
been affected it becomes like it and is such as it is” (De Anima II.5 418a3–7).
19On many representational accounts of intentionality, if one is in a representational state, then one stands
in a certain relation to a proposition (or a suitable non-propositional structure). Even if these propositions
are Russellian, the relation to a proposition or to the entities within it must be distinguished from the
relation to entities invoked by relational accounts of intentionality. Also, one can say that the satisfaction of
a contentful state’s correctness condition places one in a relation to the entities the state represents. But the
relatedness to entities that veridical representation affords, unlike its counterpart in the relational account,
is not constitutive of the state’s being intentionally directed (even if the content comprises object-dependent
elements, cf. fn. 14).
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can possess original intentionality, and (ii) The possession of representational content is not
sufficient for the possession of intentionality. I will elucidate these claims in turn, but the
discussions are brief and will not dispel all elements of stipulation. This status, however, is
temporary; one of my major aims in this essay is, as Sellars once said, to put this verbal
currency on the gold standard.
2.1.3.1 Dispositional States and Intentionality All objects, animate and inanimate
alike, relate to each other in myriad ways. To understand most of these relational states or
events, for example, standing in spatial relations or undergoing simple causal interactions,
one need not invoke any notion of directedness upon an entity. I currently stand in the
spatial relation is east of to Los Angeles but am not thereby in a state that is of, about, or
directed upon that city. Nor is a cue ball in a state that is of, about, or directed upon an
eight ball, or vice versa, when the two strike.
But many states can only be understood completely if one recognizes that they are the
manifestations of an object’s stable disposition to be in such a state or are the results of
the proper exercise of a capacity with a particular end or goal. To attribute a capacity
or disposition to an object is to carve out a class of (possible) states or events in a way
that makes it sensible to claim that the object is directed upon members of the privileged
class. For example, the event of a glass breaking can only be understood if we recognize
that the event is the manifestation of the glass’s fragility, and for a glass to possess fragility
is for it to be in a state that is directed upon events in which it breaks. Furthermore, if
this privileged class comprises relational states, and if the class of (possible) relata is itself
suitably delimited, then it is also sensible to claim that the object is directed upon these
relata (or upon a particular relatum when the disposition manifests). For example, a metal
ball disposed to attract metallic objects magnetically (when a particular set of conditions is
realized) is, in virtue of possessing such a disposition, in a state that is directed upon, among
other things, metal bars. On a liberal but natural construal, this dispositional directedness
satisfies our current characterization of intentionality: the disposition is directed upon bars
as metallic (and not, say, as rectangular prisms or as having a particular mass) and is directed
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upon them magnetically (and not, say, gravitationally or electrically).20
Whatever the merits of speaking this way, this sort of dispositional directedness ought not
be confused with intentional directedness. First, occurrent, categorical states can possesses
original (intentional) directedness.21 If we prescind from its dispositional origin, the magnetic
relation that obtains in our example differs little from the simple, non-dispositional, causal
relations of which we deemed attributions of directedness inappropriate. Any directedness
that belongs to the categorical state the ball is in when it is attracting the bar will be
parasitic on the ball’s dispositional directedness toward metallic objects in general.
Second, and more important, only occurrent, categorical states can possess original in-
tentionality. Consider a disposition that manifests states that possess intentionality. For
example, let’s assume that to have a standing belief is to be disposed to accept a particular
proposition on appropriate occasions. A manifestation of this disposition will be a categorical
state that is intentionally directed upon the entities represented by its associated proposi-
tion and this directedness will be original to that occurrent state. We may be inclined,
in such cases, to attribute intentionality to the dispositional state itself. For differences in
the type of entities upon which a disposition’s manifestations are intentionally directed and
differences in the manner in which such directedness occurs mark or (partly) type-identify
the disposition. But any intentionality we attribute to the dispositional state will be, at
best, proleptically parasitic on the intentional directedness of its (perhaps merely possible)
categorical manifestations.22
So intentional directedness, including that of experiential intentionality, is principally and
primarily a feature of occurrent, categorical states or events. Though we come to perceive the
world through the exercises of our perceptual capacities, the directedness of our perceptual
20The example is taken from Nes [2008]. Nes employs the example to undermine the restriction of in-
tentionality (conceived, more or less, as in (Int 1*)) to mental phenomena. Similar arguments are found in
Martin and Pfeifer [1986], Place [1996], Mumford [1999], and Molnar [2003]. Mentality will not be central
to our proscription of dispositions from intentionality’s domain.
21Philosophers typically employ the narrower distinction between original and derived intentionality
[species] rather than that between original and derived directedness [genus]. Early discussions of the distinc-
tion can be found in Grice [1957], Haugeland [1981], and Searle [1983]. For opposition to the distinction, see
Dennett [1987].
22I say ‘at best’ because this intentionality will not be like that which we standardly attribute to paradig-
matic possessors of derived intentionality, e.g. sentences, maps, street signs, etc. For in each of these familiar
examples the derived intentionality belongs to a categorical state. See Strawson [2005] and Strawson [2008]
for an expression of similar reservations.
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experiences is to be distinguished from the directedness that belongs to these capacities.
2.1.3.2 Representational Content and Individual Organisms Explanations within
empirical psychology often focus on the systems by means of which individuals come to be in
intentionally directed states. Many of these systems involve the formation, transformation,
and employment of states that possess representational contents that satisfy our current
characterization of intentionality. Are these states or the systems to which they belong
intentionally directed upon entities? If relational accounts of intentionality are viable, then
a state’s possession of representational content is not necessary for it to possess intentionality.
But regardless of whether this is so, a state’s possession of representational content is not
sufficient for it to possess intentionality.
Some states have an environmental significance but do not qualify as intentional because
they fail to meet the conditions on intentionality already in place. Information can be
registered whenever there is a reliable, causal covariation between two types of state or event.
For example, the width of a tree ring registers information about the amount of rainfall that
occurred in the tree’s environment during the year the ring came to be. Many organisms
possess systems that acquire, transform, and employ such registrations. Heliotropic plants,
for example, possess systems in which information about the light of the sun is registered
and used to modify cell growth within the stem so that the plant’s photosynthetic surfaces
track the light’s westerly movement. And some fish possess systems in which information
about environmental oxygen levels is registered and used to calibrate the volume of gas
contained in various bladders so that the fish’s depth is altered appropriately. But the states
involved in these systems are mere registrations of causally-covariant, proximal stimulation.
They do not represent the distal entities that cause the arrays of proximal stimulation to
which the system’s receptors are sensitive as being of a particular type and cannot determine
distal entities under different conditions. To register information is not to be directed upon
an entity as being some way from a particular perspective; informational significance is
insufficient for intentionality.23
23Registrations of information fail to meet the semantic criteria for intentionality as well. The informational
states within the oxygen-detecting system of a fish or the states of a retinal surface upon which light is incident
are, with respect to questions of veridicality or correctness, like the state of a billiard ball that has been
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But there are states within perceptual systems that pass all requirements for attribu-
tions of representational contents. For example, the visual perceptual system of a honeybee
processes its initial registrations of proximal, visual stimulation, viz. dynamic arrays of light
frequencies, along with other afferent/efferent inputs, to yield states that represent perspec-
tivally determinate, objective, environmental entities, e.g. egocentric and allocentric angles,
distances, compass directions, and landmarks.24 The outputs of the system (and many of
its intermediary states) are not mere registrations of information. First, these states exhibit
perceptual, representational constancies. The formation of these states within the perceptual
system operate under certain fixed, general principles for filtering out the effects of significant
variations in proximal stimulation. The resultant states represent a constant distal cause of
the variable proximal stimulation and represent it as being a particular type.25 Second, these
states have correctness conditions; we can evaluate them for how accurately they correspond
to the objects, properties, and relations they represent.
Nevertheless, many of these genuinely representational states do not possess intentional-
ity. Though it is convenient to attribute intentionality to an organism’s states and events, a
convenience that I have already taken advantage of, the feature’s proper bearer is individual
organisms. It is individual organisms inhabiting and coping with their environment that
perceive, believe, judge, desire, reason, and know. To attribute an intentional state to an
individual is to communicate indirectly that the individual is intentionally directed upon an
entity. So if a system involved in an organism’s perceptual experience is entirely modular in
its output, that is, if the states it yields are neither attributable to the whole organism nor
available to guide activity or other responses by the whole organism, then these states do
not possess intentionality regardless of whether we can attribute a representational content
to them. I will, however, continue to speak about states and will express this condition by
saying that an intentional state must be a state for its subject.26
struck. Questions of veridicality or correctness cannot be raised intelligibly for states that merely register
information. For them to “get things wrong” is not a representational failure but a practical or teleological
failure with respect to the ends of the system to which they belong.
24See Gallistel [1998] and Burge [2010] for discussion of this and other examples.
25Burge [2005] 9–21, contains an excellent discussion of the role perceptual constancies play in psychological
explanations of perceptual systems. See also the articles in Walsh and Kulikowski [1998].
26Ruth Millikan, among others, argues that an intentional state “must be one that functions as a sign or
representation for the system itself ” (Millikan [1989] 284). But Millikan’s account of ‘being for’ encompasses
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This condition will not proscribe all of the representational states that are involved with
our perceptual systems from intentionality’s domain, but it will eliminate many of them.
What criteria must a state meet in order for it to be for its subject? A more thorough
discussion must wait (see chapter 5), but a few clarifications can be made presently without
leading us afield. First, though some of the states within the perceptual system’s purview
are states that are for their subject and possess intentionality, it would be misleading to
say that there are “sub-personal” (or, more properly, “sub-organismal”) states that possess
intentionality. All attributions of intentionality are attributions at the level of whole indi-
vidual organisms, but some of the states invoked in explanations of our perceptual system’s
operation are attributed principally to the organism. Second, though it is typically conscious
states that are for their subject, a particular state need not be conscious, be capable of be-
coming conscious, or be available to an individual’s conscious (cognitive) agency to possess
intentionality.27
2.1.4 Intentionality Defined
Our discussion has left us with the following conception of intentionality.
(Int 1**) Intentionality is that aspect of an occurrent, categorical state or event that con-
sists in
(i) its being of, about, or directed upon an entity other than itself (or upon itself qua
other)
(ii) as an exemplar of some general property, relation, kind, or category
(iii) from a particular perspective or under a particular aspect
(iv) to or for its subject.
Let me repeat, given its importance to the arguments to come, that intentionality thus con-
ceived is to be distinguished from representationality. To analyze experiential intentionality
in terms of veridicality-evaluable, representational contents is merely to embrace one among
dispositional, sub-personal phenomena and should thereby be distinguished from our notion of ‘being for a
subject’.
27The appeal to the capacity to become conscious finds expression in Searle’s connection principle (Searle
[1990]). The appeal to availability attempts to identify being for a subject with being access conscious (Block
[1995]).
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the several alternatives left open by our characterization. I turn now to the second of our
elucidatory discussions.
2.2 PHENOMENOLOGY AND PHENOMENALITY
The core notion in our preferred account of phenomenality is that of something being phe-
nomenally appreciable in an experience for a subject. To perceive visually a stop sign under
optimal perceptual conditions is, inter alia, to appreciate phenomenally a quality, namely, a
determinate shade of redness. To perceive visually the same stop sign under artificial light-
ing is, inter alia, to appreciate phenomenally a distinct quality, say, a determinate shade
of blueness. Merely being in an experiential state suffices to render various elements in the
experience phenomenally appreciable for its subject and enables its subject to discriminate
experiences on the basis of these elements’ relative (dis-)similarity.28
At this stage of our argument, phenomenal appreciation is, as a matter of methodology,
a primitive theoretical notion. We can nevertheless advance our understanding of this notion
by distinguishing it from related but importantly different forms of access and awareness:
phenomenal appreciation is not introspection, attention, perception, thought, or conception.
But before we proceed down this negative path (in § 2.2.2), it will serve us well to examine
what has become the canonical means to commence discussions of phenomenality. This brief
detour will not only provide us with a relatively accessible foundation for our discussions of
experiential phenomenality, it will in addition allow us to examine a class of phenomenally
appreciable elements in experience, namely, the non-sensuous, that will play an important
role in the forthcoming arguments for our principal theses.
28Discrimination is weaker than either recognition or categorization and does not require that one be
able to form beliefs or judgments about these phenomenally appreciable elements. The term ‘element’
denotes whatever it is that is phenomenally appreciable to an experiencing subject. It carries no significant
metaphysical connotations. I emphasize this metaphysical innocence in §§ 2.2.2 and 3.1.
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2.2.1 Phenomenally Appreciable, Non-Sensuous Elements in Experience
It is difficult to find a contemporary discussion of experiential phenomenality that does not
contain some variation of this passage:
Among the states that one can be in are those which are like something for their subjects.
There is something it is like for one to see green grass that is absent when one merely thinks
about green grass. And what it is like for one to see green grass is different from what it is
like for one to see white snow. For a state to be like something for its subject is for the state
(or its subject) to be phenomenally conscious. For states to differ with respect to what it is
like for a subject to undergo them is for the states to instantiate different phenomenal (or
experiential/sensory/qualitative/subjective) properties. The totality of a state’s phenome-
nal properties is its phenomenal (or experiential/sensory/qualitative/subjective) character
and a state’s phenomenal character determines what it is like for a subject to undergo it.
Within this exemplary passage, the expression ‘what it is like’ is not used to define ‘phe-
nomenal consciousness’, ‘phenomenal character’, or similar terms. Its purpose is to direct
us toward phenomena of which we are all antecedently familiar. As Block says, “really all
one can do is point to the phenomenon [of phenomenal consciousness . . . ] Nonetheless, it is
important to point properly.”29
Unfortunately, the what-it-is-like idiom fails to achieve even this modest objective. The
intuitive notion of being like something for a subject is unable to capture a determinate
phenomenon at all. It fails to provide even a semblance of a method for discriminating
phenomenality from other non-phenomenal aspects of experience or for adjudicating dis-
agreements about what is phenomenally appreciable for a subject in experience.
These shortcomings are present in the following exchange.
Q: What is it like for you to be in your current state of visual experience?
A: Right now, it looks to me as if a soccer ball is about two meters in front of me. Its surface
is covered with alternating black pentagons and white hexagons. The ball is spherical, quite
solid, and appears to have been purchased recently. I’m in a good position to know things
about it visually and am aware of the possibility of setting it in motion by kicking it.
This response is a perfectly legitimate partial description of what it is like for one to undergo
a particular visual episode. But it encourages a variety of (possibly legitimate) extensions
to phenomenality’s domain without providing the support they require.
29Block [2002a] 206. The expression ‘what it is like’ stems from Farrell [1950] and owes its popularity to
Nagel [1974].
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Our exemplary paragraph contains an appeal to the phenomenal character of experience
and this notion can be usefully employed to characterize this tendency toward phenomenal
inflation. There are at least two ways in which the notion of a phenomenal character can be
employed.
Total Phenomenal Character: The total phenomenal character of a state s for y =df the
totality of phenomenally appreciable elements in s for y.
Sensuous Phenomenal Character: The sensuous phenomenal character of a state s for
y =df the totality of phenomenally appreciable, sensuous elements in s for y.
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If an answer to a what-is-it-like question is a partial articulation of an experience’s total
phenomenal character, then the total phenomenal character of an experience can, and often
does, contain more than its sensuous phenomenal character. That is, descriptions of experi-
ence like that in our exchange suggest that we can phenomenally appreciate far more than
sensuous qualities in experience: if the kind soccer ball, the property being purchased recently,
and the practical possibilities in which I stand to the objects of experience are phenomenally
appreciable, it is not because they are sensuous.
If a philosopher offended by such profligacy wishes to maintain that the total and sen-
suous phenomenal characters of experience are co-extensive, then they must exclude these
additional, non-sensuous features from phenomenality’s domain altogether. Perhaps the sub-
sumption of objects under kinds or sorts that can be recognized only by those who possess
various conceptual resources, the seen item being a soccer ball in our example, can be re-
moved. Perhaps the ball’s being purchased recently can be excised since its inclusion in the
description of the experience draws on background knowledge about the way the condition
of sports equipment changes with use. Perhaps the expectations, judgments, memories, and
preferences involved in the appreciation of one’s practical and epistemic position are similarly
eliminable. But however much resistance it meets, the invocation of the intuitive notion of
what-it-is-like discourages phenomenological austerity and has led to a proliferation of views
30As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the most salient phenomenally appreciable elements in expe-
rience are sensuous: the way the redness of a Red Delicious apple looks when one sees it, the way middle C
sounds when one hears it being played on a Bo¨sendorfer piano, and the way a pain feels when one experiences
a pin pierce one’s finger. Though I will develop the notion of sensuousness momentarily, this enumeration
of paradigmatic instances—the typical means whereby the notion is introduced—will suffice for the point at
hand.
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that countenance various classes of phenomenally appreciable, non-sensuous elements in ex-
perience. Appendix A (p. 42) contains a partial list of recently defended candidates. Which,
if any, of the phenomena compiled therein are phenomenally appreciable and which, if any,
of these phenomenally appreciable elements are non-sensuous?
Though it forces this question upon us, the what-it-is-like idiom is of little help in ad-
judicating the phenomenological disputes it engenders. Consider for example one of the
candidates from our list: what it is like to think occurrently that P. Many claim that it is
like something to be in a state of thinking and that what it is like is sensitive to the thought’s
propositional content.31 Chalmers reports that “When I think of a lion, for instance, there
seems to be a whiff of leonine quality to my phenomenology: what it is like to think of a
lion is subtly different from what it is like to think of the Eiffel tower” (Chalmers [1996]
10). The thesis, in its strongest form, is that “[e]ach type of conscious thought—each state
of consciously thinking that p, for all thinkable contents p—has a proprietary, distinctive,
individuative phenomenology” (Pitt [2004] 5). But the acceptance of cognitive phenomenal-
ity, as it is commonly called, is far from universal.32 For one can admit that there are often
differences in what it is like to think thoughts with different contents while maintaining a
comparatively austere view of experiential phenomenality that refuses to countenance any
phenomenally appreciable, non-sensuous elements in our occurrent propositional attitudes.
What, then, must one do to establish that there are phenomenally appreciable, non-
sensuous elements? First, one must show that the candidate is phenomenally appreciable
and not, as we will see in the next subsection, appreciable in virtue of some supra-experiential,
recognitional capacity or in virtue of some form of higher-order awareness or representation.
Second, if the candidate is phenomenally appreciable, one must establish that it is non-
sensuous. This requires the satisfaction of two conditions: (i) the element must make a
distinctive contribution to the experience’s total phenomenal character (i.e. it isn’t simply
an amalgam of previously countenanced sensuous qualities) and (ii) the element must not
belong to a novel class of sensuous qualities (i.e. it isn’t simply an expansion of what can
belong to sensuous phenomenal characters).
31Notable defenses of some version of this thesis can be found in Flanagan [1992], Strawson [1994], Goldman
[1993], Siewert [1998], Horgan and Tienson [2002], and Pitt [2004].
32Opposition can be found in Lormand [1996], Nelkin [1996], Jacob [1998], and Georgalis [2006].
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This pair of conditions, however, cannot be useful in the adjudication of phenomeno-
logical disputes without a more general characterization of sensuousness. Fortunately, there
is something common to the examples that have so far served to fix the class of sensuous
qualities and this commonality allows us to advance beyond our ostensive understanding.
Sensuous: A phenomenally appreciable element q is sensuous if and only if q belongs to a
phenomenal modality.
Phenomenal Modality: A phenomenally appreciable element q belongs to a phenomenal
modality m if and only if q (or the “basic” elements q comprises33) has a location within
the manifold of phenomenal similarity for m.
For example, some phenomenally appreciable qualities are comparable to one another, i.e. can
stand in relations of relative similarity that are determined by a subject’s ability to match or
discriminate experiences in which they are appreciable, along three continuous dimensions of
variation: hue, brightness, and saturation. To be comparable along these three dimensions
is to have a location within an ordered similarity space, color space in this example, in
which relative similarities are represented by relative distances. Each phenomenal modality
is associated with a distinctive and proprietary similarity manifold and all sensuous qualities
have a location within such a manifold.34
So, to return to our example, if there are content-sensitive, phenomenally appreciable,
non-sensuous elements in our occurrent, propositional attitudes, they cannot be compa-
rable along previously countenanced dimensions of phenomenal variation and they cannot
constitute a distinct phenomenal modality. If the former is true, e.g. if the phenomenally
appreciable elements in familiar kinds of orthographical/phonological imagery, bodily sen-
sations, perceptual experiences, etc. exhaust what is phenomenally appreciable in our oc-
current, propositional attitudes, then the experience’s total phenomenal character remains
co-extensive with its sensuous phenomenal character. If the later is true, then the state’s
33See Byrne and Hilbert [2008].
34On phenomenal modalities and phenomenal similarity spaces in general see Helmholtz [1878/1995] 345,
Hardin [1988/1993], Clark [1993], and Matthen [2005]. Note that not every sensory modality—sight, hear-
ing, taste, etc.—will be associated with a similarity manifold that can be represented as a single space.
The sensuous qualities associated with the sensory modality of smell, for example, are comparable along
dimensions that do not unite to form a single space. So a single sensory modality can comprise numerous
phenomenal modalities.
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total and sensuous phenomenal characters are co-extensive, but they comprise more than is
typically recognized.35
2.2.2 Introspection, Conception, and Attention
Though there are myriad forms of experiential access and awareness, we can sharpen our
understanding of phenomenal appreciation by distinguishing it from three similar but im-
portantly different notions: introspection, conception, and attention.
Introspection: To appreciate phenomenally an element in an experience places no demand
on its subject beyond that of being in the experiential state. For this reason alone, phenom-
enal appreciation is not to be identified with introspection. Introspection, as it is commonly
understood, is a form of first-personal awareness or attention that is directed upon one’s
occurrent mental states or events and their features as such. This introspective operation
is distinct from (though, perhaps, necessarily concomitant with) one’s first-order mental
states. It takes first-order mental states as input and yields conceptually structured judg-
ments about these states as output. Phenomenal appreciation, however, neither consists in
nor involves essentially any higher-order activity or operation directed upon one’s experien-
tial states. The introspection of experiential states is phylogenetically, epistemically, and,
on most accounts, causally posterior to phenomenal appreciation.
But there are two important additional reasons for distinguishing phenomenal appreci-
ation from introspection. First, introspection, as we have described it, is a capacity (or a
family of capacities) to engage either an “inner” object or property, say, a sense datum, or
(the intrinsic properties of) an experiential state itself. To invoke such a capacity is to com-
mit oneself both to the intelligibility of an inner/outer distinction and to the intelligibility of
35Others have noticed that the expression ‘what it is like’ fails to differentiate sensuous phenomenality
from non-sensuous phenomenality. Their remedy is to employ the expression in two ways: a broad sense to
cover both sensuous and non-sensuous phenomenality and a narrow sense to cover sensuous phenomenality
exclusively (cf. Flanagan [1992], Carruthers [2000], and Georgalis [2006]). I think it best to jettison the
offending notion altogether and proceed, as I have, with our two distinctions: (i) that between the sensuous
and the non-sensuous elements that are phenomenally appreciable for one in experience, and (ii) that between
the total and the sensuous phenomenal character of experience. Similar distinctions have been made between
phenomenal character and presentational character (Fish [2009] 10–14, Martin [1998] 174, and Maund [2003]
57), between phenomenal character and qualitative character (Crane [2001] 75–6), and between what it is
like and phenomenal character (Langsam [1997] 35).
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this inner domain’s constituents being possible foci of one’s attentional activities.36 Though
I speak of an element in an experience being phenomenally appreciable to or for a subject,
this does not entail that these elements are, or are instantiated in, the subject’s experiential
states. To be appreciable in an experience for a subject is simply to be appreciable by a
subject that is in that experiential state. The metaphysical status of what is phenomenally
appreciable is left open.
That phenomenal appreciation is, in this sense, metaphysically neutral is clear when we
consider the sensuous qualities in experience. Are the sensuous qualities in an experience
qualities of that experience? Perhaps, but they needn’t be. There are at least three options.37
Sensory Quality =df a sensuous quality that is instantiated by an experiential state
Sensible Quality =df a sensuous quality that is instantiated by an objective, worldly object
Sensational Quality =df a sensuous quality that is instantiated by an “internal”, mental
object, e.g. a sense-datum
It may turn out that the sensuous qualities in an experience belong to one and only one of
these categories. It may turn out that they lack uniformity and are distributed multiply. But
to classify a quality as sensuous is not to specify the ontological category of the objects that
can instantiate it. Nor is it to specify the ontological category of the phenomenally apprecia-
ble element itself. Though I will often speak of sensuous qualities, it may turn out that what
one appreciates is not a quality or an object exemplifying a quality but an adverbial modi-
fication of an experiential episode or a mode of an experiencing subject.38 This point holds
for phenomenally appreciable elements in experience generally, so phenomenal characters,
both total and sensuous, inherit the metaphysical innocence of phenomenal appreciation.39
36These commitments reflect the term’s etymology: ‘introspection’ derives from the Latin introspicere—to
look inward. Some suggest that introspection of the “outer” is nonsensical (cf. Stoljar [2004], Aydede [2005]
127, and Hill [2009] ch. 8). The neologism ‘extrospection’ has been introduced to mark this difference. I
am not concerned with whether extrospection is a variety of introspection or whether the two belong to
fundamentally distinct kinds.
37Though these classifications have been made by many, I am adopting the terminology used in Byrne
[2009].
38When matters of metaphysical status are important, I will revert to using the metaphysically neutral
term ‘element’ (cf. fn. 28).
39In this respect, our definitions of total and sensuous phenomenal character are somewhat idiosyncratic;
most definitions explicitly attribute phenomenal characters to experiential states. Ultimately, phenomenal
characters may comprise intrinsic features of experiences. It may turn out that phenomenal characters
comprise features of the external world (Tye argues for this position in Tye [2009] and relationalists—see
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Three clarifications: (i) The metaphysical neutrality of phenomenal appreciation is quite
radical. Even if an ideal subject is unable to distinguish two experiences on the basis of their
phenomenally appreciable elements, it does not follow that the appreciable elements in the
first experience have the same metaphysical status as those in the second. Identity in total
phenomenal character does not imply metaphysical identity. (ii) Our characterization of
phenomenal appreciation excludes neither the possibility that the phenomenally appreciable
elements in an experience can exist when not being appreciated nor the possibility that
one can come to know facts about the phenomenally appreciable elements in an experience
without being in the experiential state. (iii) One may be inclined to judge that a particular
phenomenally appreciable element is or is not, say, an intrinsic feature of an experiential
state, and one may possess good reasons for doing so. The grounds for such judgments
might even include facts about what is phenomenally appreciable for one in experience. But
the very ideas of phenomenal character and phenomenal appreciation do not imply such
metaphysical conclusions.40
The second additional reason for distinguishing phenomenal appreciation from intro-
spection is that introspection, unlike phenomenal appreciation, yields states that possess
conditions of satisfaction. If I make the claim ‘it looks to me, introspectively, as if something
is red’, I thereby attribute to myself an introspective state distinct from the experiential
state upon which my introspective attention is directed and this introspective state is evalu-
able for veridicality.41 But to appreciate phenomenally a sensuous redness in an experience
is not to be in a distinct, contentful, veridicality-evaluable, introspective state. Nor does
it entail that our experiences themselves possess phenomenal contents. Our descriptions of
what it is like to undergo an experience suggest that the phenomenally appreciable elements
in it are rich enough to determine one or more conditions of satisfaction for the experience.
“Intuitively,” says Chalmers, “by virtue of their phenomenal character, experiences present
the world as being a certain way [. . . ] the phenomenal character determines a condition of
§ 2.3.2.1—are committed to it as well). Perhaps there is no uniform category to which the phenomenally
appreciable elements in experience belong. But each of these is a substantive claim that goes beyond the
very ideas of phenomenal character and phenomenal appreciation.
40I elaborate on each of these three points in ch. 3.
41This is so even if, as many claim, introspection is associated with one or more epistemic perfections—
infallibility, indubitability, incorrigibility, self-intimation, etc. I do not presume that any of these features
belongs to introspection.
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satisfaction for the experience, one that is shared by any experience with the same phenom-
enal character.”42 It is possible that some of our experiences possess phenomenal contents in
this sense. And the fact that one appreciates a particular element in an experience may be
a “truth-maker” for one’s descriptions of what it is like to undergo the experiential episode.
But again, neither of these claims follows from the very ideas of phenomenal character and
phenomenal appreciation. The phenomenal appreciation of an element in an experience is
neither correct nor incorrect; it merely occurs or does not occur.
Conception: There are two ways in which concept-dependent, recognitional capacities can
be involved in experience. When I go to the zoo and look into a particular enclosure, I
can immediately and noninferentially recognize that there is a lemur in front of me. This
recognitional capacity is concept-dependent; if I did not already possess the concept lemur,
I would have been unable to recognize what I saw as the kind of animal it is. Though im-
portant, I wish to place aside this variety of experiential conceptualization and the questions
it engenders. That is, I will remain neutral with respect to whether we can phenomenally
appreciate kinds in experience that we recognize in this manner.
But there is a second way in which concepts can afford awareness that must be distin-
guished from phenomenal appreciation. The domain of what we can be aware of or attend
to in experience by means of a supra-experiential, recognitional capacity is larger than the
domain of what is phenomenally appreciable for one in experience. For example, one may
be able to attend to properties of experience as properties of experience if one exercises a
recognitional capacity that one possesses only if one also has the concept property of expe-
rience or quale in one’s conceptual repertoire. These higher-order, conceptualized modes of
attention are directed upon experiences as such and go beyond what is minimally required
to undergo or phenomenally appreciate the myriad elements within an experience. The ex-
ercises of these supra-experiential, recognitional capacities do not introduce new classes of
phenomenally appreciable elements.43
42Chalmers [2006] 51. Experiences can possess both phenomenal contents and non-phenomenal, represen-
tational contents. The motivation for countenancing phenomenal contents is expressed well in Siewert [1998]
ch. 7 and Horgan and Tienson [2002]. Similar appeals are made in epistemological contexts, e.g. in defences
of dogmatism (cf. Pryor [2000] 536ff.).
43See Loar [2003b] and Burge [2003b] 406 for appeals to supra-experiential modes of attention and Nida-
Ru¨melin [2008] 315-6 and Siewert [2004] for discussions of the sort of unsophisticated phenomenal reflection
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Attention: Finally, we must distinguish phenomenal appreciation from phenomenal atten-
tion. To attend phenomenally to a sensuous element in an experience is to focus upon it
in a way that commonly increases its intensity, vividness, and resolution. Though phe-
nomenal attention aids the introspective formation of judgments about the phenomenally
appreciable elements in experience, it is posterior to phenomenal appreciation and prior to
introspection.44
2.3 OUR PROJECT: STATEMENT, ORIENTATION, AND MOTIVATION
2.3.1 Our Principal Theses
With these elucidatory discussions behind us, we are now in a position to express more
precisely our principal theses. I begin with a relatively concise statement.
Among the first of our conclusions is this: to experience is always (in part) to appre-
ciate phenomenally an element as other or as before one; it is always (in part) to appre-
ciate phenomenally a manifest opposition between the self—that before which the other is
present—and the other—that which is present before the self. I call this aspect of expe-
riential phenomenality, this universally appreciable but non-sensuous sense of otherness in
experience, phenomenal presence. Though much more needs to (and will) be said, this rough
characterization of phenomenal presence will suffice for the time being.
Phenomenal presence is absolutely central to our project. Recall the first of our guid-
ing questions: What is the relationship between experiential intentionality and experiential
phenomenality? Within the context of this inquiry, phenomenal presence bears a twofold
importance. Its first consequence is negative. Phenomenal presence neither depends es-
sentially upon nor is explanatorily grounded in the non-phenomenal, intentional features of
experience. So experiential intentionality, understood in isolation from experiential phenom-
enality, neither determines completely nor explains exhaustively experiential phenomenality.
Its second consequence is positive. Phenomenal presence is itself the minimal manifestation
currently at issue.
44See Hill [1991] and Hill [2009] in which this capacity is called processing attention.
31
of experiential intentionality. Phenomenal presence embodies an autonomous and original
directedness that satisfies the conditions we have placed on intentionality. This essentially
phenomenal directedness is constitutively and explanatorily prior to all other forms of expe-
riential intentionality.
Together, the negative and positive theses imply that experiential phenomenality is,
in several respects, more fundamental than experiential intentionality as it is usually con-
ceived. Establishing this relationship is, as we will see, philosophically significant. In par-
ticular, it supports a surprising answer to our second guiding question: What is the rela-
tionship between experiential phenomenality and the intentionality of our paradigmatically
non-phenomenal states? To understand a state’s intentionality, regardless of its phenomeno-
logical status, requires that one possess (i) the ability to conceive oneself as a self, i.e. as a
subject of intentional states, and (ii) the ability to conceive one’s intentional states as such,
i.e. as being directed upon entities beyond themselves (or upon themselves qua other). I
contend that to have either of these abilities in one’s conceptual repertoire requires a prior
appreciation of this irreducibly phenomenal but non-sensuous aspect of experience. One’s
ability to think in terms of self and other, and therefore one’s ability to understand inten-
tionality, has its ground in experiential phenomenality.45
In order to clarify and to develop these claims, I will situate them within four promi-
nent philosophical currents. These brief discussions will serve additionally to motivate our
preferred approach. I will then outline briefly the essay’s argumentative structure.
2.3.2 Four Philosophical Movements
2.3.2.1 Movement 1: The Exaltation of Intentionality At the beginning of this
chapter, I introduced three positions that receive widespread support in contemporary phi-
losophy of mind.
Methodological Separatism: If inquiry into the phenomenality of experience is to occur
at all, one can (and ought to) adopt a separatist methodology—one’s philosophical labor
45The inability to conceive or understand the intentionality of one’s states is of no small consequence. To
be a critical, reflective reasoner, i.e. to be able to recognize, employ, evaluate, weigh, and criticize reasons for
one’s thoughts, judgments, etc. as reasons, requires an ability to understand in this manner the intentionality
of one’s states (cf. Burge [1996] and Moran [2001]).
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will comprise two projects with experiential phenomenality and experiential intentional-
ity as their respective foci.
Intentional Independence: An experience’s intentionality neither depends essentially up-
on nor is explanatorily derived from its phenomenality (assuming the features are nu-
merically distinct).
Intentional Priority: If there is any connection between the phenomenality and intention-
ality of experience, it will be a relation of dependence, e.g. supervenience, of the former
on the latter. If the phenomenal features of experience are identical to (a subset of) its
intentional features, their status as intentional is somehow fundamental.
The affirmation of one or more of these claims is almost always associated with the
acceptance of an account of perceptual experience that privileges experiential intentionality
over experiential phenomenality. So it is no surprise that what are currently the three most
popular accounts of perceptual experience, despite what appear initially to be quite radical
differences, are unified by the demands that this orientation imposes.
Dual-Component Account: To perceive is, in part, to be intentionally directed upon an
entity by virtue of the exercises of a distinctively intellectual capacity, say, a capacity
for non-phenomenal thought or judgment. The sensuous elements that are phenome-
nally appreciable for one in an experience are either (i) intrinsic, sensational qualities of
“internal” mental entities, e.g. sense-data, that accompany these states, or (ii) sensory
qualities that somehow belong to the otherwise non-phenomenal states that these intel-
lectual operations yield. These sensuous elements, the phenomenal component or aspect
of experience, determine exhaustively a perceptual experience’s total phenomenal char-
acter and, on some accounts, can indicate the fact that a limited variety of merely causal
relations obtain. But an experience’s phenomenal character plays no role in the experi-
ence being intentionally directed. Experiential intentionality is entirely a consequence of
an experience’s intellectual component or aspect.
Relationalism: To perceive is to be intentionally directed upon an entity in virtue of a
primitive relation of direct awareness or acquaintance. If an experiencing subject stands
in this relation to entities in the world, then the sensuous elements that are phenom-
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enally appreciable for the subject in the experience are the sensible qualities of these
worldly relata. If an experiencing subject stands in this relation to an entity “within”
one’s mind, e.g. a sense-datum, then the sensuous elements that are phenomenally ap-
preciable for the subject in the experience are the sensational qualities of this “internal”
relatum. Either way, it is the features of the entities to which a subject is primitively
related through experience, not features of the relation or of the experience itself, that
determine exhaustively a perceptual experience’s total phenomenal character. But an
experience’s phenomenal character plays no role in the experience being intentionally di-
rected. Experiential intentionality is entirely a consequence of these primitive relations.
Representationalism (or Intentionalism): To perceive is to be intentionally directed
upon an entity in virtue of a state with one or more representational contents (that meet
various conditions). The sensuous elements that are phenomenally appreciable for one in
an experience supervene upon or are identical with either (i) features of the experience’s
representational content(s), (ii) features of the experiential state in virtue of which it has
its representational content(s), or (iii) features of the entities the experience represents. In
all three variations, it is representational facts that determine exhaustively a perceptual
experience’s total phenomenal character. But an experience’s phenomenal character,
considered in isolation from its representational characterization or supervenience base,
plays no role in the experience being intentionally directed. Experiential intentionality
is entirely a consequence of an experience’s representational features.46
I do not accept any of the three positions that encourage, if not entail outright, experi-
ential phenomenality’s relative insignificance. In fact, I will defend their (near) negations:
Methodological Inseparatism: Attempts to provide an account of experiential intention-
46These abstracts are meant to communicate the core commitments of the three approaches; one can find
subtle variations that depart from the letter of our characterizations. Among the clearest proponents of the
dual-component account are Sellars [1956], Hamlyn [1957/1979], and Coates [2007]; of relationalism Alston
[1999], Martin [2002b], Campbell [2002b], and Johnston [2006]; of representationalism Harman [1990], Tye
[1995], Dretske [1995], Lycan [1996], and Byrne [2001]. Some accounts incorporate aspects of more than
one of these approaches. For example, the views advanced in Peacocke [1983] and Block [1996] can be
seen as taking a middle ground between dual-component accounts and representationalism. Also, these do
not exhaust the available ways to elevate intentionality over phenomenality in one’s account of experience.
An extreme instance is phenomenal eliminativism—the view that perception consists in nothing but the
exercise of various capacities to identify, recognize, or form beliefs about entities—which refuses altogether
to countenance phenomenality (cf. Armstrong [1968], Dennett [1979], and Rey [1998]).
34
ality that ignore experiential phenomenality (and vice versa) cannot succeed. Though
the adoption of a separatist methodology can yield important results, the understanding
it furnishes will be partial at best.
Intentional Dependence: An experience’s intentionality is either constituted by or de-
pends essentially upon aspects of its phenomenality.
Intentional Impotence: Experiential intentionality, understood in isolation from experi-
ential phenomenality, neither determines completely nor explains exhaustively experien-
tial phenomenality.
Consequently, the account of experience I develop does not take the basic shape of those
just canvassed. Though our account will ultimately share several important features with
representationalism, I use this view and the answers that it gives to our guiding questions
as foils throughout the essay.47
2.3.2.2 Movement 2: Phenomenal Intentionality and Phenomenal Content It
is increasingly popular for philosophers of mind to countenance, in some form or other,
phenomenal contents. According to these views, the phenomenally appreciable elements in
many of our experiences are rich enough to determine one or more conditions of satisfaction
that belong to the experiences themselves. Experiences make claims and these claims, which
may or may not be propositionally structured or conceptually articulated, are evaluable for
veridicality.
In § 2.2.2, I asserted the following: the fact that an element in an experience is phenom-
enally appreciable for its subject does not entail that the experience possesses phenomenal
content. We may ultimately have good reasons to attribute to some or all of our experiences
contents that are determined or constituted wholly by aspects of their phenomenality. But
the identification within an experiencing subject of states in which a sensuous redness (for
instance) is phenomenally appreciable with states that are veridical if and only if something
before the subject is red is not guaranteed by any episode of phenomenal appreciation on its
own.
47Many of the claims I make about representationalism will be applicable to the remaining pair of views.
I will take note occasionally of the distinctive challenges these and other alternative views pose to our
arguments.
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Though I develop and defend this picture in the chapters that follow, it is important
to distinguish the thesis currently at issue—that experiences are phenomenally contentful—
from a similar thesis that I endorse enthusiastically—that experiences are phenomenally
intentional. The term ‘phenomenal intentionality’ is commonly (and unfortunately) em-
ployed in a way that makes it synonymous with ‘phenomenal content’.48 This use is natural
if one adopts the broadly semantical conception of intentionality in which intentionality is
equated with the possession of satisfaction conditions and/or representational contents (as
discussed in § 2.1). I emphasized in that discussion that intentionality, properly conceived, is
to be distinguished from representationality; the invocation of veridicality-evaluable, repre-
sentational contents is merely one among several possible ways to enrich the relatively basic
conception of intentional directedness.
The conditions an experience must satisfy in order to possess phenomenal intentionality
mirror those enumerated in our preferred characterization of intentional directedness (in §
2.1.4). Roughly and briefly, for an experience to possess phenomenal intentionality is for the
other-directedness in which intentionality consists to be phenomenally appreciable in the ex-
perience for its subject. Though experiential phenomenality is unable to ground attributions
of phenomenal content, I will argue that it does ground attributions of phenomenal intention-
ality. Phenomenal presence is universally appreciable in sensuous experience and this aspect
of experiential phenomenality is itself the minimal realization of intentional directedness.
2.3.2.3 Movement 3: Mere Sensation There is a venerable taxonomy of mental states
that divides experiences into two distinct kinds: perceptions and sensations. Perceptions
seem to be intentionally directed upon objective entities, i.e. mind-independent, publicly
accessible, enduring entities that are in principle re-identifiable. Sensations, however, do
not possess intentionality of any sort, let alone a directedness that purportedly brings an
objective world into view. Sensations, e.g. pains and after images, are, to use a once popular
expression, raw feels. At best (or worst), to undergo a sensation is to appreciate phenome-
nally an aspect of one’s “inner” consciousness.
48One can also find the term being used to refer to phenomena of an entirely different sort, e.g. those that
would fall under what we called ‘cognitive phenomenality’ (cf. §§ 2.2.1 and 6).
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Sensations are typically conceived to be psychologically and ontogenetically prior to
perceptions and this priority presents us with a challenge: if we are to be directed upon an
objective world through experience, we must find a way either to transcend this inner domain
or to obviate the need by providing an account of perceptual experience in which sensations
play no role. One way to execute the former strategy, the way typified by but not limited
to dual-component theorists, is to supplement sensation with an additional, distinctively
cognitive operation, say, an intentionally directed belief or judgment. This cognitive element
accounts for perception’s objective character and itself requires that we possess, in addition,
a relatively sophisticated apparatus for individuating experienced objects and for locating
them within a wider system of objective entities.49 One way to execute the latter strategy
is altogether to refuse to countenance experiences that are not intentionally directed upon
objective entities. According to representationalists, for example, to suffer, say, a pain is to
be in a contentful state to the effect that some region of one’s body is somehow damaged or
disordered.
In what follows, I defend a view that occupies a middle ground between these approaches.
On the one hand, the view I defend is like that of the representationalist. I reject the
categorial distinction between sensations and perceptions. There is a primitive form of
intentionality that occurs in even the simplest of our sensations and this intentionality is
involved essentially in the more sophisticated experiential intentionality of our perceptions.
This intentional directedness, however, is not representational in nature. On the other hand,
the view I defend is like that of the dual-component theorist. I recognize that the intentional
directedness that sensations possess is not sufficient for experiential objectivity. Experiential
objectivity, however, is not necessary for experiential intentionality.
2.3.2.4 Movement 4: The Self Our initial characterization of phenomenal presence
invoked a notion that is a perennial source of philosophical frustration: the self. Many of
the difficulties that beset attempts to understand the self spring from a famous Humean
observation.
49For example, to undergo an experience as of an objective, physical object might require the acquisition
and exercise of an ability to represent a comprehensive spatial system with non-egocentric origins and an
ability to place oneself within such a system (cf. Strawson [1959/2006], Evans [1982], and Cassam [1997]).
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[W]hen I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular
perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never
catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the
perception. (Hume [1739/1978] I.vi.6)
One cannot perceive, attend to, introspect, or otherwise be aware of oneself as a subject of
perceptual experience; the self is not among experience’s phenomenally appreciable elements.
Since every idea must, according to Hume, have its origin in the phenomenally appreciable
elements of a relatively rich and vivid type of experience he calls impressions, the absence
of such an origin for the idea of a simple, continuous, experiential subject forces Hume to
conclude that this idea is necessarily beyond our ken.50
But if we relax the condition that our ideas must be copied form prior, phenomenality-
rich impressions, several routes to self-awareness become available. For example, many take
consciousness or awareness of the self to be possible in virtue of one of the following.
(i) A capacity to think in that manner which is associated with uses of the first-person
pronoun ‘I’
(ii) A capacity to think that various experiences belong to a single subject
(iii) A capacity to adopt the perspective of another toward oneself
(iv) A theory of mind that includes the concept experience
(v) A capacity to execute successfully various cognitive tasks such as mirror recognition51
Perhaps a prior appreciation of experiential phenomenality is necessary to acquire these
concepts and competencies. Nevertheless, these approaches share a common conviction: the
abandonment of experiential phenomenality as a source of our self-awareness. Each of these
conditions makes self-consciousness and self-awareness essentially intellectual or cognitive
achievements; experiential phenomenality plays no essential role in our being self-conscious
or in our achieving an awareness or understanding of ourselves as subjects of experience.
50It is interesting to note that two decades earlier, Berkeley makes an identical observation but nevertheless
maintains that he possesses an idea (or at least a notion) of the self (Berkeley [1713/1998] 231–234). Similar
claims are made by philosophers that do not accept a Humean framework. For example, Kant asserts that
“The consciousness of oneself in accordance with the determinations of our state in internal perception
is merely empirical, forever variable; it can provide no standing or abiding self in this stream of inner
appearances [. . . ]” (Kant [1781/1998] A107; cf. B132, B157, and B275–277). See also Mach [1886/1984]
19ff., Carnap [1928/1967] §65ff., and Wittgenstein [1930/1955] 13ff.
51In recent years, (i) has been held by Baker [2000] and Ro¨dl [2007], (ii) by Cassam [1997], (iii) by Mead
[1962], (iv) by Gopnik [1993], and (v) by Lewis [2003].
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All of these conditions plausibly delineate phenomena that deserve the label ‘self-con-
sciousness’ or ‘self-awareness’. They do not, however, exhaust the varieties of self-awareness
or the means by which one can acquire it. In the course of my argument, I defend two theses
about the self similar in form to our conclusions concerning intentionality. First, there is
in every experience a distinctive and original source of self-awareness that is phenomenally
appreciable for the experiencing subject. Hume’s observation is correct to a point: the self is
not among the sensuous elements in experience and is not appreciable to one in the way that
sensuous elements are. But insofar as phenomenal presence is appreciable in experience, the
self is appreciable as well, in a sense to be elaborated, as that before which this manifest
otherness is present. Second, the possession of this irreducibly phenomenal form of self-
awareness is a necessary precondition for the more sophisticated varieties of self-awareness
we can achieve.52
2.3.2.5 A Common Theme Together, these four discussions lead us toward an account
of perceptual experience in which the phenomenality of experience is competent to direct
us intentionally beyond ourselves, independently of the contributions made by the under-
standing or intellect. Modeling the intentionality and self-awareness involved in experience
upon the intentionality and self-awareness involved in belief and judgment or insisting that
the former depend on the latter obscures both the role of and the contribution made by the
exercises of our perceptual capacities. This tendency to assimilate the perceptual and the
intellectual realms and to privilege the intellectual leads inevitably to accounts that either
render epiphenomenal the distinctive contributions of experiential phenomenality or neglect
altogether those contributions. This essay is governed by the conviction, to wax Aristotelian
once again, that we do not need to exercise our rational capacities to transcend a nutritive
existence. We do, however, need to appreciate the phenomenality of the exercises of our
perceptual capacities to achieve a rational existence. A careful examination of experiential
phenomenality and the understanding of phenomenal presence this examination provides
will equip us with the resources needed to restore perception to its proper place among the
52An account of self-awareness along these lines was held by the majority of the early phenomenologists in-
cluding Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre. Contemporary proponents of broadly similar views include Flanagan
[1992], Kriegel [2004], and Zahavi [2005b].
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animate capacities constitutive of animal life.
2.3.3 The Project in Outline
Our discussion proceeds in two stages.
Stage One. The first stage of the essay (chapters 3 and 4) concerns the subject of our
first guiding question—the relationship between experiential phenomenality and experiential
intentionality. I begin (in § 3.1) with a discussion of a phenomenon that is closely related
to our core notion of phenomenal presence, namely, experiential transparency (sometimes
called experiential diaphanousness).53
Contemporary discussions of experiential transparency have their source in two famous
passages within G. E. Moore’s Refutation of Idealism.
[I]n general, that which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact seems to escape us: it
seems, if I may use a metaphor, to be transparent—we look through it and see nothing but
the blue [. . . ] (Moore [1903] 20)
[T]hough philosophers have recognised that something distinct is meant by consciousness,
they have never yet had a clear conception of what that something is. They have not been
able to hold it and blue before their minds and to compare them, in the same way in which
they can compare blue and green. And this for the reason I gave above: namely that the
moment we try to fix our attention upon consciousness and to see what, distinctly, it is,
it seems to vanish: it seems as if we had before us a mere emptiness. When we try to
introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue: the other element is as if it were
diaphanous. Yet it can be distinguished if we look attentively enough, and if we know that
there is something to look for. (Moore [1903] 25)
Unfortunately, the views inspired by reflection on experiential transparency are laden
with numerous (and ultimately extraneous) theses regarding, for example, the (direct/im-
mediate) objects of introspection, awareness, and attention; the nature of intrinsic properties;
and the perennial philosophical oppositions between the internal and the external, the sub-
jective and the objective, the private and the public, and the mental (or mind-dependent)
and the non-mental (or mind-independent). Phenomenal presence is the precipitate that
53This is a natural starting point for an inquiry into the presentational character of experience since “trans-
parency and the immediacy of the objects of conscious awareness seem to be part of the same phenomenon.
When we encounter the world in perception, it doesn’t seem to be merely represented by us, but presented
to us” (Levine [2006] 179).
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remains once we jettison these encumbrances (§ 3.2). In addition to this negative charac-
terization, I provide a positive description of the phenomenon that models the distinction
between self and other upon the Fregean distinction between concept and object (ch. 4).
With this understanding of phenomenal presence in hand, I provide an answer to our
guiding question in three steps. (i) Using representationalism as a foil, I argue that the
intentional features of experience, understood in isolation from experiential phenomenality,
can neither constitute nor explain phenomenal presence. Consequently, experiential inten-
tionality neither determines completely nor explains exhaustively experiential phenomenality
(§ 3.3). (ii) I argue that phenomenal presence is itself the minimal realization of experien-
tial intentionality (§ 3.4). (iii) I argue that the variety of phenomenal intentionality that
phenomenal presence realizes is constitutively and explanatorily prior to all other forms of
experiential intentionality (ch. 5).
Stage Two. The second stage of the essay (ch. 6) concerns the subject of our second
guiding question—the relationship between experiential phenomenality and non-experiential
intentionality. I begin with a discussion of the conditions one must meet to conceive or
understand the intentionality of one’s states. To achieve this understanding requires, at a
minimum, the exercise of two essentially first-personal, conceptual capacities: (i) the capacity
to conceive oneself as a self, i.e. as a subject of intentional states, and (ii) the capacity
to conceive one’s intentional states as such, i.e. as being directed upon entities beyond
themselves (or upon themselves qua other). In short, to understand the intentionality of
one’s states—and, therefore, to be a critical, reflective reasoner—requires the ability to
think, in a distinctively first-personal manner, in terms of self and other.
The relevance of these claims to our question is shown through two arguments. First,
I argue that phenomenal presence provides one with an irreducibly phenomenal form of
self-awareness. Second, I argue that the possession of this phenomenal self-awareness is a
necessary precondition for the possession of the pair of conceptual capacities one needs to
achieve a first-personal understanding of intentionality. I then develop the resultant view by
outlining an argument against the possibility of beings with angelic minds, that is, beings
that possess a faculty for discursive, reflective judgment and ratiocination but lack a faculty
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for experience or phenomenal appreciation.
2.4 APPENDIX A: THE DOMAIN OF THE PHENOMENALLY
APPRECIABLE
A partial list of alleged, phenomenally appreciable, non-sensuous elements in experience,
expressed in the what-it-is-like idiom:
1. Cognitive/Judicative Phenomenality
a. What it is like to believe/judge/think/hope/desire/etc. occurrently that P
b. What it is like to think occurrently that P/that Q/that R/etc.
c. What it is like to comprehend or understand a sentence or utterance
d. What it is like to try, in thought, to achieve a particular kind of result
2. Agential Phenomenality
a. What it is like to author a voluntary action (appreciation of efficacy, initiation, or
intentional causation)
b. What it is like to be in control of one’s voluntary actions
c. What it is like to feel an external check to one’s agency
d. What it is like to play the piano competently (i.e. to perform an action with “know-
ledge-how”)
3. Moral Phenomenality
a. What it is like to do something for a moral reason or with moral concern in mind
b. What it is like to find, say, murder morally repugnant or to undergo imaginative
resistance to what one finds morally repugnant
4. Phenomenally appreciable elements about one’s metaphysical status
a. What it is like to be a member of kind K
b. What it is like to be alive/male/thirty-something/American/etc.
5. Experiential Phenomenality
a. What it is like to experience a series of notes as a melody (or, generally, what it is
like to experience a gestalt unity)
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b. What it is like to possess perceptual expectancies—to appreciate perceptual affor-
dances and potentialities
c. What it is like to appreciate an experience as one’s own
d. What it is like to undergo “odd” experiences: blurred vision, after-images, double
vision, hypnogogic/hypnopompic images, shifts of focus, figure-ground switches, etc.
e. What it is like to recognize a face
f. What it is like for an experience to be spatially/temporally organized
g. What it is like to be, say, depressed/elated or to perceive when depressed/elated
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3.0 PHENOMENAL PRESENCE
One frequently encounters the thesis that experience is transparent or diaphanous in contem-
porary philosophical discussions of perceptual experience.1 Michael Tye provides a recent
and representative statement of this thesis:
When you introspect your visual experience, the only particulars of which you are aware
are the external ones making up the scene before your eyes. [. . . ] Your awareness is of
the external surfaces and how they appear. The qualities you experience are the ones the
surfaces apparently have. Your experience is thus transparent to you. When you try to
focus upon it, you ‘see’ right through it, as it were, to the things apparently outside and
their apparent qualities. (Tye [2002] 139)
According to experiential transparency’s advocates, all that perceptual experience even seems
to present us with are objective entities and their sensible characteristics. No amount of
phenomenological reflection will enable us to appreciate the intrinsic features of perceptual
experience as such.
The question of whether all experiences are transparent occasions spirited disagreement.
These disagreements, however, are premature. I will argue that the most common interpre-
tation of experiential transparency’s significance is laden with substantive and ultimately ex-
traneous metaphysical commitments. I divest this inflated interpretation of its unwarranted
encumbrances and consolidate the precipitate into a position I call Core Transparency (§
3.1).
Core Transparency is a thesis about experience’s presentational character. We open our
eyes and a world is before us. Someone strikes a tuning fork, and a sound is simply present.
1Gilbert Harman (Harman [1990]) is responsible for initiating the present era of relatively intense interest
in experiential transparency. But the thesis that experience is transparent can be traced back at least to G.
E. Moore’s Refutation of Idealism (Moore [1903] 20, 25) and has never been entirely absent from subsequent
discussions of perception and consciousness. Notable early treatments include Broad [1923], Price [1932],
Ryle [1949] 152, Firth [1949], Heidegger [1951/1968] 41, Wittgenstein [1953] §§ 275-7, and Grice [1962] 252.
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In all sensory modalities, the objects of perceptual experience are there, present to us, in a
way that the objects of most beliefs and judgments are not. According to Core Transparency,
it is in the disclosure of that which is central to experience’s presentational character, an
intrinsic and irreducibly phenomenal aspect of experience I call phenomenal presence, that
transparency’s significance principally consists (§ 3.2).
Though valuable in itself, the consequences of this analysis extend well beyond the clarity
it provides to discussions of transparency. For phenomenal presence is uniquely positioned
to illuminate the relationship between perceptual experience’s most important features: its
intentionality and its phenomenality. One popular account of how these features are related,
namely representationalism, asserts, roughly, that an experience’s representational features
completely determine its phenomenal features. The thesis that all experiences are transpar-
ent is often taken to support representationalism; representationalists maintain that their
account best (or uniquely) explains such transparency.2
I will argue that experiential transparency is far from being a solid foundation upon
which representationalists can rest their arguments. The phenomenon is, when interpreted
properly, not only among the view’s greatest obstacles, it supports a converse orientation.
The position I defend comprises two main claims.
1. The representational features of experience, understood in isolation from experiential
phenomenality, neither constitute nor explain phenomenal presence. Consequently, the
representational features of experience neither determine completely nor explain exhaus-
tively experiential phenomenality (§ 3.3).
2. Phenomenal presence is not representational, but is nevertheless the minimal realization
of experiential intentionality (§ 3.4).
2Prominent defenses of representationalism along these lines include Harman [1990], Tye [1995], Dretske
[1995], and Byrne [2001]. The motivation for representationalism extends well beyond its alleged explanatory
advantages with respect to transparency. For example, many representationalists, especially those impressed
by cognitive science’s explanatory successes, argue that their account facilitates the establishment of a
materialist account of the mind.
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3.1 THE PURPORTED SIGNIFICANCE OF EXPERIENTIAL
TRANSPARENCY
Though transparency’s significance is subject to a multiplicity of (often ambiguous and
heterogeneous) interpretations, one can discern an emerging consensus over its general form.
(T) The sensuous elements that one phenomenally appreciates in an experience are (with
varying emphases) always appreciated as (i) public, (ii) objective, (iii) mind-independent,
and/or (iv) external (i.e. distally located).3
According to (T), when one undergoes, say, a visual experience as of a tree, the sensuous
green one appreciates is appreciated as a quality of the tree’s leaves. One appreciates the
sensuous green as being, being exemplified by, or being about an objective entity in one’s
external environment. Moreover, no amount of phenomenological reflection will alter the
apparent externality of an experience’s sensuous elements or reveal novel elements with a
different apparent ontological status. So if transparency holds generally, one will never
appreciate an experience’s sensuous elements as intrinsic features of either the experience
itself or oneself qua experiential subject.4
This interpretation is, at least in comparison to many characterizations that were ad-
vanced during the initial stages of transparency’s recent era of popularity, narrowly phe-
nomenological. It concerns only apparent ontological classifications and does not involve a
commitment to Revelation, i.e. the thesis that the intrinsic nature of a sensuous element is
fully revealed by the phenomenal appreciation of that element in a standard experience (cf.
Johnston [1992]). According to these earlier interpretations, undergoing or reflecting upon
3I take no stand on how the adjectives ‘public’, ‘objective’, ‘mind-independent’, and ‘external’ are related.
(T) is stated in such a way as to cover various interpretations of these expressions.
4(i) Though phenomenological reflection can affect the sensuous elements that one phenomenally ap-
preciates in an experience—it can, and commonly does, increase their intensity, vividness, and resolution
(cf. Hill [1991])—such reflection, according to (T), does not effect a change in the apparent nature of the
experience’s appreciable elements and is not a window onto new ontological domains. (ii) Some attribute
an epistemological significance to transparency, e.g. the claim that one’s access to the intrinsic features of
one’s experiences is indirect : “By being aware of the qualities apparently possessed by surfaces, volumes,
etc., we become aware that we are undergoing visual experiences” (Tye [2003b] 24; cf. Chalmers [2004] 28
and Stoljar [2004]). This essay, however, is concerned primarily with transparency’s metaphysical import.
(iii) The rider ‘qua experiential subject’ allows a visual experience of, say, the color of one’s leg to count as
transparent.
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an experience discloses the apparent ontological status of the sensuous elements one appre-
ciates therein and Revelation guarantees that these elements are as one appreciates them to
be.5
To abandon Revelation, as (T) does, is to recognize that phenomenological reflection,
by itself, is metaphysically neutral. This neutrality is twofold. First, phenomenological
reflection, by itself, does not disclose the ontological status of an experience’s sensuous ele-
ments. (T)’s advocates readily admit that phenomenological reflection does not immediately
yield conclusions about the metaphysical status of what one appreciates in experience. For
example, Gilbert Harman concedes that “one might be aware of intrinsic features of expe-
rience without being aware of them as intrinsic features of experience” (Harman [1990] 42).
Similarly, both Michael Tye and Alex Byrne hold that transparency, on its own, does not
speak against sense-datum accounts of experience.6 So even if we always appreciate an ex-
perience’s sensuous elements as being or qualifying physical objects in a publicly accessible
environment, it may turn out that they are, as a matter of fact, instantiated by amalgams
of sense-data or are intrinsic features of one’s experiential states.7
Second, phenomenological reflection, by itself, does not disclose the ontological status of
experiential episodes themselves. Perhaps one has an experience with a particular phenom-
enal character in virtue of being in a representational state with a special kind of content or
a special functionally specified role. Perhaps one has this experience in virtue of standing in
some primitive relation of acquaintance or direct awareness to an appropriate class of enti-
ties. Perhaps one has this experience by virtue of the divine dispensation of an omnipotent
5“Appeals to transparency appear to involve the following thought: just by having a perceptual experi-
ence, the perceiver is placed in a position whereby he or she is able to classify the ontological category of
what is manifest in experience. The nature of experience is supposed to be the kind of thing that can be
discerned through introspection” (Coates [2007] 157).
6See Tye [2000] and Byrne [2001]; cf. Schroer [2007], Jackson [2007] 55, and Hill [2009] ch. 3.
7Again, though I speak of an element in an experience being phenomenally appreciable to a subject, this
does not entail that these elements are, or are instantiated in, the subject’s experiential states. To be appre-
ciable in an experience for a subject is simply to be appreciable by a subject that is in that experiential state.
The metaphysical status of what is phenomenally appreciable is left open. Also, phenomenological reflection
is not only neutral with respect to classification but is existentially silent as well. A hallucinatory experience
can be subjectively indistinguishable from a veridical experience, but this phenomenological fact, on its own,
requires neither existential profligacy—through, say, the positing of Meinongian objects (Smith [2002]) or
the countenancing of uninstantiated properties/universals (Johnston [2004])—nor existential parsimony—
through, say, the acceptance of an adverbial (Ducasse [1942]) or disjunctive account of experience (Martin
[2004]).
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god. Whatever the source, it is invisible. The means by which a scene becomes experientially
present to one is not itself phenomenally appreciable.
Despite the relative restraint of (T), many who accept it nevertheless aspire to the yield
of its metaphysically indulgent counterpart. If (T) is correct, then undergoing an experience
always involves the appreciation of something as having certain features, namely, those that
constitute membership in one or more of the classes enumerated in (T). This is best explained,
the argument goes, if experiential phenomenality is representational in nature. That is, for
an experience to possess a phenomenal character is for it to make a claim that something is
a certain way and such claims are evaluable for veridicality. These contentful experiences,
the argument continues, will be radically (and problematically) misleading unless things are,
at least in standard cases, as we appreciate them to be.8
It should concern those who advance such arguments that parallel arguments exist for
incompatible views. For example, many argue that transparency is best explained by an
explicitly non-representational form of na¨ıve realism.9 But of even greater concern is this:
the narrowly phenomenological interpretation of transparency against which all parties have
agreed to measure the explanatory virtues of their preferred accounts is, I contend, simply
false. Let us begin with an examination of two rare but illustrative sorts of experience that
serve as counterexamples to (T).
Case 1: Ganzfeld Experiences. A ganzfeld is a visual field that is completely permeated
with a constant and homogeneous sensuous color, say, a determinate shade of blue.10 The
advocate of transparency is correct to this extent: the sensuous blue that is present in a
ganzfeld experience is not appreciated as being an intrinsic property of the experience itself
or of oneself qua experiential subject.
Does this mean that one appreciates the sensuous blue as qualifying (or as being) an
objective, mind-independent entity? Not at all. When one undergoes such an experience, one
8Arguments along these lines are widespread, e.g. at Tye [2000] 46, 111ff. and Jackson [2007].
9See Snowdon [1990] 136, Martin [2002b], and Alston [2005]; cf. Schroer [2007] 405-7 and Smith [2008]
198-9.
10This discussion involves a slight but unproblematic idealization. In practice, there are no absolute
ganzfeld experiences. Just as the darkness we appreciate when we close our eyes includes what Helmholtz
called ‘optical dust’, i.e. sundry points of light and dim patches, the experience of a ganzfeld will be subtly
heterogeneous.
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does not appreciate anything as possessed of the phenomenal characteristics that constitute
the alleged world-disclosing phenomenality of our ordinary perceptual experiences. There
is no figure-ground contrast, no manifestation of diachronic perceptual constancies, and
no opportunity for perspectival variation. Relations of relative, spatial location are either
severely limited or altogether absent, so one does not even appreciate the sensuous expanse
as being a properly extended region of space.11 Finally, one need not (and often does not)
appreciate the ganzfeld as distally located; at most, one can say that one appreciates the
sensuous blue as being before one, where ‘before’ does not connote ‘in front of’ or any other
notion that involves apparent spatial egocentricity.12
Case 2: Spatially Punctiliar Experiences. Damage to one’s occipital cortex can result
in the diminution of one’s visual field. That which is lost is not replaced with darkness, the
so-called “brain grey” that permeates our visual field when external optical stimulation is cut
off. The visual system registers nothing in these lost regions; the field itself simply shrinks.13
It is possible in principle for one’s brain to atrophy in such a way that one undergoes visual
experiences that are spatially punctiliar.14 These are not experiences as of a point of light
in a sea of darkness, i.e. an isolated phosphene. One who possesses such a visual system
would undergo visual experiences in which a single phenomenal point, and nothing more, is
appreciable.15
A sensuous element is present in a spatially punctiliar experience. But one does not ap-
preciate the sensuous point as possessed of features that constitute one or more of the classes
11See Pylyshyn [2007] 66, Hochberg et al. [1951], and Avant [1965].
12Some individuals report that the ganzfeld vaguely resembles a surface; they estimate that it is located
less than six inches in front of them (Gibson and Waddell [1952]). But just as many find such spatial
descriptions inadequate or inappropriate (Cohen [1957]). The fact that apparent distance is not a necessary
aspect of a ganzfeld experience means that its phenomenality is committed to even less than that of other
atypical experiences, e.g. after-images. For we appreciate the sensuous color in an after-image as qualifying
a particular distal region in our visual field: according to Emmert’s law, an after-image always occupies a
single visual solid angle, but the apparent linear size of the region filling that angle is directly proportional
to the apparent distance of the surface onto which it is projected (cf. Clark [2000] 51).
13See Wright [1981] 589, Sorensen [2004] 462-3, and Magee and Milligan [1995] 11.
14I suspect such experiences are nomologically possible, but metaphysical possibility is sufficient.
15(i) A phenomenal point is not extended in the sense that one does not appreciate it as being spatially
divisible. (ii) Spatially punctiliar experiences can occur in other sensory modalities. For example, if there
were a creature with a single spine for a limb, and if the spine’s only sensory function is to extend outwards in
a single direction so as to register collisions with distinct bodies, then such collisions would yield non-haptic,
tactile experiences that are spatially punctiliar (cf. Smith [2002] 154).
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enumerated in (T). Moreover, this case undermines not only the necessity of apparent three-
dimensional spatiality in experience (as ganzfelds do), but that of apparent two-dimensional
spatiality as well (as ganzfelds may not). That is, the possibility of spatially punctiliar ex-
periences shows that a widely held constraint, viz. “If x is visually aware of y (if x sees y),
then y must look extended to x”, is false.16
What conclusion should we draw from the possibility of these sorts of experience? One
response is to maintain the interpretation of transparency expressed in (T), but abandon its
universality. These and other atypical experiences show, according to this approach, that
transparency is a normal but not ubiquitous phenomenon.17
But I think this approach is mistaken. The two sorts of experience we have considered
are indeed counterexamples to (T). But (T)’s inadequacies extend well beyond these atypical
cases. I noted earlier that an experience’s phenomenal character is compatible with a wide
range of possibilities about both the experience’s nature and the nature of the sensuous ele-
ments one appreciates therein. But the retreat to apparent ontological status does not place
its advocate on safe ground. For a typical experience’s phenomenal character is not only com-
patible with, say, a sense-datum account of perceptual experience, it is exactly what we ought
to expect from a sense-datum account. Competing philosophical accounts of perception—e.g.
representationalism, na¨ıve realism, projectivism, sense-datum theories, etc.—issue identical
phenomenological “predictions.” So even in unexceptional cases, experiential phenomenality,
by itself, is silent with respect to the classifications in (T).
Additionally (but relatedly), phenomenological reflection, by itself, places no conceptual
or semantic constraints on discourse or judgment about experiential phenomenality. Most
of the time, a normal perceiver undergoing an unexceptional experience will describe the
sensuous qualities she appreciates as being instantiated in an objective, worldly entity. Fur-
thermore, if she is justified in thinking that nothing is awry, she will be warranted when
16Pautz [2007] 517. In particular, the possibility of spatially punctiliar experiences undermines any inter-
pretation of transparency according to which the phenomenon consists in our appreciation of a multiplicity
of sensuous elements “as being spatially related to one another” but does not require “that these spatial
relationships include that of depth” (Schroer [2007] 410).
17These responses range from the mere withholding of judgment when certain types of experience are at
issue (Dretske [1995] xv) to the outright denial that certain types of experience are transparent (e.g. Block
[1996], Kind [2003], and Smith [2008]).
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she judges that things are as she appreciates them to be. But we cannot accuse someone
of inconsistency or misunderstanding simply because she judges, after reflecting upon the
phenomenality of her experiences, that the sensuous qualities she appreciates are instanti-
ated in one or more private, mind-dependent sense-data. If, for example, a perceiver were
antecedently committed to a sense-datum account, it would not only be coherent for her
to judge that a sensuous color she appreciates is an intrinsic property of an amalgam of
sense-data, it would be reasonable for her to do so. It would, of course, be unreasonable
for someone not antecedently committed to a sense-datum account to make such judgments.
But this suggests only that the phenomenality of experience, by itself, does not epistemically
privilege one set of judgments over its alternatives (cf. Gupta [2006]).
3.2 CORE TRANSPARENCY AND PHENOMENAL PRESENCE
Should we conclude then that no experiences are transparent? To do so would be to deny
that we can educe any important insight from the sort of phenomenological observations
to which the champions of experiential transparency appeal. This, I believe, is to go too
far. Though transparency’s significance is far more modest than is commonly proclaimed,
its advocates are pointing to a genuine phenomenon. The proper response, I contend, is to
uphold the thesis that all experiences are transparent, but to employ an interpretation of
transparency that is free of unwarranted commitments.
The seed of an appropriately parsimonious interpretation is already contained in our
examinations of ganzfeld and spatially punctiliar experiences. It seems that no matter how
simple or peculiar an experience may be, we always appreciate its sensuous elements as being
present or before us in a way that the objects of most beliefs and judgments are not. That
is, when we phenomenally appreciate a sensuous element in an experience, we appreciate it
as being both something other than ourselves and as standing in opposition to ourselves.
This view, which I call Core Transparency (CT), can be formulated in two interdependent
ways.
(CT1) The sensuous elements that one phenomenally appreciates in an experience are al-
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ways appreciated as other.
(CT2) The sensuous elements that one phenomenally appreciates in an experience are never
appreciated as being, being instantiated in, or being about the self qua experiential
subject (or a state/mode thereof).
I will call the experiential nexus of self and other to which this pair of formulations refer
phenomenal presence. Phenomenal presence is central to the presentational character of
experience and it is in the disclosure of phenomenal presence that transparency’s significance
principally consists.18
If Core Transparency is to avoid (T)’s fate, we must be careful to distinguish the pred-
icates ‘ appreciates x as other’ and ‘ appreciates x as (being. . . the) self’ from similar
expressions that we have already jettisoned, e.g. ‘ appreciates x as objective’ and ‘
appreciates x as distally located’. For (T)’s failure stems not from the particular classes or
properties it employs, but from the very appeal to classification. If phenomenal presence
involved the attribution of properties to, or the classification of, an experience’s sensuous el-
ements, then it would determine a veridicality-evaluable claim. But as we have already seen,
the metaphysical neutrality of phenomenological reflection guarantees that transparency, by
itself, makes no such claims.
What then is the significance of (CT)? We can, as a first pass, describe the situation
as follows. To undergo a sensuous experience is (in part) to appreciate an element as other
or as before one; it is (in part) to appreciate a manifest opposition between the self —that
before which the other is present—and the other—that which is present before the self. But
phenomenal presence does not consist in the instantiation of some relation, say, experience e
presents y to z by members of two distinct kinds, viz. other and self. The distinction between
self and other is rather an oblique communication of sensuous experience’s basic and intrinsic
phenomenal structure. Sensuous experiences are phenomenally articulate unities and to
18Experience’s presentational character has long been considered a basic datum that any adequate philo-
sophical account of perception must accommodate. From sense-datum theorists—“[T]hat this whole field of
colour is presented to my consciousness [. . . ] cannot possibly be doubted. [. . . ] This peculiar and ultimate
manner of being present to consciousness is called being given, and that which is thus present is called a
datum” (Price [1932] 3)—to direct realists—“[Perceptual] experience has a kind of directness, immediacy
and involuntariness which is not shared by a belief which I might have about the object in its absence.
It seems therefore unnatural to describe visual experiences as representations [. . . ] because of the special
features of perceptual experiences I propose to call them ‘presentations’ ” (Searle [1983] 46).
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appreciate something as other is to appreciate its invariant position within this bipartite,
phenomenal articulation. I will elucidate this view by examining the two formulations of
(CT) in turn.
(CT1) — According to (CT1), experience is necessarily presentational; there can be no
appreciation of a sensuous element in experience that is not also an appreciation of it as other.
This is true even of pain experiences and cases of perceptual imagination. Insofar as one
appreciates a sensuous element in such experiences, one appreciates it as other. There may
be, in addition to this manifest otherness, a genuine phenomenal basis for associating some
of these elements more intimately with the self than others: an appearance of subjectivity or
interiority may be due to, respectively, a distinctive sense of ownership in bodily sensation
or an appreciation of the subordinacy of imaginative phenomenality to the spontaneity of
our mental agencies. But the sensuousness of these experiences guarantees that they involve
an apparent confrontation with something other than oneself.
This is not because sensuous experience always involves the appreciation of something
as having features that would ground a classification of kind, viz. the kind other, but be-
cause phenomenal presence does not involve veridicality-evaluable classifications at all. It
is a category mistake to assess phenomenal presence in terms of success and failure.19 To
appreciate a sensuous element as other is not to appreciate some mark possessed by that
element; it does not consist in the apparent exemplification of some property or the appar-
ent satisfaction of some criterion. It is rather to appreciate the sensuous element’s position
within the experience’s basic phenomenal articulation. The occupation of such a phenomenal
position by a sensuous element in an experience is no more subject to conditions of satisfac-
tion or veridicality than is the occupation of a grammatical position by a proper name in a
sentence.20
19Compare with the following remarks: “Phenomenal consciousness is indeed a presentation to the indi-
vidual that cannot fail. It cannot fail, not because it is an infallible representation, but because it is not a
representation with veridicality conditions at all. It can neither fail nor succeed. Either phenomenal aspects
of psychological states are present for, presented to, the individual in consciousness, or they are not. There
is no question of right or wrong. It is a matter of presence or absence” (Burge [2007b] 406–7).
20It may help those familiar with Frege’s philosophy of logic to note that this account of experiences as
phenomenally articulate unities with a structure describable in terms of the distinction between self and
other resembles, in several important respects, Frege’s account of thoughts as logically articulate unities with
a structure describable in terms of the categorial distinction between object and concept (Frege [1892/1997b];
cf. Geach [1976], Diamond [1984]). The distinction between object and concept does not effect an ontological
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(CT2) — According to (CT2), the phenomenal appreciation of a sensuous element in ex-
perience can never be an appreciation of our selves, or the states/modes thereof, as such.
Hume makes this point vividly when he reports on his attempts to do so:
[W]hen I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular
perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never
catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the
perception. (Hume [1739/1978] I.vi.6)
As a matter of ontology, we are personal selves—living, embodied human-beings with
complex psychological histories located within an objective, ordered world of public, physical
objects. Perhaps it is possible for one to appreciate a sensuous element in experience that
is, as a matter of fact, a feature of oneself qua personal. That is, there is nothing incoherent
about the sensuous manifestation (and the correlative appreciation as other) of an intrinsic
feature of a personal self. But as a matter of what is revealed in experience’s presentational
character, experiential subjects are phenomenal selves. Thus conceived, the other is simply
that which is present before the self; the nature of the phenomenal self is exhausted by the
position it occupies within experience’s phenomenal articulation.21
So the phenomenal self is not sensuously manifest in experience. For to be sensuous is,
in part, to be appreciated as other, and to be appreciated as other is to occupy a particular
position within experience’s phenomenal articulation. The phenomenal self cannot occupy
this position, it cannot be sensuous and present before one, without ceasing to be what it
is. Any attempt to appreciate the phenomenal self or to appreciate the features, including
structural features, of experience itself in the same manner as we appreciate an experience’s
sensuous elements is guaranteed to fail.22
division of entities into kinds; the distinction captures thought’s logical articulation—an articulation which
cannot be expressed in thought but is reflected in the syntactic segmentation of a properly constructed
language’s well-formed formulas. Similarly, the distinction between self and other does not divide the
world into two kinds; the distinction captures experience’s phenomenal articulation—an articulation which
cannot be expressed by an experiential content but is phenomenally manifest in sensuous experience. ‘Self’
and ‘other’ signify, as it were, phenomenal categories. This connection (also mentioned in fn. 22) will be
expanded greatly in ch. 4.
21Phenomenal presence determines a phenomenological conception of the self, not an ontological concep-
tion. Phenomenologically, the self phenomenal presence reveals is a featureless locus of pure apprehension.
But it needn’t thereby be an attenuated Cartesian Ego or a merely formal transcendental subject. It may
be, as far as ontology is concerned, an aspect of the temporally extended life of a personal self, i.e. an aspect
of a “man who, in natural self-experience, finds himself as a man” (Husserl [1931/1991] 25).
22The parallels between the current proposal and Frege’s account of thought’s logical structure (cf. fn.
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These conclusions may initially appear to be in conflict with my earlier assertion that
experiential transparency’s significance consists in its disclosure of phenomenal presence, i.e.
in the disclosure of the intrinsic nexus of self and other that structures every episode of
sensuous phenomenal appreciation. But to dissolve this tension, we needn’t posit additional
sensuous elements. Experience’s presentational character does not involve an appreciation
of some sensuous “present-to-me” or “is-mine” quality (cf. Kapitan [1999] 40). If we do
appreciate phenomenal presence, it will be among the non-sensuous aspects of experiential
phenomenality. For if phenomenal presence were sensuous, it would not be a manifestation
of experience’s basic phenomenal structure but would, like every other sensuous element in
experience, simply occupy one position within this structure.
And we needn’t advert to additional de se representational capacities. Intellectually
sophisticated subjects can conceptually represent an experience’s sensuous elements as being
present to them qua subjects, but such representation is not a part of sensuous experience per
se. The appreciation of phenomenal presence (and the concomitant appreciation of oneself
qua phenomenal subject) is pre-reflective.23
Most important, it is a mistake to suppose that an appreciation of phenomenal presence
requires one to turn away from that which is present in experience and toward some isolated
interiority. Experience is universally and intrinsically directed toward the other. But it is
only through the presence of the other that the phenomenal self exists at all. The intrin-
sic orientation of experiential phenomenality toward the other phenomenally embodies its
converse. To focus, as we must, on the other in experience is, ipso actu, to appreciate its
position with respect to our phenomenal selves.
So phenomenal presence is not sensuous. But it is phenomenally appreciable. This
is what the phenomenological observations that have so impressed the advocates of trans-
20 and ch. 4) are especially strong on this point. According to Frege, we cannot truthfully (or sensibly)
say of a concept that it is a concept; any attempt to make a singular claim about a concept will invariably
result in a claim about an object. For “the three words ‘the concept horse’ do designate an object, but on
that very account they do not designate a concept” (Frege [1892/1997b] 184). According to the view I am
elucidating, we cannot appreciate the phenomenal self (or the states/modes thereof) as such; any attempt
to appreciate the self as such will invariably result in the appreciation of a sensuous element as other. For
we can appreciate sensuous elements in experience, but on that very account they are not features of the
phenomenal self.
23On the notion of pre-reflective awareness, see Henrich [1970], Frank [1995], Zahavi [1999], and Thomasson
[2000].
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parency reveal—not the apparent natures of that which is present in experience, but the
aspect of experiential phenomenality that constitutes this appreciable presence itself. Any
account of perception that purports to provide a complete explanation of experiential phe-
nomenality must accommodate this ubiquitous phenomenon.
3.3 THE EXPLANATORY INADEQUACY OF REPRESENTATIONALISM
This essay’s ultimate goal is to illuminate the relationship between the intentionality and
the phenomenality of perceptual experience. Phenomenal presence bears a twofold signif-
icance for this project. Its first consequence is negative. I will argue in this section that
phenomenal presence neither depends essentially upon nor is explanatorily grounded in the
non-phenomenal, representational features of experience. Its second consequence is positive.
Phenomenal presence is not representational, but is nevertheless the minimal realization of
experiential intentionality (§ 3.4).
One account of how the intentionality and phenomenality of experience are related,
namely representationalism, is overwhelmingly popular. It comprises (i) a representational
account of experiential intentionality and (ii) a thesis of ontological supervenience.
Representationalism: (i) To undergo an experience is, inter alia, to be intentionally di-
rected upon an entity in virtue of being in a state with one or more representational
contents (that meet various conditions). (ii) An experience’s phenomenal features super-
vene upon either (a) features of the experience’s representational content(s), (b) features
of the experiential state in virtue of which it has its representational content(s), and/or
(c) represented features of the entities the experience represents.
As Alex Byrne correctly notes, representationalism “does not take a stand on whether phe-
nomenal character can be explained in terms of, or reduced to, [representational features]—at
least it doesn’t if these claims don’t follow from the mere fact of supervenience” (Byrne [2001]
204; cf. Horgan [1993]). But if the representationalist is to contribute to the project of under-
standing experiential phenomenality, she must explain why each basic and distinctive type
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of phenomenal feature supervenes upon a specific class of the experience’s representational
features.
Representationalism has the resources to provide adequate explanations for many of the
relevant supervenience relations. In particular, it can explain how many of an experience’s
sensuous elements supervene upon specific features of the experience’s representational con-
tent(s). That is, representationalism can in principle explain:
(i) The scope of phenomenal appreciation—Why do I appreciate a sensuous patch of blue
(rather than a sensuous patch of red) in the experience I am currently undergoing and
why do I appreciate it as being circular and located three feet to my left (rather than as
being rectangular and located three feet to my right)?
(ii) The phenomenal differences between experiences—In virtue of what does the phenome-
nality of my experience of a red patch differ from the phenomenality of my experience
of a blue patch? In virtue of what does the phenomenality of my visual experience of a
circular object differ from the phenomenality of my tactile experience of the same circular
object?
(iii) Many distinctive features of experiential phenomenality—What explains the complexity,
richness, determinacy, and particularity of, say, my typical visual experiences?24
But even if we grant that experience’s representational features not only determine but ex-
plain these aspects of experiential phenomenality, we have not thereby conceded that the
representationalist has successfully executed her explanatory project. For the representation-
alist must not only explain what is phenomenally present in experience; she must explain
the phenomenality of this presence itself. There are numerous representational states, e.g.
beliefs, judgments, desires, and other propositional attitudes, that altogether lack a presen-
tational character. What representational facts explain the manifestation of phenomenal
presence in experience and the absence of phenomenal presence in other contentful states?25
24An example: the colors one appreciates in a typical visual experience are phenomenally rich. That is,
the shades are absolutely determinate and assessments of their relative similarity yield a dense ordering.
The representationalist can explain this aspect of visual phenomenality by attributing a non-discursive or
analog content to the experience upon which sensuous colors supervene. The representational structure of
such contents is isomorphic to the phenomenal structure of the similarity orderings and can thereby explain
the latter’s manifestation.
25This challenge is similar to that posed by the alleged possibility of absent qualia. The representation-
alist must be able to explain, insists the proponent of absent qualia, why it isn’t possible for there to be
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There are several approaches available to the representationalist. I will focus on the
shortcomings of three: (i) appeals to content, (ii) appeals to functional role, and (iii) appeals
to primitive forms of representation. I will then offer reasons for thinking that these attempts
do not fail because of their respective idiosyncrasies. Representationalism’s explanatory
limitations are, I contend, endemic to the theory.
Approach 1: Appeal to Content. The representationalist can advert to the distinctive
kinds of representational content experiences possess, e.g. non-conceptual, analog, pictorial,
etc., to explain experience’s presentational character. But this view is a non-starter. First,
the candidate contents can be attributed to representational states that lack a presentational
character. For example, it is not unreasonable to think that there are sub-personal states
generated in vision that non-conceptually represent changes in light intensity (Tye [2000]
62; cf. Stalnaker [1998]). So the possession of such contents is not sufficient to demarcate
phenomenally presentational states.
Second, and more important, being present is not a property of experiences’ sensuous
elements. According to representationalism, the phenomenal appreciation of x in an expe-
rience is constituted (in part) by the inclusion of x, or an entity that determines x, in the
content of the experience’s constituent representation. To say that an experience, in addition
to representing an object, must represent that object as being present, is to introduce an
unnecessary and problematic redundancy.
For these reasons, most representationalists do not attempt to explain an experience’s
presentational character in terms of its representational content but rather offer explanations
that appeal to the distinctive characteristics of experiential representation itself. That is,
they maintain that,
[representationalism] is not the view that the content of an intentional state determines
its nature qua mental state without remainder [. . . ] it is the doctrine that the content of
an experience plus the fact that the experience represents the content as obtaining in the
way distinctive of perceptual representation are what determines the experience’s nature
without remainder. (Jackson [2007] 58; cf. Chalmers [2004] and Martin [2002b] 378)
functional and representational duplicates of sentient creatures that lack phenomenal consciousness. The
present challenge does not focus on qualia themselves but on the phenomenally appreciable presence of such
qualia. I believe that this reorientation avoids many of the problems associated with the hypothesis of absent
qualia and other challenges that fall under the heading of ‘The Explanatory Gap’ (cf. Levine [1983]) while
simultaneously capturing what is central to the dissatisfaction of those who issue such challenges.
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These attempts typically appeal to the distinctive functional role of experiential represen-
tation (approach 2) or introduce primitive forms of experiential representation (approach
3).
Approach 2: Appeal to Functional Role. Representationalists often claim that it is
experience’s functional role that makes experiential representation distinctive. For example,
Tye claims that
experiences and feelings, qua bearers of phenomenal character, play a certain distinctive
functional role. They [. . . ] stand ready and available to make direct impact on beliefs
and/or desires. (Tye [2000] 62)
A subject phenomenally appreciates something in virtue of being in an experiential state
that is, in the normal run of things, a maximally proximal causal trigger for the formation of
beliefs, desires, and purposive actions. Representationalists can invoke functional roles of this
sort, i.e. roles that involve personal-level cognitive/practical agencies, to explain experience’s
presentational character.
[F]or the subject it is as if the objects are right there before him. [The representationalist]
seeks to explain this aspect of experience by reference to the kind of state of mind experi-
encing is. According to him, it is just that state of mind which is liable to fix the subject’s
beliefs about how his environment must be, and hence is a state of being presented to as if
things are so. (Martin [2002b] 399; cf. Langsam [2001] 413)
It is true that our perceptual experiences are apt or poised to produce (authoritative)
perceptual beliefs and influence action. But the representationalist’s approach reverses the
proper order of explanation. Though I do not wish to endorse its representationalist accou-
trements, the spirit of the following quote goes some way toward motivating this stance.
In my view, it’s not the irresistibility of our perceptual beliefs, nor the nature of our
concepts, which explains why our experiences give us the immediate justification they do.
Rather, it’s the peculiar “phenomenal force” or way our experiences have of presenting
propositions to us. Our experience represent propositions in such a way that it “feels as
if” we could tell that those propositions are true—and that we’re perceiving them to be
true—just by virtue of having them so represented. (Pryor [2000] 547 fn. 37)
It is phenomenal presence itself that is both the source of our inclination to form beliefs
on the basis of experience and the (partial) source of the warrant associated with these
beliefs. The doxastic role of experience cannot be explained without adverting to experience’s
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presentational character. But representationalism, even versions according to which the
phenomenal features of experience are identical to (a subset of) its representational features,
must be able to explain experiential phenomenality in a manner that avoids altogether
phenomenal notions and characterizations.
Approach 3: Appeal to Primitive Representational States. The representationalist
can explain why experiences manifest a presentational character while other contentful states
do not if experience involves a primitive and sui generis form of representation. On this
approach, the distinctive manner in which an experience represents its content as obtaining
is not determined by its functional role. In fact, it is not determined by anything at all.
Though not himself a representationalist, Mark Johnston expresses this view when he says
that a, “visual experience is a sui generis propositional attitude—visually entertaining a
content concerning the scene before one’s eyes” (Johnston [1992] 172-3; cf. Chalmers [2004]).
According to this third approach, to be in a state in which something is phenomenally present
is to represent experientially that something is the case. Nothing more can be said.
If correct, the representationalist would be able to explain an experience’s presentational
character in terms of its representational features. But this approach deprives the represen-
tationalist’s explanatory project of its value. The invocation of a primitive and sui generis
kind of representational state that is essentially presentational in one’s explanation of expe-
rience’s presentational character is no better than the invocation of a virtus dormitiva; it is
to abandon the view that there is an independent and relatively basic level of explanation
for facts about experiential phenomenality.
Though these three approaches do not exhaust representationalism’s explanatory re-
sources, the remaining options will fare no better. For if our interpretation of transparency
is correct, then it undermines any representationalist explanation of experience’s presen-
tational character. I have argued that the phenomenological observations that ground the
thesis of experiential transparency do not reveal the apparent natures of that which is present
in experience or of experience itself, but disclose what is central to experience’s presenta-
tional character. This non-sensuous aspect of experiential phenomenality, namely phenom-
enal presence, is the manifestation of sensuous experience’s basic and intrinsic phenomenal
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structure. It may still be the case that experiences are essentially representational. But if
the nature of experience is entirely determined by its representational features, then this
class will necessarily include representations that are intrinsically and irreducibly phenome-
nal. That is, if representationalism is true, then it must take the form described in the third
approach canvassed above. But if representationalism requires the introduction of primitive,
presentational forms of representation, then it will be unable to provide an adequate and
exhaustive explanation of experiential phenomenality.
The representationalist can retreat to the less ambitious claim of ontological superve-
nience. For phenomenal presence poses no threat to the thesis that experiential phenome-
nality supervenes upon experience’s representational features. But while relations of super-
venience are often uninformative, this particular instance is exceptionally so. Phenomenal
presence is not just a universal feature of sensuous experience, it is a necessary feature; one
cannot appreciate a sensuous element in an experience that lacks a presentational character.
So facts involving phenomenal presence are trivially entailed by facts involving experience’s
representational features. Without an adequate explanation of this supervenience relation,
representationalism can say next to nothing about a ubiquitous feature of experiential phe-
nomenality.
Perhaps the only option left is the bold recognition of representationalism’s limited ex-
planatory power:
Why then do experiences, including hallucinatory experiences, have a presentational phe-
nomenology while thoughts do not? [. . . ] My answer to this question is that there is no
answer. (Pautz [2007] 519)
3.4 PHENOMENAL PRESENCE AND EXPERIENTIAL
INTENTIONALITY
3.4.1 Intentionality
Recall our previous characterization of intentionality (§ 2.1.4).
(Int 1**) Intentionality is that aspect of an occurrent, categorical state or event that
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consists in
(i) its being of, about, or directed upon an entity other than itself (or upon itself qua
other) [directedness ]
(ii) as an exemplar of some general property, relation, kind, or category [generality ]
(iii) from a particular perspective or under a particular aspect [aspectual shape ]
(iv) to or for its subject [personal subjectivity ].
Directedness . It is in the nature of intentionality to be directed beyond itself, beyond
the individual (or a state thereof) that possess it. Intentional states that are, as a matter
of fact, directed upon themselves are possible. It is even possible, as Brentano held, that
all intentional states are, in addition to being directed beyond themselves, self-directed.
But when such cases occur, the identity that obtains between that which is intentionally
directed and that upon which it is intentionally directed is entirely accidental. Such states
are directed upon themselves qua other.
Generality . Our intentional states are not directed upon entities simpliciter. They are
always directed upon entities as exemplars of some property, relation, kind, or category that
is capable, in principle, of applying to or being exemplified by various particulars.
Aspectual shape . Our intentional states are always directed upon entities from a particular
perspective or under a particular aspect. This is easily seen in perceptual experience. Our
perceptual capacities are divided into distinct sensory modalities—a single property, say,
sphericity, can be experienced either visually or tactilely. Moreover, they are always exercised
from a particular point of view and provide, at best, a partial and incomplete perspective
on that which we perceive.
Personal subjectivity . Though it is convenient to attribute intentionality to an organism’s
states and events, a convenience that I have already taken advantage of, the feature’s proper
bearer is individual organisms. It is individual organisms inhabiting and coping with their
environment that perceive, believe, judge, desire, reason, and know. To attribute an inten-
tional state to an individual is to communicate indirectly that the individual is intentionally
directed upon an entity. So if a system involved in an organism’s perceptual experience is
entirely modular in its output, that is, if the states it yields are neither attributable to the
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whole organism nor first-personally available to guide the activity or other responses of the
whole organism, then these states do not possess intentionality.
Some of these conditions, especially personal subjectivity, are controversial. But if we
momentarily prescind from this condition, it is clear, as we have already seen (§ 2.1), that
(Int 1**) serves as the core of the comparatively substantive accounts of intentionality one
typically encounters: (i) the broadly semantical/representational account of intentionality
that takes the basic other-directedness of an intentional state to consist in the possession of
one or more representational contents that determine conditions of correctness/satisfaction,
and (ii) the relational account of intentionality that takes the basic other-directedness of an
intentional state to consist in the establishment of a simple, non-representational relation
between the state (or the individual whose state it is) and one or more entities that partly
constitute this intentional relation.
According to the representational elaboration, a state is intentional only if there are ways
the world can be that render it veridical. This captures the generality of intentional directed-
ness because such contents attribute some general property, relation, kind or category to one
or more entities. Moreover, this conception can accommodate the aspectual shape of inten-
tionality since a state’s representational contents can have principles of type-individuation
that are more fine-grained than the experience’s satisfaction condition.
According to the relational elaboration, perceptual success does not presuppose experien-
tial intentionality but consists in its establishment. That is, particular experiential episodes
establish connections with entities and, in so doing, make them available to the perceiver
as objects for attention, recognition, thought, and purposive action. The relata upon which
our experiences are intentionally directed occur as exemplars or instances of various general
features and the intentional relation obtains from a particular point of view thereby satis-
fying the conditions of generality and aspectual shape. But standing in such an intentional
relation to an entity is no more evaluable for correctness or veridicality than is standing in
the relation kicking to a soccer ball.
So directedness upon an entity can involve the possession of representational contents
and directedness upon an entity can involve the establishment of certain non-representational
relations. But (Int 1**) captures the common commitment of both views; the representa-
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tional and relational accounts simply provide different analyses of this conceptually prior
characterization of intentional directedness.
3.4.2 Experiential Intentionality
The neutrality of (Int 1**) with respect to the various, relatively-substantive accounts of
intentionality is mirrored by the neutrality of (CT) with respect to the various, relatively-
substantive accounts of the nature of experience’s presentational character. This opens up
the possibility that phenomenological reflection reveals an essentially phenomenal form of
intentional directedness. But it is more than a possibility. Phenomenal presence satisfies all
of the conditions for intentionality encapsulated in (Int 1**): (i) The phenomenal apprecia-
tion of sensuous elements in experience is universally and intrinsically other-directed. (ii) The
sensuous elements one appreciates exemplify one or more appreciable general characteristics.
(iii) These sensuous elements are always appreciated under an aspect; phenomenal presence
affords a primitive “point of view” on that which is present. (iv) The sensuous elements
we appreciate in experience are present to the self; we appreciate these sensuous elements
both as being other than ourselves and as standing in opposition to ourselves. Consequently,
phenomenal presence realizes a basic and non-derivative form of intentional directedness.
Several philosophers argue that experiences possess some form of phenomenal or ex-
periential intentionality. But most of these accounts take this intentionality to consist in
the possession of one or more phenomenal contents, i.e. veridicality-evaluable contents that
are determined by a state’s phenomenal features. A subset of these philosophers make the
stronger claim that these phenomenal contents are fully constituted by the state’s phenom-
enal features and cannot be reduced to its non-phenomenal features.26
Given the result of the previous section, namely, that the representational features of
experience neither constitute nor explain phenomenal presence, it follows that accounts
according to which the intentionality of experience is essentially representational are too
demanding. This is the case regardless of whether these representational contents are phe-
nomenal or not. Experiences may still possess phenomenal contents, but there is a form of
26Examples of the stronger claim include Horgan and Tienson [2002], Loar [2003a], and Kriegel [2007].
64
phenomenal intentionality that is distinct from and prior to phenomenal representation.27
Despite these differences, the present proposal shares at least this much in common
with alternative views of phenomenal intentionality: experiential phenomenality contains a
basic form of intentional directedness and any attempt to provide an account of experiential
intentionality that ignores phenomenality (and vice versa) cannot succeed.
27Consequently, the present account can avoid many of the controversies that surround the notion of
phenomenal content, e.g. whether such contents are narrow or wide. Additionally, this form of intentional
directedness only occurs in sensuous experiences. So the present account can remain neutral about its
relationship to the intentionality of non-sensuous states.
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4.0 CATEGORIES — LOGICAL AND PHENOMENAL
We arrived at our initial characterization of phenomenal presence by first stripping away the
inessential features of a related phenomenon, experiential transparency, of which it is the
core. A richer understanding of phenomenal presence required the provision of a positive
characterization. An attempt was made (§ 3.2) and in the process of doing so, the distinction
between self and other was compared to the Fregean distinction between concept and object
(fns. 20 and 22). In this chapter, I wish to expand upon this comparison. Doing so will not
only (I hope) help the reader to understand phenomenal presence more thoroughly, but will
uncover aspects of phenomenal presence that we have yet to touch upon.
I begin with a discussion on Frege’s conception of logical categories (§ 4.1) and then
develop the idea that self and other are phenomenal categories (§ 4.2).
4.1 CONCEPT AND OBJECT AS LOGICAL CATEGORIES
In the introduction of his Foundations of Arithmetic, Frege states the work’s three guiding
principles. The third is “never to lose sight of the distinction between concept and ob-
ject” (Frege [1884/1953] x). This distinction retains its elevated status throughout Frege’s
subsequent work and is repeatedly the focus of his philosophical attention.1 The source of
this continual attention, however, goes beyond the distinction’s alleged importance. For as
we will see, the distinction between concept and object, by its very nature, erects perhaps
1Most notably in his ‘On Concept and Object’ (Frege [1892/1997b]), but also in several posthumously
published texts, e.g. Frege [1892/1997a] and Frege [1891/1997b].
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insuperable obstacles to its perspicuous and intelligible description.2
Frege’s expositions of the object–concept distinction typically begin with a discussion of
sentences. The most salient grammatical division within a majority of ordinary-language
statements is that between subject and predicate. Instantiations of this schema can embody
what are logically quite different relations.3 The most important of these logical relations
is that which is present in sentences that have a singular term (e.g. a proper name) for a
grammatical subject. Let us call such sentences STP-sentences (S ingular T erm Predicate
sentences). For example, ‘John is six feet tall’ is an STP-sentence that can be analyzed
grammatically into a proper name, ‘John’, and a monadic predicate ‘is six feet tall’.
The subject–predicate analysis of STP-sentences can be incorporated in principle into
either of two opposing accounts of sentential composition. On the one hand, we can take
STP-sentences to be constructed from linguistically self-subsistent and complete subjects
and predicates by a grammatically independent relation, say concatenation. On the other
hand, we can take subjects, predicates, or both to be dependent, incomplete abstractions of
grammatically prior, unitary sentences.
Frege defends the latter view. What joins subject and predicate within a sentence is
neither concatenation nor any other external relation. According to Frege, there is a basic
predicative “relation” that obtains between a sentence’s subject and predicate. This source of
sentential unity is not external to its relata; it belongs essentially to a sentence’s grammatical
predicate. “[T]he relation of subject to predicate” says Frege, “is not a third thing added to
the two, but it belongs to the content of the predicate” (Frege [1882/1997] 81). When we
decompose a STP-sentence into its grammatical elements, we isolate the predicate from its
subject. But this predicate retains the same inherent power to join with a subject that it
possesses in its original unified state. So grammatical predicates, considered in abstraction
from their sentential context, are incomplete (unvollsta¨ndig) and in need of supplementation
(erga¨nzungsbedu¨rftig). To make this predicative incompleteness pellucid, we can employ a
notation that explicitly marks the location of the grammatical subject’s removal, e.g. ‘ is
2The following discussion of Frege is heavily indebted to Diamond [1984], Diamond [1988], and Thomas
Ricketts’ unpublished paper ‘Concepts, Objects, and the Context Principle’.
3According to Frege, the schema can be satisfied by sentences that express relations of conceptual subor-
dination, e.g. ‘All logicians are philosophers’, or identity, e.g. ‘The Morning Star is Venus’. Also, there are
sentences that are not analyzable into subjects and predicates at all, say, most imperatives.
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six feet tall’.
Frege’s ultimate concern is not sentences, but thoughts or judgeable contents. Neverthe-
less, this linguistic digression is heuristically valuable. For the application of the grammat-
ical distinction between subject and predicate to STP-sentences mirrors the application of
the comparatively fundamental logical distinction between object and concept to thoughts.4
“[T]he analysis of a sentence” says Frege, “corresponds to an analysis of the thought [. . . ] and
this [viz. this correspondence] I should like to call a basic logical fact (logische Urthatsache).”5
So just as STP-sentences can be decomposed into subjects and predicates, thoughts can be
decomposed into objects and concepts. Objects are discrete and self-subsistent individu-
als; they are integral wholes (abgeschlossen). Concepts, on the other hand, are unsaturated
(ungesa¨ttigt). Just as subjects must stand in the grammatically basic “relation” of predica-
tion to predicates within a sentence, so objects must stand in the logically basic “relation” of
subsumption to concepts within a thought.6 Furthermore, just as predication is an inherent
feature of grammatical predicates thereby rendering predicates incomplete when considered
in isolation from a subject, subsumption is an inherent feature of concepts thereby render-
ing concepts unsaturated when considered in isolation from an object. Frege makes these
parallels explicitly when he remarks that the imprecision of ordinary language,
creates the impression that the relation of subsumption is a third element supervenient upon
the object and the concept. This isn’t the case: the unsaturatedness of the concept brings
it about that the object, in effecting the saturation, engages immediately with the concept,
without need of any special cement. Concept and object are fundamentally (urspru¨nglich)
dependent on each other, and in subsumption we have their fundamental connection” (Frege
[1906/1969] 193; cf. Frege [1892/1997b] 193).
That concepts are by their very nature joined with objects to form the unitary judgeable
contents of thought allows Frege to equate concepts with functions. Concepts are a subclass
of monadic functions which map objects to a pair of privileged objects: the True and the
False.7 For example, the concept denoted by ‘ is six feet tall’ maps any object that is six
4Table 1 (p. 69) encapsulates this paragraph’s analogical characterization of the object–concept distinc-
tion.
5Frege [1902/1976] 218. Cf. Frege [1923/1977].
6“The fundamental logical relation (logische Grundbeziehung) is that of an object’s falling under a concept:
all relations between concepts [e.g. relations of conceptual subordination] can be reduced to this” (Frege
[1892/1997a] 173). Cf. Frege [1882/1997].
7See especially Frege [1891/1997a].
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The Distinction Principal Feature Form of Unity
STP-Sentences
Subject Complete
Predication
Predicate Incomplete
Thoughts
Object Saturated
Subsumption
Concept Unsaturated
Table 1: Sentences and Thoughts
feet tall, i.e. any object that the concept is six feet tall subsumes, to the True and maps
every other object to the False. A concept need not subsume an object, i.e., a concept may
be empty and map all objects to the False, but it is “essential for a concept that the question
whether something falls under it have a sense” (Frege [1882/1997] 81).
Though Frege commences his expositions of the object–concept distinction as we have—
by investigating the grammatical features of sentences and by invoking notions like function
and being unsaturated—such passages, on their own, encourage a radically incorrect inter-
pretation of Frege’s view. Taken at face value, these passages support an interpretation in
which Frege’s aim is to elucidate a mutually exclusive, and jointly exhaustive distinction
among the logical entities relevant to thoughts. If we could survey the “third realm”, as it
were, we would be able to discern in some of its members the exemplification of a mark,
say, the property of being unsaturated, in virtue of which those entities belong to the logi-
cal kind concept and the remainder to the logical kind object. On this first interpretation,
object and concept mark an ontological distinction of logical kind—the expressions ‘ is
an object’ and ‘ is a concept’ are contrasting, first-level predicates and the concepts they
signify effect a non-vacuous classification of thoughts’ logical components into two mutually
exclusive kinds.8
But a second way to understand Frege’s view becomes available once we move beyond
the initial stages of his expositions. On this second interpretation, Frege’s invocation of
the object–concept distinction is viewed as an oblique communication of thoughts’ logical
8Many advance this incorrect interpretation. A relatively clear example is Parsons [1986].
69
articulation. That is, ‘concept’ and ‘object’ indicate positions or roles within the logical
structure of objective thought. The distinction’s function is not to pick out or to signify
logical kinds but is rather to indicate what I will call logical categories.
Peter Geach was the first to provide what has since become a widely accepted starting
point for investigations of the object–concept distinction that conform to the second of our
interpretations:
Frege already held, and his philosophy of logic would oblige him to hold, that there are
logical category-distinctions which will clearly show themselves in a well-constructed for-
malized language, but which cannot properly be asserted in language: the sentences in
which we seek to convey them in the vernacular are logically improper and admit of no
translation into well-formed formulas of symbolic logic. All the same, there is a test for these
sentences’ having conveyed the intended distinctions—namely, that by their aid mastery of
the formalized language is attainable. (Geach [1976] 55)
This passage comprises three claims.
(i) Both ordinary languages and properly constructed logical languages cannot be used to
make true (or even sensible) statements about the object–concept distinction.
(ii) Ordinary-language sentences can nevertheless play a heuristic role; they can facilitate
the mastery of a properly constructed logical language.
(iii) The object–concept distinction can be discerned in the well-formed statements of a prop-
erly constructed logical language.9
Though these theses are subject to a variety of subtly different interpretations, it is
clear that Frege accepts them in some form. “If I want to speak of a concept,” says Frege
“language, with an almost irresistible force, compels me to use an inappropriate expression
which obscures—I might almost say falsifies—the thought” (Frege [1892/1997a] 174). Frege
asserts slight variations of this claim on many occasions, for example:
I admit that there is a quite peculiar obstacle in the way of an understanding with my
reader. By a kind of necessity of language, my expressions, taken literally, sometimes miss
9These theses have attracted significant attention in recent years, attention due largely to their appropri-
ation by Wittgenstein in his Tractaus Logico-Philosophicus. The principal concern of this literature is the
distinction between saying and showing, that is, the question of whether a language can somehow show or
display truths that cannot be said sensibly within it. Notable contributions include Geach [1976], Diamond
[1988], Goldfarb [1997], Hacker [2000], Conant [2000], and Sullivan [2002]. In the discussion that follows, I
attempt to elucidate the notion of a logical category while remaining neutral with respect to most of the
difficult and contentions issues that encumber these debates.
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my thought; I mention an object, when what I intend is a concept. (Frege [1892/1997b]
192; cf. Frege [1906/1969] 192ff. and Frege [1906/1997] 295-6)
So Frege’s initial descriptions of the object–concept distinction are, by his own admission, at
best misleading and at worst nonsensical. There are two ways in which these descriptions are
problematic: (i) they are problematic insofar as their grammatical subjects purport to signify
concepts, and (ii) they are problematic insofar as they involve the grammatical predicates
‘ is a concept’ or ‘ is an object’.
First, when Frege says ‘The concept horse is a function with one argument-place’ or
‘The concept square root of four is unsaturated’, he appears to be making a claim about a
concept. But, says Frege, this is not so. For a “concept cannot play [the part of grammatical
subject], in view of its predicative nature; it must first be converted into an object, or, more
precisely, an object must go proxy for it” (Frege [1892/1997b] 185; cf. Frege [1884/1953] x).10
So the grammatical subject ‘the concept horse’ cannot signify a concept and, in general, we
cannot truthfully (or sensibly) say of a concept that it is a concept.
Second, when Frege says ‘No object is a concept’ the terms ‘object’ and ‘concept’, on
his own initial construal of such statements, signify first-level concepts that take objects as
arguments. This statement is therefore equivalent to a generalization, namely, that no object
that falls under the concept signified by ‘object’ falls under the concept signified by ‘concept’.
But every object falls under the first-level concept signified by ‘object’ and no object falls
under the first-level concept signified by ‘concept’. This generalization is far from capturing
a “distinction of the highest importance” (Frege [1892/1997b] 192). It is a vacuous triviality
that is equivalent to the claim that no object is a non-object. Frege recognizes this problem
when he says,
[T]he word ‘concept’ itself is, taken strictly, already defective, since the phrase ‘is a con-
cept’ requires a proper name as grammatical subject; and so, strictly speaking, it requires
something contradictory, since no proper name can designate a concept; or perhaps, better
still, something nonsensical. (Frege [1906/1969] 193)
Though these sentences are necessarily misleading and possibly nonsensical, Frege thinks
that they nevertheless provide “hints” (Anspielung) that can lead us to an understanding
10I am less concerned with Frege’s invocation of surrogate objects, say, concept extensions, and the prob-
lems that these proxies create than with the claim that concepts are essentially predicative.
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of the object–concept distinction.11 They can do so because they facilitate the mastery
of Frege’s Begriffsschrift : a topic-neutral notation for (i) expressing thoughts perspicuously,
unambiguously, and in accordance with the laws of logic, and (ii) executing inferences validly.
While this logical language is no better than ordinary languages for making statements about
distinctions of logical category, these distinctions are reflected in the language’s syntactical
segmentation and in the structurally determined ways in which we can use the language to
express thoughts.
To see this, we must recognize the importance of Frege’s quantificational conception
of logical generalization. Frege understood that there are two logically distinct forms of
generality. If we employ the terms ‘object’ and ‘concept’, we can describe these two manners
thusly: (i) there are unrestricted, first-level generalizations over objects, and (ii) there are
unrestricted, second-level generalizations over concepts. But these descriptions are infected
with the same tendency to mislead that we found in Frege’s initial characterizations of the
object–concept distinction. They suggest that there is an independently grounded ontological
classification of entities into two kinds—objects and concepts—that serve as the respective
domains of the two forms of logical generality.
But what Frege is trying to convey is not a conception of logical entities, but a logical con-
ception of entities. It is the laws of logic that fix exhaustively the conceptions of objecthood
and concepthood that are at issue. Frege’s Begriffsschrift reflects this logical conception
in the ways it can be used to express generalizations. The notation has two syntactically
distinct argument positions: (i) an argument position determined by proper names, and (ii)
an argument position determined by predicates. The placement of variables in the former
allows the expression of first-level generalizations and the placement of variables in the latter
allows the expression of higher-level generalizations.12 This division marks a categorial dis-
tinction; Begriffsschrift contains no variable that generalizes simultaneously over both types
of argument position.
11Two quotes: “On the introduction of a name for something logically simple, a definition is not possible.
There is nothing for it but to lead the reader or hearer, by means of hints, to understand the words as is
intended” (Frege [1892/1997b] 182) and “‘Complete’ and ‘unsaturated’ are of course only figures of speech;
but all that I wish or am able to do here is to give hints”(Frege [1892/1997b] 193).
12In the notation of Begriffsschrift’s contemporary descendants, these uses are captured respectively in
the statements (∀x)F (x) and (∀F )F (x).
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So to appreciate a distinction between logical categories is not to appreciate an ontological
division among what there is. It is rather to appreciate the logical articulation of thought.
This articulation is reflected in the syntactic segmentation of a properly constructed logical
language’s well-formed formulas and consists in its regimentation of two logically distinct
forms of quantificational generality. Someone who has mastered Begriffsschrift or any other
properly constructed logical language will recognize that the inadequacies of Frege’s initial
characterizations of the object–concept distinction do not strip the logical categories they
aim to illuminate of their significance. For the significance of these categories does not stem
from the contents of sentences or thoughts; it derives from the logical structure of thought
as reflected in the logically proper uses of language, specifically the distinctive ways in which
we can use variables of quantification to express generalizations.
4.2 SELF AND OTHER AS PHENOMENAL CATEGORIES
This discussion of logical categories can shed light on our descriptions of experiential trans-
parency and phenomenal presence. This is because the principal distinction our descriptions
employ—that between self and other—resembles Frege’s distinction between object and con-
cept in several important respects. In fact, self and other are what I will call phenomenal
categories. I attempt in this section to elucidate this notion and to argue for the appropriate-
ness of its application to the distinction between self and other. I first highlight five parallels
between the object–concept distinction and the self–other distinction and thereupon fashion
an account of phenomenal category.
4.2.1 Five Parallels
(LC1) Thought is logically articulate.
Thoughts, logically, are at once unitary and bipartite. The unity of thought consists in
subsumption, i.e. a logical nexus of two interdependent categories: object and concept.
The object is that which saturates the concept and the concept is that which is saturated
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by an object.
(PC1) Experience is phenomenally articulate.
Experiences, phenomenally, are at once unitary and bipartite. The unity of experience
consists in phenomenal presence, i.e. a phenomenally appreciable nexus of two interde-
pendent categories: self and other. The other is that which is present to the self and the
self is that before which the other is present.
(LC2) The logical unity of thought is not effected through a relation external to both objects
and concepts.
There is not a third unifying element in a thought in addition to the concept and the
object. The source of their unity resides within the concept. It is “essential for a concept
that the question whether something falls under it have a sense” (Frege [1882/1997] 81).
(PC2) The phenomenal unity of experience is not effected through a relation external to
both the self and the other.
There is not a third unifying element in an experience in addition to the self and the
other. The source of their unity resides within the self. It is essential for a self that the
question of whether something is phenomenally present before it have a sense.13
(LC3) The distinction between object and concept is not a classification of logical kinds.
The terms ‘object’ and ‘concept’ are not first-level predicates. The terms do not effect a
non-vacuous classification of a domain into mutually exclusive kinds. For something one
can think of to be (trivially) an object or (per impossibile) a concept does not consist in
the exemplification of some property or the satisfaction of some criterion.
(PC3) The distinction between self and other is not a classification of phenomenal kinds.
13On the last point, compare Zahavi: “Subjectivity is essentially oriented and open toward that which
it is not, and it is exactly in this openness that it reveals itself to itself. What is disclosed by the cogito
is, consequently, not a self-contained immanence or a pure interior selfpresence, but an openness toward
alterity, a movement of exteriorization and perpetual self-transcendence” (Zahavi [2005a] 308).
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The terms ‘self’ and ‘other’ are not first-level predicates. The terms do not effect a non-
vacuous classification of a domain into mutually exclusive kinds. For a sensuous element
in experience to be phenomenally appreciable (trivially) as other or (per impossibile) as
(a state/mode of) the self does not consist in the exemplification of some property or the
satisfaction of some criterion.
(LC4) We cannot truthfully (or sensibly) say of a concept that it is a concept.
A sentence’s grammatical subject cannot signify a concept. Frege makes this point vividly
when he affirms the sentence ‘The concept horse is not a concept’. According to Frege
“the three words ‘the concept horse’ do designate an object, but on that very account
they do not designate a concept” (Frege [1892/1997b] 184). Any attempt to make a
singular claim about a concept will invariably result in a claim about an object.
(PC4) We cannot phenomenally appreciate (the intrinsic features of) the self (or the states/
modes thereof) as such.
We cannot phenomenally appreciate a sensuous element in an experience as (a state/
mode of) the self. Hume makes this point vividly when he reports on his attempts to do
so:
[W]hen I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some
particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain
or pleasure. I never catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can
observe any thing but the perception. (Hume [1739/1978] I.vi.6)
Any attempt to phenomenally appreciate the self as such in the same manner as we
appreciate an experience’s sensuous elements will invariably result in the phenomenal
appreciation of an element in experience as other.
(LC5) The logical categories reflect the basic forms of logical generalization.
The logical articulation of thought is reflected in the syntactic segmentation of a properly
constructed logical language’s well-formed formulas and consists in its regimentation of
two logically distinct forms of quantificational generality: first-level generalizations and
higher-order generalizations.
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(PC5) The phenomenal categories reflect the basic forms of conscious awareness.
The phenomenal articulation of experience is itself phenomenally manifest and reflects
the basic modes of conscious awareness: awareness of something qua object and awareness
of something qua subject.14
4.2.2 Phenomenal Categories
Our investigation of experiential transparency (§ 3.2) yielded two interdependent formula-
tions:
(CT1) The sensuous elements that one phenomenally appreciates in an experience are al-
ways appreciated as other.
(CT2) The sensuous elements that one phenomenally appreciates in an experience are never
appreciated as being, being instantiated in, or being about the self qua experiential
subject (or a state/mode thereof).
Phenomenal presence is the experiential nexus of self and other to which this pair of formu-
lations refers.
To conceive self and other as phenomenal categories is to admit that these initial char-
acterizations of experiential transparency and phenomenal presence are misleading. For
example, the expression ‘as other’ suggests that there is some mark that a phenomenally
appreciable element in experience exemplifies in virtue of which it is so classified. That is,
the expression suggests that phenomenal appreciation is contentful; to appreciate a sensuous
element as other is to undergo an episode that is evaluable for veridicality.
But this is not so. To phenomenally appreciate a sensuous element in experience as other
is not to stand in a relation, representational or otherwise, to an entity. Moreover, the phe-
nomenally appreciable otherness in experience does not consist in an element’s membership
in or subsumption under a phenomenal kind.
14Though the distinction between the appreciation of oneself qua object and qua subject is quite old
(e.g. Kant [1781/1998] B407 or even Aristotle, Metaph. V.12 1019a15ff.), most contemporary discussions of
the distinction stem from Wittgenstein [1958] 66–7. Prominent discussions include Anscombe [1962] and
Cassam [1997]. The appreciation of oneself qua subject is closely related to the epistemological thesis that
some experiences ground self-ascriptive judgments that are immune to error through misidentification (cf.
Shoemaker [1968], Evans [1982], and Pryor [1999]).
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The sensuous elements in experience exist under the phenomenal category other. This at-
tribution is not part of the content of experience but reflects the position of sensuous elements
within experience’s invariant phenomenal structure. That is, the phenomenal categories self
and other are manifest in experience but not expressible or expressed in experience; phe-
nomenal presence does not make a claim about the world, not even the minimal claim that
something other than oneself is sensuously present in experience.15
15As with any analogy, there will be some disanalogous features. For example, one can judge without appre-
ciating the judgement’s logical articulation. An experience’s phenomenal articulation, however, is manifest
in experience and one cannot appreciate a sensuous element in an experience without also appreciating
phenomenal presence.
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5.0 PHENOMENAL PRESENCE AND EXPERIENTIAL
INTENTIONALITY
In this chapter, I will argue that phenomenal presence and the form of phenomenal, in-
tentional directedness that it realizes are constitutively and explanatorily prior to all other
forms of experiential intentionality. There are at least three broad challenges to any account
that would make phenomenal presence central to the intentionality of perceptual experience.
After briefly presenting the challenges, I attempt to meet them in turn.
The Challenge from Sensuousness. Phenomenal presence is not necessary for per-
ceptual intentionality. It is not in virtue of the phenomenal features of experience that
one comes to be intentionally directed upon what one perceives. There are reliable causal
processes whereby one comes to be perceptually engaged with the world and our sensuous
states typically play an important role in these processes. But there are genuinely possible,
reliable, causal processes by virtue of which one can come to perceive the world that do not
involve any sensuous appreciation. Radical blindseers and non-sentient zombies are extreme
“examples”. But even in normal cases, the sensuous features of experience are inessential ac-
companiments to our perceptual acts and an exhaustive account of perceptual intentionality
need not appeal to such features.
The Challenge from Objectivity. Phenomenal presence is not sufficient for perceptual
intentionality. Experience, if it is to be intentional, must present us with an objective world,
a world of mind-independent, publicly accessible, enduring entities that are in principle re-
identifiable. Phenomenal presence structures bodily sensations and phosphene experiences,
but these and other “mere” sensations do not present themselves as being or qualifying
anything external to phenomenal consciousness. Phenomenal presence does not allow one to
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transcend the “inner” domain of mere sensation and consequently cannot, on its own, direct
one intentionally toward the objective world in which we are embedded.
The Challenge from Cognition. Phenomenal presence is not a suitably meaningful form
of intentionality and it cannot carry out experiential intentionality’s rational role. We do
not simply believe that the world is some way; we perceive that it is so. When we come to
believe that something is the case on the basis of perception, we do so because we perceive
that things are, or at least appear to be, that way. Phenomenal presence realizes a form of
intentionality that is too far removed from the suite of cognitive capacities typical of adult
human beings either to yield our contentful, perceptual engagements with the world or to
be credited with this rational significance.
5.1 THE CHALLENGE FROM SENSUOUSNESS
Does the appreciation of an experience’s sensuous elements play an essential role in one’s
being intentionally directed upon an entity in perception? A negative answer to this question
can be found, often explicitly, in a surprising number of philosophical accounts. I will focus
on two philosophical movements that reach the same negative conclusion from diametric
starting points.
5.1.1 Naturalist Accounts of Perceptual Intentionality
The first source is a commitment to identifying intentionality with a physically respectable
relation that holds between one’s token brain states and the entities toward which one is in-
tentionally directed. Typically this physical relation takes the form of a tracking relation that
obtains when one’s sensory apparatus operates appropriately in the presence of specific ex-
ternal stimuli. Various phenomena have been proposed as central to such tracking relations:
causal covariation, asymmetric counterfactual dependence, teleofunctional indication-role,
etc.1 But all such attempts to “naturalize” perceptual intentionality agree that it is a com-
1Early accounts focussed solely on “simple” causal relations and the registration of information, e.g.
Dretske [1981]. Later developments have tended to incorporate a teleological aspect into their accounts,
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pletely physical phenomenon. If one stands in the appropriate tracking relation to an entity
and thereby registers information about that entity in a way that makes it available for the
control and guidance of behavior, then one is intentionally directed upon, one perceives, that
entity.
Within this program, sensuous experience’s role is not to ground perceptual intentionality
but to serve as a causal intermediary between perception and various cognitive activities. To
undergo an experience in which something is phenomenally appreciable is simply to acquire
a (possibly suppressed) disposition to form immediate, i.e. non-inferential, beliefs about the
intentional objects of one’s perceptual states and, perhaps, to acquire various recognitional
and imaginative capacities as well.2 Moreover, the warrant conferred to one’s perceptual
beliefs does not depend upon any operation on the sensuous aspects of one’s experiences but
upon the reliability of the belief-yielding, causal process in which these experiences figure.
Is an exhaustively causal account of perceptual intentionality that does not involve sen-
suous appreciation achievable? I have already argued that many alleged examples fail to
meet one or more necessary conditions for intentionality (§ 2.1.3.2). (i) An ‘accredited re-
ceptor system’ (Dretske [2006] 150) can extract, transform, and employ information about
causally-covariant, proximal stimulation. But to register information is not to be directed
upon an entity as being some way from a particular perspective. (ii) An organism’s percep-
tual system can involve veridicality-evaluable states that perspectivally represent a constant
distal cause of variable proximal stimulation as being an instance of a particular type. But
many of these genuinely representational states are neither attributable to, nor available to
guide the activity of, the whole organism qua individual, the proper bearer of intentionality.
These exclusions, however, do not proscribe all of the non-sensuous states that a per-
ceptual system can yield from intentionality’s domain. There is considerable evidence that
individual organisms, not just subsystems of individuals, have unconscious, and therefore
non-sensuous, perceptual states.
First, empirical psychologists impute perceptual states to individual organisms that may
e.g.Millikan [1989], Papineau [1993], and Dretske [1988].
2On dispositions to believe, see Armstrong [1968] 222-3 and Pitcher [1976] 92-3. On recognitional and
imaginative abilities, see Lewis [1988] and Nemirow [1990].
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not be conscious, e.g. honey bees.3 These states attribute specific properties to environmental
particulars, exhibit numerous perceptual constancies, and are integral to the organisms’
action.
Second, in some human pathologies, subjects who lack phenomenal consciousness are
nevertheless able to pick out particular entities visually. For example, in cases of blindsight,
psychological systems that exhibit perceptual constancies with respect to motion, location,
and size enable individuals to attend to particular entities, attribute specific qualities to
them, and actively engage these entities appropriately even though the subjects lack any
relevant sensuous experiences.4
But the point needn’t turn on whether there are actual cases of unconscious perception.
Even if, in our own case, sensuous experience is always involved in our perceptual episodes,
it is consistent with naturalist accounts of intentionality that sensuous experience is never
present. For on this view, non-sentient organisms can in principle be causally related to
worldly entities by means of a reliable, physical process that imparts the same cognitive
abilities and confers the same warrant as our own perceptual processes do. If the acquisi-
tion of a disposition to believe or imagine a scene is only a regular effect of our sensuous
experience, then this effect can in principle be caused by any number of causal interme-
diaries that altogether bypass sensuous experience. Moreover, when sensuous experiences
do occur, their sensuous features will be explanatorily irrelevant to the directedness of one’s
perceptually-based beliefs and actions. Chalmers expresses this well in the following passage.
To explain my reaching for the book in front of me, we need not invoke my phenomenal
sensation of the book; it is enough to invoke my perception instead. When a concertgoer
sighs at a particularly exquisite movement, one might have thought that the experienced
quality of auditory sensations might be central to an explanation of this behavior, but
it turns out that an explanation can be given entirely in terms of auditory perception
and functional responses. Even in explaining why I withdraw my hand from a flame, a
functional explanation in terms of the psychological notion of pain will suffice. (Chalmers
[1996] 168-9)
3See § 2.1.3.2, Gallistel [1998], and Burge [2010] for discussion of these cases.
4It is unclear whether blindsight possesses inaccessible phenomenal features or lacks altogether phenome-
nality (cf. Weiskrantz [1986] and Block [2007a]). Either way, blindsight involves no phenomenal appreciation
of sensuous elements. On blindsight and attention, see Kentridge et al. [1999] and Kentridge et al. [2004].
On unconscious perception due to other pathologies such as pagnosia and extinction-neglect syndromes, see
Schacter et al. [1989] and Farah [1995]. For general discussions of unconscious perception see Carruthers
[2000] 147-79 and Dretske [2006].
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If experience’s role is exhaustively causal, then the sensuousness of such experiences is a mere
accompaniment to the underlying causal chain that grounds the intentionality of perception.
5.1.2 Dual-Component Accounts of Perceptual Intentionality
A second source for denying the necessity of sensuous experience is the contention that
experience’s sensuous elements are simply incapable of grounding perceptual intentional-
ity. Several characteristics of sensuous experience have been cited as the reason for this
impotence.
(i) An experience’s sensuous elements are “internal”. There is “no difference between the
sensation and the feeling of it; they are one and the same thing. It is for this reason
that we before observed, that, in sensation, there is no object distinct from that act
of the mind by which it is felt; and this holds true with regard to all sensation” (Reid
[1785/1863] II.16).
(ii) An experience’s sensuous elements are not representational. Genuine intentionality is
always directed upon an entity as being something or being some way and this ‘as’ es-
sentially involves an exercise of a conceptual, representational faculty. The appreciation
of an experience’s sensuous elements is among the “non-conceptual states of conscious-
ness.” So this sort of appreciation, “though it is a constituent of seeing something as
something, is not itself a case of seeing something as something” (Sellars [1968] 10 and
Sellars [1977] ¶48).
(iii) An experience’s sensuous elements have no positive epistemic significance. “Nothing
can count as a reason for holding a belief except another belief” and so “the relation
between a sensation and a belief cannot be logical since sensations are not beliefs or other
propositional attitudes” (Davidson [1986] 310 and 311).
I will discuss these motivations in §§ 5.2 and 5.3. For now, I only wish to highlight
their consequences. These charges against the sensuousness of experience lead naturally,
though not ineluctably, to a dual-component or dual-aspect account of perception. Accord-
ing to this view, perception comprises two components: (i) a phenomenal, nonconceptual
component, and (ii) the exercise of a cognitive, conceptual capacity by virtue of which the
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subject represents aspects of her physical surroundings. The first component determines an
experience’s phenomenal character and it can play a role in fixing the references of one’s
perceptually-based beliefs. But perceptual intentionality essentially involves the conscious
representation of an entity as an exemplar or instance of some general property, relation,
kind, or category. And for the phenomenal appreciation of an experience’s sensuous elements
to be representational in this way requires the exercise of an appropriate conceptual capac-
ity. So perception’s phenomenal component plays no positive role in one’s being intentionally
directed upon an entity; perceptual intentionality consists entirely in the other-directedness
of the conception or ‘perceptual taking’ that is the the actualization of perception’s second,
conceptual component.5
Though its pessimism about the viability of a non-conceptual account of perceptual
intentionality places dual-component accounts of perception in direct opposition with nat-
uralist accounts, both camps are equally committed to the idea that sensuous experience’s
role in perception is merely causal. Sellars asserts that a perceptual taking is a “conceptual
response to a stimulus” and that “having sensations is having causes of judgments, not
reasons for judgments.”6 Davidson reaches the same conclusion.
What then is the relation [between a sensation and a belief]? The answer I think is obvious:
the relation is causal. Sensations cause some beliefs and in this sense are the basis or ground
of those beliefs. But a causal explanation of belief does not show how or why the belief is
justified. (Davidson [1986] 311)
Sensuous experience is typically involved in perception’s etiology and the sensuous manifold
one appreciates in these experiences serves to distinguish perception from the non-sensuous
thoughts it occasions. But these sensuous elements neither determine nor constitute per-
ception’s intentional directedness and the appreciation of such elements plays no positive
epistemic role in the formation of our immediate perceptual beliefs.
5The expression ‘perceptual taking’ is Sellars’ preferred phrase for perception’s conceptual component.
Reid holds that perception’s conceptual component takes the form of a belief. Sellars sometimes contrasts
perceptual taking with belief (e.g. at Sellars [1981] 89 n. 11). But he consistently treats such perceptual
takings as being both ‘propositional’ and ‘doxastic’ (ibid. and Sellars [1982] 101; cf. Chisholm [1957] 75–80,
84–90).
6Sellars [1981] 89 n. 11 and Sellars [1954] 205. Elsewhere, Sellars says that “the direct perception of
physical objects is mediated by the occurrence of sense impressions which are, in themselves, thoroughly
non-cognitive. Furthermore, this mediation is causal rather than epistemic” (Sellars [1963a] 90-1).
83
Dual-component accounts are therefore just as open to the absence of sensuous experience
as are their naturalist rivals. Sensuous experience accompanies or occasions our intentional
perceptual states, but this causal relationship is contingent. A non-sensuous causal inter-
mediary could serve just as well in our coming to be perceptually directed upon the world.
Reid recognizes this consequence explicitly when he says “[f]or anything we know, we might
perhaps have been so made as to perceive external objects, without any [. . . ] of those sensa-
tions which invariably accompany perception in our present frame” (Reid [1785/1863] II.20).
Though sensuous experience is actually a component of human perception, a philosophical
analysis of perceptual intentionality need not advert to it.
5.1.3 Sensuous Experience and Perceptual Availability
I will argue in this section, pace the naturalist and dual-component accounts of perception,
that an experience’s sensuous elements play an ineliminable role in one’s being intentionally
directed upon an entity through perception. More specifically, I will argue that the appre-
ciation of phenomenal presence that occurs whenever one appreciates a sensuous element in
experience is necessary for perceptual intentionality.
We want to understand perception’s contribution from the viewpoint of the experiencing
subject; we want to understand sensuous experience’s role within the subject’s perceptual
life as it unfolds for her. Within this context, perception’s primary function is to afford its
subject an opportunity to avail herself of the entities upon which her experiences are directed.
To possess intentionality, a perceiver must be directed upon entities in a manner that makes
them available, in a sense to be elaborated, as objects of attention, recognition, thought
(especially singular, demonstratively-expressible judgments), and purposive action. I will
focus on one of these capacities, the capacity to form perceptually-based singular beliefs.
Experience not only prompts or disposes us to form singular beliefs but introduces novel
entities into our cognitive purview by making them available as the objects of immediate
demonstration.7 If an experience is to possess intentionality, the experience itself must make
7(i) Here and throughout, I associate singular perceptual reference with demonstrative reference. This
move is not universally accepted (cf. Papineau [2007] 113–14). It is, however, convenient to make the
assimilation and doing so does not bear any significant argumentative weight. (ii) The following argument
does not depend upon the cognitive nature of singular perceptual thought. Perhaps we need to possess
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an entity available to its subject and the experiencing subject, by virtue of undergoing the
experience, must in some sense be able to appreciate that it has done so. We can begin to
grasp what it is for perception to make an entity available by focussing upon three topics:
the dual-component account of perception, the appeal to phenomenal concepts, and the
Russellian notion of acquaintance.
According to the dual-component account of perception, to perceive an entity is in part
to perceive it as being some way or as being of a particular type and this involves the em-
ployment of recognitional or classificatory conceptual capacities. These concepts cannot be
entirely general. Singular reference has to underlie and mediate exhaustively descriptive
representations of particular entities.8 So the dual-component theory must appeal to recog-
nitional/classificatory conceptual capacities that possess a singular demonstrative element,
say, the concept ‘that shape’. These concepts single out (or purport to single out) particular
entities as being of a particular type thereby enabling the deployment of general classificatory
concepts, say, the monadic concept ‘red’ or the relational concept ‘lighter than’.
But all capacities, including conceptual capacities, are essentially dispositional. To pos-
sess a concept is to be disposed to respond selectively to what is antecedently in one’s
cognitive purview. In perception, it is experience that makes particular entities available
as potential objects of singular belief. So if experience is to execute this role, if it is to
provide the materials upon which our conceptual capacities are exercised, it must itself be
directed upon entities in a manner that is distinct from, and explanatorily prior to, the form
of directedness involved in our singular perceptual beliefs.9 As John Campbell notes,
We are not to take the intentional character of experience as a given; rather, experience
of objects has to be what explains our ability to think about objects. This means that we
several conceptual capacities to have singular thoughts involving demonstrative reference to particulars.
Our present concern is the role perceptual experience plays in making entities available for singular thought,
not the conditions for singular thought itself. The notion of perceptual availability at issue does not change
when one shifts focus to availability for non-cognitive capacities and is applicable to the experiences of
organisms that altogether lack conceptual capacities.
8Though I disagree with several of the conditions Strawson places on singular reference, I consider his
argument for the priority of singular reference over general (descriptive) reference to be persuasive (Strawson
[1959/2006] ch. 1 and 114–117).
9A. D. Smith arrives at the same conclusion: “the dual-component account [. . . ] is incoherent because it
presupposes that a this-thinking has an object, while making the occurrence of that very thinking constitutive
of the awareness of the object that itself alone gives cognitive access to the object [. . . ] For a perceptual
this-thought to succeed referentially, our senses themselves must provide an object” (Smith [2002] 85, cf.
114).
85
cannot view experience of objects as a way of grasping thoughts about objects. Experience
of objects has to be something more primitive than the ability to think about objects, in
terms of which the ability to think about objects can be explained. [. . . ] For experience to
have its explanatory role, it must be prior to, and not require, demonstrative thoughts.10
The non-conceptual component of experience, or at least a component of experience that does
not involve the exercise of conceptual capacities for singular reference, must play a distinctive
role in making particular entities available as the objects of perceptual demonstration.11
There are several ways to provide a larger role for experience’s sensuous elements in one’s
coming to be directed upon an entity. For example, one can hold that the concepts we employ
in perception are phenomenal concepts. Most philosophers who invoke phenomenal concepts
think they apply primarily to experiences. Phenomenal concepts enable demonstrative-like
recognition and reidentification of experiential types on the basis of first-person phenomeno-
logical reflection; they have the form ‘that kind [of experience]’. The sensuous features of
experience, qua sensuous, partly individuate (or are constituent parts of, or are somehow
“quoted” by) these concepts.12
But, as I have emphasized previously (§§ 2.2.2 and 3.1), phenomenological reflection in
general, and the appreciation of an experience’s sensuous elements in particular, are meta-
physically neutral. An experience’s sensuous elements may be, as far as their phenomenality
is concerned, either sensory (instantiated by an experiential state), sensible (instantiated by
an objective, mind-independent entity), or sensational (instantiated by an internal, mind-
dependent entity). Freed from its restricted application, the introduction of phenomenal
concepts allows one to accommodate the intuition that the sensuous qualities we appreci-
ate in experience are tightly connected to the qualities our immediate perceptual beliefs
attribute to perceived entities, regardless of the metaphysical category to which these per-
10Campbell [2002a] 136. Later, Campbell expresses this point in terms of perceptual availability: “So
experience of the object should not be regarded as consisting in grasping a thought about the object,‘in the
mode: vision’, as we might say. Rather, consciousness of the object has to be a more primitive state than
thought about the object, which makes thought about the object possible by revealing the object to you”
(ibid. 143; cf. Coates [2007] 55 and Peacocke [2001]).
11This is one way to maintain the basic Kantian distinction between sensibility and understanding. I
will discuss “Neo-Kantian” views according to which experience is already conceptually articulated before
being made available to our dispositional classificatory/recognitional capacities, e.g. McDowell [1994a] and
McDowell [2008], in § 5.3.
12Notable discussions of phenomenal concepts include Loar [1990], Block [2002b] (an example of the
partial constitution view), Papineau [2002] (an example of the quotational view), Tye [2003a], Chalmers
[2003], Stoljar [2005], and many of the articles in Alter and Walter [2007].
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ceived entities belong. Experience’s sensuous elements, qua sensuous, partly individuate
the recognitional/classificatory concepts we employ in our immediate, first-order perceptual
beliefs.13
But even if one grants experiences’ sensuous elements this additional significance, doing
so will not make them essential to perceptual availability. For the introduction of phenomenal
concepts does not preclude one from holding a naturalist or dual-component account of
perception. One can maintain that the “references [of phenomenal concepts] are determined
solely by the causal and dispositional relations an individual has to her internal states that
are effected by an introspective “pointing in”; that is, by the fact that she’s in causal
contact with a certain property and is disposed to reidentify it on subsequent occasions”
(Levin [2007] 89). So an experience’s sensuous elements may partly individuate some of the
concepts that figure in our perceptual beliefs, but when it comes to explaining how experience
facilitates singular thought about the objects that fall under these phenomenal concepts, the
sensuousness of experience is otiose. For,
any theory that makes the semantic powers of phenomenal concepts a matter of their
conceptual role, or their informational links to the external world, or any other facet of
their causal-historical workings [. . . ] will make it incidental to the referential powers of
phenomenal concepts that they have the same phenomenology as their referents. Any such
theory leaves it open that some other state, with a different or no phenomenology, could
have the same causal-historical features and thus refer to experiences for the same reason
that phenomenal concepts do. [. . . P]henomenal concepts do indeed refer because of their
cognitive function, not because of their phenomenology, and therefore other states with a
different or no phenomenology, but with the same cognitive function, would refer to the
same experiences for the same reasons. (Papineau [2007] 125)
On this view, the sensuousness of experience is epiphenomenal to the causal/functional
information-processing that both occasions and fixes the reference of our singular perceptual
beliefs. Consequently, one can hold constant an experience’s sensuous features while varying
13Block endorses something like this when he states that we have, in addition to a phenomenal concept of
the experience of red, the phenomenal concept of the color red (Block [2007b] 252). The present proposal
is even more neutral in that it is prior to any distinction between experience and the objects of experience.
Burge comes closer when he claims that, “associated with the intentional content of typical perceptual
judgments is a phenomenal element that is part of, or at least necessary to, the content—inseparable from
the way of thinking, or mode of presentation, of the perceived entities. A normal visual judgment about a
visually presented red surface would have a different content—or would be a different visual judgment—if
the phenomenal aspect associated with the judgment were relevantly different (though the different visual
judgment might still represent a red surface)” (Burge [1997] 384; cf. Tye [2000] 49, Lycan [2001] 32, and
Fish [2009] 10–15).
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the properties that one’s phenomenal concepts represent things as having (by varying the
experience’s causal/functional ancestry) and two “qualia-inverted” individuals can have dis-
tinct phenomenal concepts that nevertheless represent things as having the same property
(if the experiences have the same causal/functional ancestry).
Our discussion has so far touched on three questions that we must be careful to distin-
guish.
(Q1) In virtue of what does experience fix the reference of the singular elements of one’s
perceptual beliefs?
(Q2) In virtue of what does experience make this particular entity rather than another
available to a perceiver?
(Q3) In virtue of what does experience make an entity available to a perceiver?
The account I have provided on behalf of dual-component and naturalist theories of per-
ception provides an answer to (Q1). Our experiences register information about particular
entities and our perceptual beliefs are systematically dependent on the (in principle non-
sensuous) informational properties of these states. It is an experience’s causal/functional
ancestry that grounds its informational properties and thereby fixes the reference of the sin-
gular beliefs the experience occasions. This answer is then brought to bear on the remaining
pair of questions. To make a particular entity available to a perceiver just is, on this view, to
occasion a belief that refers singularly to that entity and not another. And if experience can
make particular entities available, then it clearly satisfies the weaker requirement of making
an entity available. If correct, all three questions can be answered without an appeal to the
sensuousness of experience.14
But this response embodies a confusion about the present task. We are not trying to
answer (Q2). The class of facts about one’s perceptual situation that determine which entity
one is directed upon when one is in an intentional state is broader than, and perhaps need
14The connection between information-processing, perceptually-based conception, and perceptual avail-
ability is made explicitly in the following passage from Evans: “[W]e arrive at conscious perceptual experience
when sensory input is not only connected to behavioural dispositions in the way I have been describing—
perhaps in some phylogenetically more ancient part of the brain—but also serves as the input to a thinking,
concept-applying and reasoning system; so that the subject’s thoughts, plans and deliberations are also sys-
tematically dependent on the informational properties of the input. When there is such a further link, we
can say that the person, rather than just some part of his brain, receives and possesses the information”
(Evans [1982] 158).
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not even contain, those facts that determine whether one is intentionally directed upon an
entity in perception at all. And accounts of experience’s role in fixing reference that would
satisfy (Q1) shed no light on the notion of perceptual availability at issue. Perhaps an
experience, in order to make an entity available, must meet those conditions that would
determine the singular references of the perceptual beliefs it occasions. But to know what
determines which entities an experience makes available to a perceiver brings us no closer to
understanding this availability itself. In particular, it brings us no closer to understanding
perception’s contribution from the viewpoint of the experiencing subject—how a subject, by
virtue of undergoing an experience, is in a position to recognize or appreciate that she is
directed upon an entity that is available as an object of cognition (broadly construed). (Q3)
must be answered independently.
Those who recognize that the extrinsic relationships that fix the reference of one’s singular
perceptual beliefs are, in the present context, explanatorily unavailing commonly advert to
something like the Russellian notion of acquaintance in order to explain experience’s role in
making entities available to their subjects. “I am acquainted with an object,” says Russell,
“when I have a direct cognitive relation to that object, i.e., when I am directly aware of
the object itself” (Russell [1910] 108). For Russell, acquaintance is a primitive, sui generis
relation that provides direct, infallible, non-propositional, and non-perspectival knowledge
about (for the most part) particular entities. Fortunately, we can prescind from many of
these controversial epistemological commitments. For our purposes, acquaintance is simply a
relation between an individual subject and an entity that (i) affords the subject direct, non-
conceptual, cognitive access to the entity and (ii) requires that the entity actually exists.15
The two clauses are not independent. The entity one is acquainted with in experience must
exist because it is somehow an essential constituent of the experience whenever the relation
obtains and acquaintance could not establish a cognitive connection with an entity, it could
15These two clauses are expressed well in Coates’ characterization of acquaintance: (i) What “grounds the
claim that a particular object is seen [is s]ome form of intrinsic (and non-causal) connection which links the
subject’s experience [. . . ] with the perceived entity, in a manner that is metaphysically necessary, such that
the existence of the former is dependent on the existence of the latter” (ii) “The Direct Realist is therefore
committed to the idea of some unique relation of acquaintance between mind and world [. . . ] The claim is
that the object perceived is intrinsically related to the perceptual experience, and is immediately present to
phenomenal consciousness, so that the subject becomes aware of it.” (Coates [2007] 75 and 86).
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not make an entity available to its subject, without this ontological connection.16
As it stands, the core notions in this characterization of acquaintance are susceptible
to naturalistic analyses that do not advert to experience’s sensuous features. There are
numerous accounts of how an experience can occasion a belief that contains entity-dependent
singular elements and there is no a priori argument that the ontological connection that
obtains in such cases cannot be explained in exhaustively causal/functional terms.17 But
in the end, whether or not a causal/functional analysis of acquaintance is achievable is of
little consequence. For neither entity-dependence, nor any notion of ontological constitution
(be it physically explicable or metaphysically primitive) that underlies it, guarantees the
kind of connection to an entity that acquaintance purports to provide. The metaphysical
notions of ontological constitution and entity-dependence have the same basic shape as the
metaphors of “intimacy” and “brute contact” that surround appeals to acquaintance. But
this surface similarity does not make the former apt to explain the latter. Ontological
constitution has existential consequences, but it does not by itself entail anything about
experience’s cognitive significance; ontological intimacy does not entail cognitive intimacy.
An experience’s (meta)physical status and the countless entity-involving relations in which
it may stand cannot explain its role in making an entity available to a perceiver.18 And
without this connection, appeals to acquaintance provide the most unsatisfying answer to
16(i) On the present construal, acquaintance is what Timothy Williamson calls a prime psychological
relation (Williamson [2000] ch. 3). When acquaintance obtains, the “objective” relatum is an ineliminable
participant in this non-composite psychological fact. (ii) This characterization of acquaintance covers a
wide variety of relations. For example, McDowell insists that “we can make sense of the idea of direct
perceptual access to objective facts about the environment” where ‘direct perceptual access’ picks out a
relation that, were it to obtain, would make “an environmental fact directly available to one” in a manner
that guarantees the existence of the entities that figure in the environmental fact (McDowell [2006] 228).
Though this notion of direct access is a relation to facts and involves the exercise of conceptual capacities,
it satisfies our characterization of acquaintance in all other respects. The irreducibly experiential relation of
‘experiential taking’ invoked by so-called primitivists also counts as an acquaintance relation (cf. Chalmers
[2004] and Pautz [2010]).
17For example, if an experience’s sensuous elements are features of the experience itself, then what it is
for a singularly-directed phenomenal concept to contain the particular entity it represents may consist in the
physical inclusion of the represented entity within the token brain-state that implements the representation.
18(i) Scott Sturgeon makes a similar claim about the invocation of entity-dependence in explanations of
experience’s presentational character (what he calls the ‘scene-immediacy’ of experience) (Sturgeon [2000]
12–15; cf. Levine [2007] 162–3). (ii) If one restricts the class of entities to which one can be acquainted to
sense-data (where sense-data are entities whose essence is constituted entirely by the way they appear to a
subject), then one might be able to derive availability from entity-dependence. This is, in the context of the
present inquiry, a desperate move.
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our guiding question: experience makes an entity available to a perceiver because experience
acquaints one with the entity, i.e. it affords a perceiver direct cognitive access to the entity.
We have not, however, exhausted the possible responses to our guiding question. The
key to an appropriate answer, I will argue, is to be found in the notion of presence in
experience. The appeal to presentation, in one form or another, is commonplace in discussions
of perceptual availability. J. J. Valberg, for example, provides the following definition: “By
‘an object of experience’ we shall mean something present in experience.” He then goes on
claim that “the fact of an object’s presence is what makes the object available for us [. . . and]
creates the possibility of demonstrative reference” (Valberg [1992] 4 and 6–7). But we must
move beyond mere postulation.
Experiential presentation may initially appear to be a dead-end. For many philosophers,
including Russell, maintain that presence is acquaintance’s converse. After Russell defines
acquaintance as a “direct cognitive relation to [an] object” he says,
When I speak of a cognitive relation here, I do not mean the sort of relation which consti-
tutes judgment, but the sort which constitutes presentation. In fact, I think the relation of
subject and object which I call acquaintance is simply the converse of the relation of object
and subject which constitutes presentation. That is, to say that S has acquaintance with
O is essentially the same thing as to say that O is presented to S.19
If correct, the appeal to presence is no advance.
We find a serviceable notion of presence, I contend, once we focus on experience’s pre-
sentational character and on that phenomenon which I have argued is central to it, namely,
phenomenal presence. When one undergoes a sensuous experience one appreciates an element
as other or as before one; one appreciates a manifest opposition between the self —that before
which the other is present—and the other—that which is present before the self. Phenom-
enal presence—this experiential nexus of self and other—is the manifestation of sensuous
experience’s basic and intrinsic phenomenal structure. This notion is not acquaintance’s
converse and it is only because of these differences that it can succeed where acquaintance
fails. I will argue that phenomenal presence is central to perceptual intentionality by showing
how it satisfies three constraints on an acceptable account of perceptual availability that our
19Russell [1910] 108; cf. Valberg [1992] 4–5. Much of Russell’s discussion of acquaintance is inspired by
the notion of presentation that occurs in the work of his teacher, James Ward (Ward [1886]).
91
discussion has so far revealed.
(A1) Perceptual intentionality (and the availability it affords) is both distinct from, and a
prerequisite for, singular perceptual belief.
Our singular perceptual beliefs are directed upon particular entities. I have argued that
the exercises of the conceptual capacities that figure in these beliefs cannot secure their own
objects. It is experience that brings particular entities into our cognitive purview making
them available as objects of singular reference. And if experience is to provide that upon
which our conceptual capacities are exercised, it must embody a form of directedness that is
distinct from, and explanatorily prior to, the form of directedness involved in our perceptual
beliefs.
This priority is an explicit feature of acquaintance. For “[k]nowledge of things, when it
is of the kind we call knowledge by acquaintance, is essentially simpler than any knowledge
of truths, and logically independent of knowledge of truths” (Russell [1912] 46). In contrast,
the presence of a sensuous element in experience does not by itself furnish knowledge of any
kind. But it does embody a basic form of intentional directedness. This distinctive sort of
intentionality is pre-reflective (cf. § 2.2.2). To appreciate something as other requires neither
the possession nor the exercise of recognitional/classificatory conceptual capacities. So the
form of intentional directedness that phenomenal presence realizes is distinct from the form
of intentionality that the exercises of our conceptual capacities effect. This does not on its
own show that phenomenal presence is central to perceptual availability or is a prerequisite
for singular perceptual belief. But insofar as phenomenal presence does not presuppose the
sort of directedness that it is meant to explain, it is not prohibited from occupying this
explanatory position.
(A2) It is experience itself that makes an entity available to its subject and the experiencing
subject, by virtue of undergoing the experience, must be able to appreciate that it has
done so.
When a suitably sophisticated individual undergoes an experience, she can deploy suc-
cessfully the concepts experience, sensuous, present, other, experiential subject, intentional
object, singular directedness, etc. Some philosophers maintain that only individuals with
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this extensive conceptual repertoire can appreciate the directedness of experience as such.
For example, Burge claims that “we can identify the directedness in experience” but “being
aware of—and even more, being able to identify—the singularity and outerness of singular
intentionality as such requires tracking abilities and certain relatively sophisticated concepts
of objectivity, as well as certain perceptual and conceptual abilities that connect one to
purported types.”20
But experiential intentionality and the availability this directedness affords cannot consist
in these conceptualized modes of attention. If one is to conceptually discern and thereby
attend to the intentionality of experience as such, experience itself must somehow make its
very other-directedness available as an object of one’s conceptual activities.
Phenomenal presence can satisfy this constraint. First, phenomenally conscious states
are necessarily states of an individual subject; phenomenal consciousness is consciousness
for an individual. And if an individual is phenomenally conscious (in an intransitive sense),
then there are necessarily elements in the conscious state that the individual phenomenally
appreciates. These elements are conscious to/for the experiencing subject qua individual.
In the case of experience’s sensuous elements, these elements are presented to, or present for,
an individual.21
Second, the form of directedness that phenomenal presence realizes is itself phenomenally
appreciable. When we judge that something is the case, the judgment’s logical structure is
not an object of judgment. But when we appreciate a sensuous element in experience we ap-
preciate it as other, we appreciate its invariant (op)position with respect to our phenomenal
selves. The intrinsic and universal orientation of sensuous experience is not appreciable in the
same way that an experience’s sensuous elements are. But phenomenal appreciation’s scope
20Burge [2003a] 440 and 441. To be fair, Burge does make the following concession: “Perhaps there is
another sense of phenomenal awareness of the singularity that would not require conceptual identification
of that feature. Perhaps insofar as a singular usage involves consciousness, one might allow a phenomenal
awareness of the singularity, even though one is not conceptually and identificationally aware of it” (ibid.
449 n. 7). Note, however, that the appeal to ‘singular usage’ reflects Burge’s contention that singular
intentionality resides in the application of concepts, i.e. in the exercise of capacities for singular reference.
21For Russell, acquaintance is essentially tied to phenomenal consciousness. But this isn’t necessary. Given
our characterization, it is possible for one to be acquainted with an entity in experience (it is possible for a
particular entity to be an essential constituent of the experience) without that entity being phenomenally
appreciable (cf. Fish [2009] 16–17 and Chalmers’ distinction between ‘disjunctivism about phenomenology’
and ‘disjunctivism about metaphysics’ at Chalmers [2006] 53 fn. 1).
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is not limited to experience’s sensuous elements and sensuous experience’s non-sensuous
phenomenal structure, viz. phenomenal presence, is itself phenomenally manifest.
Third, the appreciation of phenomenal presence is pre-reflective. So if the availability
that presence-based intentionality affords is inherent to the phenomenality of presence itself
(which still remains to be argued), then the subject of a sensuous experience will be in a
position to appreciate this availability simply by virtue of undergoing the experience.
(A3) An account of perceptual availability concerns not the entities that experience makes
available but the nature of the connection between individual subject and entity that is
inherent to experience.
Both dual-component and naturalist theorists maintain that perceptual availability is
ultimately a semantic phenomenon (broadly construed). A particular entity is available to
an experiencing subject because the experience’s causal/functional ancestry determines that
entity to be the singular reference of the subject’s perceptual beliefs. But I have argued that
we must distinguish questions that concern the entities we are directed upon in experience
from questions that concern the subjective availability of these entities. We must not mistake
an explanation of that which makes a particular instance of sensuous blue (rather than
another particular) the entity one appreciates with an explanation of “that which makes the
[appreciation] of blue a mental fact” (Moore [1903] 20).
Accounts that center on acquaintance may appear better positioned to illuminate per-
ceptual availability. According to these accounts, an experiencing subject appreciates a
particular entity only if that entity is a constituent of the experience. The ontological inclu-
sion of the entity in the experience is what explains the entity’s availability to the subject’s
cognitive powers. But again, I have argued that this approach fares no better than its
causal/functional rivals. For though ‘acquaintance’ refers to the connection that obtains
between individual subjects and particular entities in experience, this relation’s significance
is exhausted by facts about its “objective” relatum. And the metaphysical position of an en-
tity vis-a`-vis an individual subject cannot by itself explain how experience makes the entity
available to the individual as an object.
The difficulties that attend this pair of approaches have a common root. Whether con-
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strued physically, semantically, or metaphysically, these accounts ground perceptual avail-
ability in a form of directedness that is fundamentally relational in nature. And all such
accounts give explanatory pride of place to the relata upon which one is thereby directed.
But perceptual availability must issue from experience itself, not the entities that experience
makes available.
Phenomenal presence is suited perfectly to avoid these difficulties. For phenomenal
presence is not a relation. It is neither a three-place relation—experience x presents y to
z—nor a two-place relation—y is present to z—where y and z pick out members of distinct
kinds, experienced entities and experiential subjects respectively. A subject may in fact
stand in numerous relations to the entities she appreciates in her sensuous experiences. But
the form of intentionality that phenomenal presence realizes does not constitutively involve
any relations.
It might be helpful to compare phenomenal presence with another non-relational con-
strual of experience: the adverbial theory.22 According to this theory, to appreciate, say,
an instance of blue in an experience is not to stand in a relation to blue; rather, it is to
experience in a particular way, namely, bluely. The sensuous elements one appreciates in an
experience are not entities one is purportedly related to but modifications of the activity or
state of experiencing.
Though typically applied to experience’s sensuous elements, the form of directedness that
is involved in sensuous appreciation can itself receive an adverbial interpretation. And if we
were to interpret phenomenal presence adverbially, experience’s sensuous elements would
drop out—whenever one appreciates a sensuous element in experience one experiences in a
particular way, namely, presentationally.23 Experiencing presentationally, like experiencing
bluely, is non-relational. Consequently, the former shares the latter’s existential neutrality—
no relatum need exist. But the existential neutrality of experiencing presentationally is
even stronger than that of experiencing bluely. One need not even advert to sensuous
22The loci classici of the adverbial theory are Ducasse [1942] and Chisholm [1957].
23This would allow one to sidestep many of the objections leveled against adverbial accounts of experi-
ence’s sensuous elements, for example, that adverbial formulations lack the compositionality of relational
formulations and consequently cannot preserve the inferences one is able to draw from the latter (cf. Jackson
[1977]).
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modifications of the act or state of experiencing in order to fully characterize its nature.24
Though suggestive, I do not endorse an adverbial interpretation of phenomenal pres-
ence. Adverbs are typically taken to denote one-place properties and phenomenal presence
can be considered a property of experience only in a strained sense. Sensuous experiences
are phenomenally articulate unities and phenomenal presence is the manifestation of this
phenomenal structure. So experiencing presentationally is akin to expressing a sentence
grammatically or making a judgment logically (cf. § 3.2, ch. 4). If these structures or forms
were properties, they would have no contrast classes. In particular, one cannot appreciate a
sensuous element in experience without it being present as other.25 I’m inclined to think, in
a Tractarian spirit, that even these expressions are problematic—the issue is not that ‘non-
presentational experience’ is empty, it is rather that the very attempt to divide experiences
into mutually exclusive classes on the basis of phenomenal presence is somehow confused.
These issues, however, are difficult and would lead us far afield. For present purposes, we
can proceed with the common core of our preferred interpretation and the adverbial theory:
the form of intentionality that phenomenal presence realizes is non-relational, existentially
neutral, and is in some sense intrinsic to sensuous experience.
Phenomenal presence’s metaphysical and existential neutrality allows it to be manifest
equally in both veridical and hallucinatory experiences. The form of directedness it realizes
does not require the posit of uninstantiated universals, Meinongian entities, or merely in-
tentional objects. Consequently, though it may initially sound contradictory, an experience
does not need to be directed upon an entity for it to ground perceptual availability. The
availability that presence-based intentionality affords is inherent to the phenomenality of
presence itself.26
Though sensuous experience always involves the appreciation of one or more entities—
the sensuous elements one appreciates as other—the appreciation of phenomenal presence
itself is not an appreciation of an entity but rather an appreciation of one’s being directed
24Sensuousness may be necessary for presence. After all, it is an experience’s sensuous elements that one
appreciates as other. But these elements are not constitutive of presence. The directedness of sensuous
appreciation is exhaustively non-sensuous.
25Nor can one express a sentence ungrammatically or make a judgment illogically. Putative counter-
examples are sentences and thoughts in name only.
26A similar view is put forward by Loar: “object-directedness is a non-relational feature that the halluci-
nation shares with the veridical lemon sighting” (Loar [2003b] 85).
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upon an entity. What one appreciates when one appreciates phenomenal presence is other-
directedness in a pure and isolated form.
The appreciation of phenomenal presence is what allows us to transcend our cognitive
isolation; it is what enables us to transition from mere relatedness to directedness. And
perceptual availability consists in this difference. Without an appreciation of experience’s
manifest other-directedness, one would not be in a position to accept, to take advantage of,
the various entities one is directed upon in experience as objects.
Of course, what determines which particular entity, if any, one is directed upon on a
given experiential occasion requires another story. And the causal/functional considerations
we have discussed will likely play an important role in this story. But, as I have emphasized
repeatedly, an account of how our experiences come to be directed upon a particular entity
is not an account of what it is for an experience to be directed upon a particular entity, nor
is the latter an account of what it is for an experience to be directed at all in the way that
would make an entity available to an individual subject.
This argument does not undermine the notion of unconscious perceptual states. There
are unconscious states that qualify as cases of perception by the standards of empirical
psychology and I am not in a position to object to this classificatory practice. But it does
undermine attributions of perceptual intentionality to these states. Without phenomenal
presence, perception is incapable of making entities available to an individual subject and
without this availability, perception is intentional in name only.
5.2 THE CHALLENGE FROM OBJECTIVITY
Is an appreciation of experience’s sensuous elements sufficient for one’s being intentionally
directed upon an entity in perception? I have argued that phenomenal presence realizes a
basic and genuine form of intentional directedness. But this position stands in stark contrast
to the central tenets of a long-standing philosophical tradition.
According to the traditional view, intentionality is that which allows one to transcend
the “inner” domain of phenomenal consciousness and become directed upon entities distinct
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from oneself. Experience, if it is to be intentional in this way, must present us with an
objective world—a world of mind-independent, publicly accessible, enduring entities that
are in principle re-identifiable. The traditional view goes on to claim that this requirement
is not universally met. Within experience, there is a manifest difference between perception
and sensation. Perceptions are ostensibly directed upon objective entities and this form of
directedness is phenomenally appreciable. Sensations, in contrast, simply do not present
themselves as being of anything external to phenomenal consciousness; they do not even
purport to be directed upon objective entities. Colin McGinn expresses this view succinctly
when he says that
bodily sensations do not have an intentional object in the way that perceptual experiences
do. We distinguish between a visual experience and what it is an experience of; but we do
not make this distinction in respect of pains.27
In general, the phenomenality of sensation does not admit a substantive appearance-reality
distinction. To appreciate a pain, say, is to be in pain and vice versa. For sensations, esse
est sentiri.28
One way to overcome this problem is through supplementation. This is the approach
of the dual-component account of experience. Such theorists hold that sensations and per-
ceptual experiences share a non-intentional sensuous core. Perceptions, however, possess a
second, conceptual component in virtue of which we are able to transcend this inner domain
and become directed upon an objective world. But, as we have already seen, this view makes
the sensuous elements of experience otiose with respect to perceptual intentionality.
A second way to overcome this problem is by rejecting the traditional categorial dis-
tinction between sensation and perception. Representationalists, for example, maintain that
sensation is a variety of perceptual experience inasmuch as both are appreciably directed
upon distinct objective entities. When you feel an ache in your foot, it is an entity within
the objective order, viz. your foot, that feels a particular way. When we undergo such an
27McGinn [1982] 8; cf. Rorty [1980] 22, Searle [1992], Wright [1991] and Smith [2002] 125ff.
28Note that this is not the only view that might deserve the label ‘traditional’. For example, there is a
historically prevalent view according to which neither perception nor sensation is manifestly other-directed.
Hume suggests that intentionality is not a phenomenally appreciable feature of even perceptual experience:
“As to the independency of our perceptions on ourselves, this can never be an object of the senses; but any
opinion we can form concerning it, must be deriv’d from experience and observation” (Hume [1739/1978]
I.iv.2 191).
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experience, we appreciate a quality, a quality we strongly dislike, and we appreciate it as
having a more or less definite location within our bodies. The experience is not infallible.
There may not be a foot at that location, perhaps being amputated years ago. But the pos-
sibility of such error supports the view that the experience is associated with a determinate
veridicality condition that the world may or may not satisfy. Bodily sensations, no less than
the perceptual experiences of vision and audition, are possessed of objective significance.29
So though the representationalist rejects a categorial perception/sensation distinction,
she is committed to the traditional requirement of experiential objectivity. The represen-
tationalist and traditionalist disagree only about the extent to which this requirement is
satisfied. According to the representationalist, sensations and perceptions both possess in-
tentionality because both are manifestly directed upon an objective world.
The view I wish to defend occupies a middle ground between the traditional and repre-
sentationalist views. On the one hand, I am sympathetic to the representationalist rejection
of a categorial perception/sensation distinction. As should be clear by now, I maintain that
sensations possess intentionality and do so in a manner that is phenomenally appreciable. If
a perception and a sensation are in any way sensuous, phenomenal presence will be equally
manifest in them both. Consequently, both types of experience possess an important and
phenomenally appreciable form of intentional directedness. On the other hand, the tradition-
alist is correct to countenance a substantive phenomenological division between perception
and “mere” sensation. The hybrid view I defend countenances a division between perception
and sensation but does so only within the genus of appreciably intentional experience. That
is, the “subjectivity” of sensation does not prevent it from possessing intentionality. The
intentional directedness that sensations possess is not sufficient for experiential objectivity.
Experiential objectivity, however, is not necessary for experiential intentionality.
To argue, as I have, that we necessarily appreciate the sensuous elements in experience,
including sensations, as other than and opposed to ourselves may initially appear to be
29The following quote captures the spirit of the representationalist approach: “The traditional view flies
in the face of the naive phenomenology of such experience [viz. bodily sensation]. When you feel an ache in
your left ankle, it is your ankle that feels a certain way, that aches. Now ankles are no less components of
the physical world than are rocks, lions, tables, and chairs. So at least to first appearance, bodily sensation
is no less concerned with aspects of the physical world—in this case one’s body—than are the experiences
associated with the traditional five senses” (Martin [1995] 268; cf. Armstrong [1962], Chisholm [1969], Pitcher
[1970], Gibson [1979], Bermu´dez [1998], and O’Shaughnessy [1995]).
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incompatible with there being any phenomenal basis for associating some of these elements
more intimately with the self than others. But this is not so. There are several ways in
which an appearance of subjectivity or interiority can be manifest in experience.
Consider phosphenes—visual experiences of variegated points and patches of light that
occur when one presses one’s closed eyes. Phosphenes, like all sensuous experiences, are
phenomenally presentational; their sensuous elements are present as other. But they lack
many of the phenomenal features of paradigmatically objective perceptual experiences: there
are no phenomenally appreciable perceptual constancies, no opportunity for perspectival
variation, no three-dimensional spatial locatedness, and so on. One could argue that the sense
of subjectivity or interiority in phosphenes consists in the absence of these “objectifying”
features.
Or consider perceptual imagination. The sensuousness of perceptual imagination ranges
widely from experiences that are, as it were, self-induced hallucinations to experiences that
are entirely non-sensuous. But if an episode of perceptual imagination is sensuous at all, it
will be phenomenally presentational. Imagination often proceeds unbidden, but the phenom-
enality of imagination is, in general, subordinate to our mental agencies. We can directly
bring about changes in the layout of the sensory manifold of an imaginative experience and
we can appreciate just when we are doing so. One could argue that the sense of subjectivity
or interiority in perceptual imagination consists in the appreciation of this subordinacy to
the spontaneity of our imaginative capacities.
Finally, consider bodily sensation, e.g. pains, throbs, tickles, cramps, aches, itches, etc.
One of the many phenomenally appreciable aspects of bodily sensation that supports the
traditional view is what is commonly called the sense of ownership. When we undergo a
bodily sensation, the region that apparently exemplifies the qualities we appreciate is not
just one more among the objects of perception. It is not merely a body that we feel, but
our body. This sense of ownership consists in our awareness of the bodily sensation as
having a location within a non-sensuous, practically-constituted body-schema (I argue for
this position in Appendix B (p. 106)).
The manifest senses of subjectivity or interiority that characterize each of these three
types of experience are posterior to the appreciation as other of that upon which the experi-
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ences are directed. One is not first confronted with an inner conscious domain that one must
transcend. For one’s default phenomenological orientation is toward something other than
oneself. That is, one not only appreciates sensuous elements in experience but appreciates
phenomenal presence itself; one appreciates one’s being directed upon something other than
oneself. Sensation is intrinsically, essentially, and manifestly other-directed.
So, at the level of the phenomenal appreciation of experience’s sensuous elements, there
is no inner/outer distinction. Though there are phenomenal grounds for associating some
of the sensuous elements one appreciates in experience more intimately with the self, all
sensuous appreciation is primarily directed upon something as other.
Many maintain that genuine intentionality requires that one be able to be directed upon
a single object despite its manifold appearances. That is, intentionality embodies a distinc-
tion between appearance—the sensuous flux of qualities immanent to consciousness—and
reality—the pole of identity that transcends this multiplicity of appearances. We will, in
the following section, discuss whether this manifest objectivity requires a synthesis under
concepts. But whatever is ultimately responsible for one’s being directed upon an objective
entity, upon an entity that remains constant through the multiplicity of its appearances, it
should not be understood as effecting a transcendence of the inner but rather as a coales-
cence of meaning within the outer, and the objectivity manifest in perception should not be
mistaken for intentionality itself.
5.3 THE CHALLENGE FROM COGNITION
In section 5.1.3, I argued that perceptual intentionality is both distinct from and a pre-
requisite for singular perceptual belief. It is experience that brings particular entities into
our cognitive purview making them available as objects of singular reference and to be that
upon which our various conceptual recognitional/classificatory capacities are exercised. This
account focussed not on the entities that experience makes available but the nature of the
connection between individual subject and entity that experience realizes. Without an ap-
preciation of phenomenal presence, of experience’s manifest other directedness, one is not in
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a position to take advantage of the various entities one is directed upon as objects.
But this account is incomplete. It is necessary for one to appreciate phenomenal presence
in order for one to be directed upon an entity rather than to be merely related to an entity,
but this appreciation is not sufficient for the entity upon which one is directed to be available
as an object of attention, recognition, thought, and purposive action. Even if we grant that
when one undergoes an experience in which one appreciates, say, the sensuous quality red
one also appreciates one’s being directed upon that sensuous quality, it does not follow that
one is in a position to believe that something is red. For that upon which one is directed
must be present in a form that allows it to be rationally significant. That is, it must be
present in a form that makes the formation of relevant beliefs intelligible from the viewpoint
of the experiencing subject.
Now phenomenal presence is the manifestation of sensuous experience’s basic phenomenal
structure. So phenomenal presence occurs in the sensuous experiences of organisms with no
cognitive capacities whatsoever (assuming, pace Malebranche, et al., that sentience is not
limited to rational animals). Insofar as an organism undergoes an experience in which a
sensuous element is present, that element will be present as other.
This is consistent with the account of phenomenal appreciation introduced in section
2.2.2. There I distinguished phenomenal appreciation from other forms of experiential aware-
ness: introspection, conception, and attention. For present purposes, the important aspects
of that discussion can be reduced to two claims:
(a) Phenomenal appreciation is pre-reflective. To appreciate phenomenally an element in
experience places no demand on its subject beyond that of being in the experiential
state. In particular, it does not require the explicit exercise of any higher order ca-
pacity directed upon one’s experiential states including one’s recognitional/classificatory
conceptual capacities.
(b) Phenomenal appreciation is not susceptible to evaluations for veridicality. An experience
may possess one or more phenomenal contents, but this does not follow merely from the
fact that one is able to appreciate phenomenally an element in that experience. The
phenomenal appreciation of an element in an experience is neither correct nor incorrect;
it merely occurs or does not occur.
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So phenomenal appreciation and the form of intentionality it realizes are in one important
sense non-cognitive. To appreciate something as other requires neither the possession nor
the exercise of representational or recognitional capacities that are conceptual in nature.
But if this is correct, a new challenge arises. When we focus on the perceptual faculties
of the rarified class of organisms to which we belong, namely rational animals, it is unclear
whether this account has the resources to accommodate experience’s rational significance.
For many maintain that perception, if it is to play a rationally significant role in our coming
to believe that something is the case on its basis, that is, if the entities upon which one is
perceptually directed are to be present in a manner that makes the formation of relevant
beliefs intelligible from the viewpoint of the experiencing subject, must in some way draw
upon the conceptual, representational faculties that are exercised in these perceptual beliefs.
Our rational capacities must, it is claimed, be operative in experience itself if our percep-
tual beliefs are to be anything more than rational responses to intrinsically meaningless
happenings.
I am, perhaps surprisingly given the preceding arguments, largely sympathetic to this
concern. In this section, I will attempt to accommodate what is correct in it without under-
mining our core account of phenomenal presence and the form of intentional directedness is
realizes.
One way to accommodate this challenge is to hold that the form of unity present in
that upon which one is perceptually directed is the same form of unity that is present
in one’s discursive, rational achievements. To judge that something is red is to exercise
a faculty for discursive activity. The judgment which is the actualization of this faculty
possess a distinctive form of unity. When effected linguistically, Frege calls this form of
unity, this logical nexus of the interdependent categories subject and predicate, predication.
When effected in judgment, Frege calls the very same form of unity, a logical nexus of the
interdependent categories object and concept, subsumption (cf. § 4.1). In what follows I will
use the expression ‘predication’ to cover both.
To hold that perception and judgment share a form of unity is to take perceptual expe-
rience to be directed upon facts, i.e. to be directed upon something that is propositionally
structured. This is not to say that perceiving is an instance of judging. I can see that
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an apple is red without judging that it is so. But often enough I do form judgements on
the basis of perception and on such occasions what I perceive is identical to what I judge,
namely, ‘that an apple (or this apple) is red’.
Though perceiving is distinct from judging, it might still be the case that the conceptual
capacities that are operative in one’s discursive achievements are operative as well in per-
ceiving that something is the case. This is clearly incompatible with the view I have been
advancing. To be directed upon an entity in experience is for that entity to be experientially
present in a manner that allows for the exercise of discursive capacities. I have argued (§
5.1.3) that if experience is to provide that upon which our conceptual capacities are exer-
cised, it must embody a form of directedness that is distinct from, and explanatorily prior to,
the form of directedness involved in our perceptual judgments and beliefs. The recognitional
capacities that enable one to judge that an entity of a particular kind is present when one
undergoes an experience do not play a role in the experience making the entity present in
such a way that it can be so-recognized.
The variety of experiential intentionality that phenomenal presence realizes is a direct-
edness upon particular entities. For a particular apple to possess a particular shade of red is
not, unless one adopts a radical version of idealism, a discursive achievement. Moreover, it
does not possess a discursive achievement’s form of unity, viz. predication. For predicative
unities are susceptible to evaluations for veridicality; they are the sort of thing that can be
true or false. But particular objects (used in the ordinary non-Fregean manner to pick out
worldly entities such as tables, chairs and rocks) are not evaluable in this way. Worldly items
are not true or false, they either instantiate or fail to instantiate particular properties.
So we have here two forms of unity that can occur between an object and a property:
predication and instantiation. But if we are directed upon entities that merely instantiate
various properties when we undergo an experience, we are stuck with the view that incites
the challenge from rationality. If experiential intentionality is a directedness upon mere in-
stantiations, then it must be the case that “immediate judgment is directly adapted to a
structure of some items in the environment, items selectively made present, but not synthe-
sized, by our “sensibility,” our distinctive capacities for sensory awareness” (Johnston [2006]
285). On this view, being directed upon an instantiation is no more rationally significant
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than being related to an instantiation. It is just a form of the sense-datum theory that
replaces mind-dependent instantiations with mind-independent instantiations.
So Mark Johnston is only partly correct when he remarks that “the “logical togetherness”
of the property of being a cube and the cube is not the same in the sensed exemplification
and the judgment. Instantiation is one thing; predication is another” (Johnston [2006] 284
fn. 16). Instantiation is indeed distinct from predication, but Johnston is incorrect when
he takes instantiation to be the form of unity present in sensed exemplifications. When I
perceive a red apple, I do not just perceive an object, an apple, and a property, a particular
shade of red. That is, I do not just stand in a relation to an object and the property it
instantiates. I perceive the apple being red. The latter manifests a form of unity distinct
from both predication and instantiation which I will refer to as exemplification.
An instantiation of a property by an object is not a predicational unity, it isn’t the sort
of thing that can be true or false, but it also isn’t the sort of thing that can account for
the truth and falsity of what we judge. If an experience is going to be rationally significant
it must “reveal things to be the way they would be judged to be in [a knowledgeable,
perceptually-based] judgement” (McDowell [2008] 9). But the “way things count as being
just where a certain thing counts as true to think”(Travis [2006] 178) is not the ‘way of being’
designated by instantiation, but by exemplification.30 That is, one must perceive something
being red, and not simply be directed upon an instance of red, if this episode is to explain
one’s coming to believe that something is red on its basis. Exemplification is a form of
unity that allows experience to play a rationally significant role that a mere relatedness to
property instantiations can not. Without this “sensible” articulation of that which is present
in experience into object and exemplified property one is not in a position to relate the one
to the other in a subject-predicate judgment in such a way that what experience presents
can be the sort of thing that a judgment advances as true.
So that upon which one is intentionally directed in experience must possess a certain form
of unity, that of exemplification, if experience is to execute its primary function, namely, to
afford its subject an opportunity to attend to, recognize, and think about something other
than herself. But this does not mean that concepts are present or actualized in experience,
30Travis makes the mistake of identifying this way of being with instantiation.
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at least not in the same manner that they are actualized in judgment. In order to be directed
upon an entity as exemplifying a particular property, one needn’t have the ability to judge
the corresponding proposition; in particular, one doesn’t have to possess the concept of the
exemplified property upon which one is directed.
It is still an open question whether these exemplifications are a product of a conceptual
synthesis. For example, there is the view that “we could not have intuitions, with their
specific forms of unity, if we could not make judgments with their corresponding forms of
unity. We can even say that the unity-providing function is essentially a faculty for discursive
activity, a power to judge. But its operation in providing for the unity of intuitions is not
itself a case of discursive activity” (McDowell [2008] 7).
Though I am uncertain whether this view is correct or not, I am at present inclined to
accept it. If true it would mean that experiential intentionality, even that minimal variety
which phenomenal presence realizes, must, if it is to execute its primary function of making
entities available as objects, be in part conceptual (at least in organisms with discursive con-
ceptual capacities). But experiential intentionality would also, in part, remain irreducibly
phenomenal. For while the form of unity present in that upon which one is directed may
depend upon the exercise of rational capacities, the appreciation of phenomenal presence
itself is not an appreciation of an exemplification but of one’s directedness upon an exem-
plification, and an appreciation of this manifest other directedness is an ineliminable and
intrinsically phenomenal aspect of experience.
But there remains an additional sense in which one’s discursive conceptual capacities
depend upon the form of intentionality that phenomenal presence realizes. This is the topic
of the next and final chapter.
5.4 APPENDIX B: THE SENSE OF OWNERSHIP IN BODILY
SENSATION
Consider bodily sensation, e.g. pains, throbs, tickles, cramps, aches, itches, etc. One of the
many phenomenally appreciable aspects of bodily sensation that supports the traditional
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view is what is commonly called the sense of ownership. When we undergo a bodily sensation,
the region that apparently instantiates the qualities we appreciate is not just one more among
the objects of perception. It is not merely a body that we feel, but our body.
The representationalist assimilation of sensational intentionality to perceptual intention-
ality seems to preclude a satisfactory explanation of this sense of ownership. For according
to the representationalist view, the objects and the modes of awareness involved in one’s
bodily sensations do not differ in kind from the objects and the modes of awareness involved
in the visual experiences that occur when one is looking at one’s body. Bodily awareness and
bodily-directed vision are both varieties of what Sydney Shoemaker calls ‘object-perception’
(Shoemaker [1994b]). They are both forms of perception that allow one to identify one’s
body as the object it is, i.e. to distinguish the physical object that is one’s body from other
perceptible physical objects, to track it through objective space, and to reidentify it over
time.
In an attempt to accommodate some sort of phenomenal intimacy in bodily sensation,
representationalists have adverted to the exclusivity of our sensory access to our own bodies
(e.g. Armstrong [1968] 307). But these moves only speak to the fact of ownership, a con-
tingent fact that can be overcome, in principle, by prosthetic extension. The empirical and
contingent informational links that obtain between our capacity for bodily awareness and the
physical entity that is our body do not explain the sense of ownership in bodily sensation.
Alternatively, representationalists often advert to peculiarities of the somatosensory field,
e.g. there are no points within the somatosensory field that do not fall within the boundaries
of the body that is its object (Martin [1995]) and the frame of reference relative to which
bodily sensations are located lacks a single egocentric origin (Bermu´dez [2006]). But none
of these moves grant bodily sensation the manifest connection to oneself qua experiential
subject that is constitutive of the sense of ownership.
I suggested earlier (§ 5.2), that the sense of subjectivity or interiority in phosphene expe-
riences consists in the absence of various “objectifying” features and the sense of subjectivity
or interiority in perceptual imagination is due to an appreciation of the experience’s subordi-
nacy to the spontaneity of our imaginative capacities. This pair of proposals may be correct
for their respective types of experience, but neither suffices to ground the sense of ownership
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in bodily sensation. The suggested explanation of the sense of subjectivity in phosphenes
consists in a lack of certain features. The phenomenality of bodily ownership, in contrast,
requires a positive characterization. The suggested explanation of the sense of subjectivity
in perceptual imagination is, in this way, positive. But the appreciation of the sort of mental
agency involved in imagination is external to the experience’s sensuousness. A satisfactory
characterization of the sense of ownership in bodily sensation should be more closely tied to
the specific types of sensuous element we appreciate therein.
Fortunately, there is a positive characterization of bodily sensation’s phenomenal charac-
ter that is capable of grounding the sense of ownership. First, I show that bodily sensation is
necessarily bound with a particular form of phenomenally conscious bodily awareness. Sec-
ond, I show that this particular form of bodily awareness is non-sensuous, non-presentational,
and is of one’s body as belonging to (or being an extension of) one’s self qua subject.
The form of bodily awareness relevant to our question is organized into a body-schema.
body-schema: To possess a body-schema is to have an integrated set of personal-level, non-
conceptual capacities that, when exercised, yields a phenomenally conscious appreciation
of one’s body. It comprises, but is not limited to, capacities to appreciate the structure,
boundaries, disposition, and orientation of one’s body and its parts.
Body-schemata occupy a middle ground between two other types of body-related state:
body-images and body-maps.31
body-image: To possess a body-image is to have an integrated set of personal-level, con-
ceptual capacities that, when exercised, yields a (possibly phenomenally conscious) rep-
resentation of one’s body. It comprises, but is not limited to,
(i) a set of beliefs about the function, nature, structure, boundaries, disposition, and
orientation of one’s body and its parts,
(ii) a capacity to semantically identify body-parts and give verbal reports of what is
going on in one’s body, and
31Paillard [1999], Gallagher [2005], and Vignemont [2007] also see the need to make the distinctions
between body-images, body-schemata, and the registration of bodily information, but draw these distinctions
in different ways.
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(iii) an integrated, multimodal perceptual representation of one’s body which includes a
visuo-spatial representation.
body-map: To possess a body-map is to have an integrated set of sub-personal, non-
conceptual capacities that, when exercised, yields a non-conscious registration of bodily
information. It comprises, but is not limited to, capacities to register information about
the structure, boundaries, disposition, and orientation of one’s body and its parts that is
needed for basic homeostatic regulation and for many aspects of an embodied organism’s
unreflective environmental coping.
On the one hand, body-schemata are like body-images inasmuch as both yield conscious
states of bodily awareness. On the other hand, body-schemata are like body-maps inasmuch
as both can arise without the exercise of the embodied individual’s conceptual capacities.
Bodily sensation and the body-schema are necessarily interconnected. For instance, we
always appreciate a bodily sensation’s sensuous elements as having a more or less definite
location. Now M. G. F. Martin observes that “the apparent location of a sensation can
determine the apparent extent of one’s body, such that wherever one feels a sensation to be
located, one thereby feels one’s body to extend to at least that point” (Martin [1993] 210).
This seems right and helps to explain phantom limb pain, the projection of bodily sensations
into prosthetic limbs and tools, and various sorts of proprioceptive illusion. One appreciates
the boundaries of one’s body as encompassing a bodily sensation’s apparent location even
when the correlative position of that felt location in the objective spatial order is outside
the actual boundary of one’s physical body.
I will call the organized totality of locations one’s bodily sensations can apparently
occupy one’s somatosensory space. The preceding claim can be expressed by saying that
the somatosensory space and the body-schema are coextensive. That is, at any given time,
the outer limit of one’s somatosensory space and the boundary of one’s apparent body will
be the same.
So to appreciate a bodily sensation as having a location is to appreciate it as being within
the boundaries of the body one is aware of in one’s body-schema. But it doesn’t follow that
our capacity to appreciate the location of bodily sensation is what enables us to become
aware of our bodies. In fact, the converse is true. Our capacity to appreciate the location of
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bodily sensations presupposes the possession of a body-schema and the capacities for bodily
awareness it comprises. The body-schema is the organizing form of bodily sensation and one
appreciates the location of bodily sensation in somatosensory space only by appreciating its
position in one’s apparent body.
So bodily sensation involves an appreciation of sensuous elements as having locations
within the system of organized bodily awareness that is our body-schema. But this is not
yet an account of the sense of ownership. For unless this form of bodily appreciation is an
appreciation of one’s body qua subject, an appreciation of the bodily self one is as such, it
will fall short.
The most popular representationalist views fail in just this respect. According to these
views, the mode of awareness involved in one’s body-schema does not differ in kind from
the mode of awareness involved in sensuous experience. This is implicit in the use of the
term ‘proprioception’ to refer to this form of bodily awareness and the previously popular
expressions ‘muscular sense’ and ‘innervation feelings’.
Consider the following illustrative passage,
In the case of pain, there is, I grant, a body[-schema]; and, in one way of talking, the pain in
the finger is located on that part of the body[-schema] representing the finger. But all this
really means is that there is, for each of us, a continuously updating sensory representation
of the sort found in general bodily feeling, and that the experience of a pain represents the
quality or qualities felt as unpleasant as being instantiated at a certain location within the
body space represented by the former representation. (Tye [2005] 109)
On this picture, one’s body-schema is constructed from below, as it were, out of the appre-
ciable locations of bodily sensation’s sensuous elements. There is no capacity of organized
bodily awareness over and above the capacity to undergo sensuous experiences.
But the basic phenomenal structure of such experiences is that of phenomenal presence.
The sensuous elements in these experiences are always present as other. And any form of
bodily awareness that consists entirely in this sort of appreciation will, at best, provide an
awareness of the body as an object, as something opposed to oneself qua experiential subject.
So our bodily awareness cannot consist in the appreciation of some novel and proprietary
class of sensuous elements nor in the appreciation of sensuous elements involved in our other
perceptual modalities. If we are to accommodate the the sense of ownership in bodily
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sensation, the body-schema must be a non-sensuous, and hence non-presentational, form of
phenomenally conscious bodily awareness.
A suggestion: it is not sensation that provides awareness of our bodies but our activity.
Bodily awareness is not presentational, it is practical. This form of awareness consists in the
exercise of a capacity to appreciate the space of possible bodily movements available to one
at a given time. This involves (i) a general appreciation of the possibilities for bodily acting
that come with having the kind of body one has (including bodily constraints like size and
strength of the limbs, kinematical constraints like the degree of freedom of the joints, etc.)
and (ii) an appreciation of which of these possible movements are available to one at a given
time given one’s current bodily disposition.
This form of practical bodily awareness is non-sensuous and non-presentational, so it can
be an awareness of one’s bodily self qua subject. What one appreciates in one’s body-schema
is not appreciated as other; it is an extension of our bodily selves and we appreciate it as
such. This systematic phenomenal manifestation of our capacities for bodily agency is the
organizing form of bodily sensation. It is the appreciation of a bodily sensation as being
located within our manifest, bodily selves that the sense of ownership consists in.
This is just the barest sketch of an account. And I endorse it only insofar as it enables
an awareness of one’s bodily self qua subject. But it shows that there is in principle a middle
ground between the traditional and representationalist views of experience. Bodily sensation
is intrinsically, essentially, and manifestly other-directed. But we can nevertheless appreciate
that upon which sensation is directed as belonging to our bodily selves in a way that the
objects of perceptual experiences do not.
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6.0 PHENOMENAL PRESENCE AND NON-EXPERIENTIAL
INTENTIONALITY
In this final chapter I will discuss the relationship between experiential intentionality, in
particular the kind of intentionality that phenomenal presence realizes, and non-experiential
intentionality, the kind of intentionality that occurs in our paradigmatically non-phenomenal
intentional states, e.g. occurrent, non-perceptual judgments.
6.1 COGNITIVE PHENOMENALITY
I mentioned earlier (§ 2.2.1) that it is increasingly common to attribute some sort of phe-
nomenal character to judgments. This claim, in its strongest form, is that “[e]ach type of
conscious thought—each state of consciously thinking that p, for all thinkable contents p—
has a proprietary, distinctive, individuative phenomenology” (Pitt [2004] 5). That is, there is
a specific phenomenality to thinking p, a phenomenality that is not appreciable in any other
sort of conscious mental state, and a change in either the attitude type—from believing p to
hoping or wondering p—or the particular content—from thinking p to thinking q—results in
a phenomenal change.
Though I am suspicious of the arguments used to establish such claims1, this view can
nevertheless be made consistent with the traditional view that denies phenomenality to
1Many of these arguments presuppose a perceptual model for knowledge of one’s own mental states; a
model according to which “[c]onsciousness is the perception of what passes in a man’s own Mind” (Locke
[1690/1975] II, I, §19). We know which particular conscious thought we are having on a given occasion, the
argument goes, by standing in something like a relation of acquaintance to the thought and it would not be
possible to identify one’s thoughts in this way unless each type of conscious thought possesses a proprietary,
distinctive, individuative phenomenal character (cf. ibid. 8 and Goldman [1993]).
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judgments. That is, if one takes cognitive phenomenality to be nonsensuous, then one can
maintain that a judgment’s total phenomenal character contains more than its sensuous phe-
nomenal character. That is, one can countenance cognitive phenomenality without accepting
a class of novel sensuous qualities that are only appreciable when one judges that something
is the case or is in some other non-experiential propositional attitude.
This is, as far as I can tell, what many proponents of cognitive phenomenality accept.
For example, one piece of evidence that supports the existence of cognitive phenomenality
is what Strawson calls ‘understanding experience’ (Strawson [1994]). There is a phenomenal
difference between hearing speech in a language that one understands and hearing speech in
a language that one does not understand. But this phenomenal contrast ought not be cashed
out in terms of sensuous phenomenal elements. It is not as if, in coming to understand a
bit of speech, one comes to appreciate something like new colors or sounds. This is why
Strawson can say that
the apprehension and understanding of cognitive content, considered just as such and in-
dependently of any accompaniments in any of the sensory-modality-based modes of imag-
ination or mental representation, is part of experience, part of the flesh or content of
experience, and hence, trivially, part of the qualitative character of experience. (ibid. 12;
emphasis mine)
So whatever cognitive phenomenality amounts to, it does not consist in an appreciation of
a novel class of sensuous elements.
This does not mean that one appreciates no sensuous elements when one judges that
something is the case. In fact, it might even be necessary that there be “some phenome-
nal consciousness—some sensed or imagined what-it-is-like quality—in the individual for a
thought to count as conscious in any sense” (Burge [1997] 386). But this sensuous phenome-
nality is not tied to the contents of one’s non-experiential thoughts and does not constitute,
even in part, its intentional directedness.
Given that phenomenal presence is only appreciable when one appreciates an experience’s
sensuous elements, it follows that the intentionality of one’s non-experiential thoughts and
judgments need not involve an appreciation of phenomenal presence. Non-experiential in-
tentionality is distinct from the kind of phenomenal intentionality that phenomenal presence
realizes.
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6.2 SELF-AWARENESS AND CRITICAL, REFLECTIVE REASONING
But there is, I will argue, a sense in which the intentionality of thought depends upon
phenomenal presence. The argument I outline for this priority can be viewed as an argument
against the possibility of angelic minds : finite beings that possesses a faculty for discursive,
reflective judgment and ratiocination but lack (or never exercise) a faculty for experience or
phenomenal appreciation.2
There are many ways in which experience could be said to be prior to discursive activity.
For example, Kant thought that “[t]here is no doubt whatever that all our cognition begins
with experience; for how else should the cognitive faculty be awakened into exercise if not
through objects that stimulate our senses [. . . a]s far as time is concerned, then, no cognition
in us precedes experience, and with experience every cognition begins” (Kant [1781/1998]
B1). But, as Kant here indicates, this is merely a temporal priority; experience is needed
only because it in part supplies the materials about which one thinks.
In what follows, I will argue that experience’s role is more fundamental. There is a way
in which an appreciation of phenomenal presence and the form of intentionality it realizes
is a necessary precondition for the possession of the conceptual capacities one needs in or-
der to achieve a first-personal understanding of non-experiential intentionality. Phenomenal
presence provides one with an irreducibly phenomenal form of self-awareness, what I will
call presentational self-awareness. Presentational self-awareness is not only a necessary pre-
condition for the more sophisticated varieties of self-awareness that one can achieve, but is
also a necessary precondition for the possession of the capacities one needs to be a critical,
reflective reasoner. Consequently, experiential phenomenality plays an essential role in our
achieving an awareness or understanding of ourselves as subjects of intentionally directed
states. I will first set out the conditions that must be in place for one to be a critical, reflec-
tive reasoner and then argue that these conditions cannot be met without an appreciation
of phenomenal presence.
2Given that the tradition typically takes angels to cognize principally by means of something like intel-
lectual intuition, the restriction to finite, discursive intellects prevents the argument from having significant
theological import. Angelic minds are also to be distinguished from philosophical zombies insofar as the
former notion is not committed to any view about the material reducibility of one’s intentional states.
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6.2.1 Critical, Reflective Reasoning
To possess a discursive intellect is not simply to be capable of a distinctively conceptual kind
of intentional directedness. It also requires an ability to reflect upon these intentional states
in a rational way. That is, one must be a critical, reflective reasoner—one must be able to
recognize, employ, evaluate, weigh, and criticize reasons for one’s thoughts, judgments, etc.
as reasons.3
Much of our reasoning occurs non-critically. We often reason in accordance with rational
norms without appreciating the mental states so-governed as reasons. Moreover, we normally
don’t reason about our thoughts but about their subject matter. Nevertheless, a critical
stance directed upon our thought contents and the rational relations among them must in
principle be available. Critical reasoning involves an ability to reflect upon one’s intentional
mental states themselves. That is, it involves an ability to appreciate that one is intentionally
directed upon a given subject matter and an ability to recognize that these intentional mental
states are subject to certain standards of theoretical and practical reason.
To achieve this understanding requires, at a minimum, the exercise of two essentially
first-personal, conceptual capacities:
(S1) the capacity to conceive oneself as a self, i.e. as a subject of intentional states, and
(S2) the capacity to conceive one’s intentional states as such, i.e. as being directed upon
entities beyond themselves (or upon themselves qua other).
In short, to understand the intentionality of one’s states—and, therefore, to be a critical,
reflective reasoner—requires the ability to think, in a distinctively first-personal manner, in
terms of self and other.
The argument for the necessity of sensuous experience can therefore be reduced to this:
one cannot possess the concepts self and other if one was never in a position to appreciate
phenomenal presence, that is, if one was never in a position to appreciate a sensuous element
in experience as other and as present before the self.
Now I have emphasized repeatedly that the notions of self and other employed in the
explication of phenomenal presence are not concepts (cf. § 3.2). To appreciate a sensuous
3Cf. Burge [1996] and Moran [2001].
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element as other is not to represent it or conceive it as possessing some property or as be-
longing to some class of entities. Nor is the form of self-awareness involved in an appreciation
of phenomenal presence, what I call presentational self-awareness, a reflective, conceptual
achievement. But I contend that presentational self-awareness is required in order for one to
possess the most basic form of reflective self-awareness, namely, apperceptive self-awareness,
and that the latter is required in order for one to possess (S1) and (S2).
6.2.2 Presentational Self-awareness and Apperceptive Self-awareness
Let me begin with the relationship between presentational self-awareness and apperceptive
self-awareness. The notion of presentational self-awareness has already made an appearance.
In chapter 3, I argued that an appreciation of phenomenal presence provides one with an
irreducibly phenomenal form of self-awareness.
Many agree that when one appreciates a sensuous element in experience, there must be
a subject to whom the sensuous element is present. Frege expresses this well when he says
The field and the frogs in it, the Sun which shines on them, are there no matter whether
I look at them or not, but the sense impression I have of green exists only because of me,
I am its owner. It seems absurd to us that a pain, a mood, a wish, should go around the
world without an owner, independently. A sensation is impossible without a sentient being.
The inner world presupposes somebody whose inner world it is. (Frege [1918/1997] 334)
But it is possible to maintain this while denying that this subject is itself appreciable in
experience. For this is just what many, following Hume, assert.
To advance the view that there is such a thing as presentational self-awareness is to go
beyond the mere claim that an experience’s sensuous elements are present to an experiencing
subject. It is to claim that the self before which the other is present in experience is itself
phenomenally appreciable. And this is just what I maintain.
Now the manner in which we appreciate the phenomenal self is not the same as that in
which we appreciate experience’s sensuous elements. Sartre recognizes this when he claims
that “[t]his self-consciousness we ought to consider not as a new consciousness, but as the
only mode of existence which is possible for a consciousness of something” (Sartre [1943/1956]
liv). So to appreciate the phenomenal self in experience is not for the self to be present in
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experience as other.
But this is not equivalent to the claim that the phenomenal self is no way phenomenally
manifest. For the intrinsic orientation of sensuous experience toward the other phenomenally
embodies its converse. That is, the sensuous elements in an experience are not just appreci-
ated as other but as present to self. To focus, as we must, on the other in experience is ipso
actu to appreciate its position with respect to our phenomenal selves. It is to appreciate
phenomenal presence. So presentational self-awareness is part of what it is for a particular
sensuous experience to to have a presentational character. The phenomenal self is not some-
thing that can be isolated and encountered in separation from an experience, but is rather
an essential position within an experience’s basic and intrinsic phenomenal structure. The
phenomenal self is part of the phenomenal manifestation of experience’s essential directed-
ness. And since phenomenal presence is not something incidental to an experience’s being,
since it is not something that an experience could lack without ceasing to be an experience,
presentational self-awareness is involved in all sensuous experience.
Presentational self-awareness is not the only variety of self-awareness. First, it is pre-
reflective. Second, phenomenal presence is the manifestation of particular sensuous expe-
rience’s intrinsic phenomenal structure. The most basic form of reflective self-awareness,
namely, apperceptive self-awareness, differs from presentational self-awareness in both of
these respects. Though there are many varieties of reflective self-awareness4, apperceptive
self-awareness is the most basic form.
4Though one can interpolate numerous additional varieties of reflective self-awareness, the following is a
fairly representative list organized in ascending order of sophistication:
(i) Apperceptive Self-awareness: awareness of oneself as a single, temporally extended, experiential subject
(ii) Physical Self-awareness: awareness of oneself (qua subject) as a physical whole with boundaries
(iii) Embodied Self-awareness: awareness of oneself (qua subject) as a single embodied owner of manifold,
bodily sensations
(iv) Agential Self-awareness: awareness of oneself (qua subject) as a single author/source of purposive actions
(v) Objective Self-awareness: awareness of oneself (qua subject) as one particular object located among
other objects in an objective, ordered world
(vi) Personal Self-awareness: awareness of oneself (qua subject) as a particular living, embodied human-
being with a complex psychological history that has a location within an objective, ordered world of
distinct physical objects and distinct personal subjects.
Some argue that awareness of the objective self partly constitutes apperceptive self-awareness (cf. Strawson
[1959/2006], Evans [1982], and Cassam [1997]). Some go even further and argue awareness of the embodied
or agential self partly constitutes objective self-awareness (cf. McDowell [1998c]). But no matter how com-
plicated experiential apperception turns out to be, there is no form of reflective self-awareness that is more
basic.
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Apperceptive Self-awareness: an awareness of oneself as a single, temporally extended,
experiential subject where (i) this awareness involves the exercise of a capacity to at-
tribute diachronic experiences to oneself qua subject, and (ii) the exercises of this capacity
for experiential self-attribution find articulation in uses of the first-person pronoun ‘I’.5
The apperceptive self is a pole of identity within the flux of experience; it is a principle
of identity that stands apart from and against the manifold of changing experiences of which
it is subject. Now insofar as the apperceptive self transcends any particular experience,
insofar as it serves as a pole of identity for a plurality of experiences thereby uniting them as
experiences within the same stream of consciousness, it is to be distinguished from anything
immanent to a particular experience itself. It is to be distinguished, therefore, from the
phenomenal self that is revealed through presentational self-awareness.
But this distinction is not, to invoke a bit of Cartesian terminology, a real distinction.
Though the apperceptive self can be distinguished from the experiences it unifies, it can-
not exist independently of them. The apperceptive self is, in Husserl’s famous phrase, “a
transcendency within immanency” (Husserl [1913/1982] § 57).
The apperceptive self is transcendent in that it is opposed to experiences themselves.
The apperceptive self has an experience. The phenomenal self is immanent in that it is
opposed to that which is present as other within an experience. The phenomenal self is not
something that stands opposed to the stream of consciousness, but is immersed in conscious
life as an integral part of its very structure. And it is only by seeing the apperceptive self as
constitutively dependent upon the phenomenal self that apperceptive self-awareness ceases to
be of a merely transcendental precondition for experience, a notion that is easily jettisoned,6
and can become a form of awareness of something that is immanent within our experiential
lives as they are lived.
5This second condition is, of course, related to Kant’s view that “the unity of consciousness” finds
expression in the ‘I think’ which can “accompany all my representations” (Kant [1781/1998] B131ff. and
A346ff.).
6This notion of the self has been rejected by classical phenomenologists (Sartre [1936/1957]) as well as
contemporary naturalists (Metzinger [2003]).
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6.2.3 Apperceptive Self-awareness and Critical, Reflective Reasoning
An angelic mind capable of critical, reflective reasoning would not only need to be able to
conceive of itself as a subject of multiple mental states. It would also have to conceive of
these states as being directed upon something distinct from itself qua subject. I am doubtful
that this can be accomplished without the sort of apperceptive self-awareness that I have
argued requires an appreciation of phenomenal presence. For in the absence of sensuous
experience, in the absence of the manifest otherness of experience’s sensuous elements, one
can, it seems, at best conceive of one’s mental states as actualizations of one’s capacities
for thought and judgment. The self that transcends and unites the various thoughts and
judgments of an angelic mind would essentially be a principle of activity or spontaneity and
the thoughts and judgments that are available for critical assessment would be modes or
actualizations of that principle. Of course, thoughts can arise unbidden. But passivity of
this sort does not amount to an appreciation of something as other than oneself.
A more thorough investigation of the resources available to the angelic mind would
be required to treat an appreciation of phenomenal presence as not only sufficient for the
possession of the capacities one needs to be understand one’s intentional states as such but
necessary for it. But these remarks serve as a reminder of the high demands that accompany
any such account and highlight the manner in which experiential phenomenality can meet
them.
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